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Abstract 
The value of the grand theories and the sacred rules advanced by economic elites in 
recent public policy debates is open to serious dispute. A more pragmatic, 
experimental, and eclectic approach to policy development is warranted, one that takes 
our traditions, our values, and the role of political compromise more seriously. 
A recent major policy debate at the Commonwealth level, the Australian Fair Trading 
debate, extending over the last twenty -five years is examined. This debate culminated 
in the 1997 Reid Report, leading to substantial legislation regulating business activity 
against the trend of recent economic rhetoric. The history of this long debate illustrates 
the influence of a strong faith in `the Market', and an associated discounting of the role 
of governments, in constraining and shaping public policy development. This policy 
discussion, like others, was impoverished by a failure to understand that the basic 
precondition for an effective capitalist system is a dynamic and effective civil society. 
What was involved in that debate about new Commonwealth regulation of unfair 
business practices were fundamental questions of the relationship between economics, 
ethics and the law raised. In particular it points to the use of economic efficiency as the 
dominant evaluative methodology and language in contemporary policy debates. The 
evaluation of these issues needs to be seen in the context of deeper debates about the 
nature of law, contract, and the epistemological status of economics as a scientific and 
moral discourse. These in turn need to be seen in the context of discourse on the nature 
of social order. 
The account points to the moral nature of the social order, in which the control of greed 
is a central concern. The disciplining of that greed is a prerequisite to any complex 
exchange economy. Ignoring the vulnerability of those systems, neo- classical economic 
analysis has effectively taken social order for granted in its search for an ahistorical, 
individualistic, mechanistic and naturalistic account of the economic system. It claims 
self- interest as the fundamental force driving economic and social activity providing a 
pseudo -scientific justification for greed and self- aggrandisement. More subtly, it 
promotes acquisitiveness, undermining relationships, as the basis of individual identity. 
It assumes and promotes contracts as the basis of those relationships and social and 
political system. 
This search is part of the Enlightenment's broader search for a naturalistic, 
individualistic, mechanistic, and universal account of our social system, divorced from 
any divine authority, and substituting Reason and Nature as the alternative sources of 
authority. That Enlightenment program has failed. Consequently, we now lack any 
generally accepted, satisfying justification for our moral values and of our social, 
political and economic arrangements. 
The Enlightenment's natural law outlook was central to Locke's justification of his 
social contract theory, and remains central to contemporary neo- classical economic 
analysis and its use in public policy formulation. The thesis traces the close historical 
and intellectual relationship between social contact theory, the doctrine of freedom of 
contract in classical contract law, and neo- classical economics. It relates the erosion of 
the medieval concern for mutual obligations in economic life to these intellectual 
developments. The recovery of a concern for equity throughout the twentieth century 
has been associated with the breakdown of nineteenth century explanatory theories and 
in particular the classical contract theory. 
There is no broad agreement on the foundations of our social system. Nevertheless, and 
in antagonism with the Enlightenment's anti -metaphysical aspirations, neo- classical 
economics now performs for contemporary policy elites the role of a static religion, 
justifying fundamental social and economic arrangements. In the case of the Fair 
Trading debate, however, these values, while they dominated the public discourse, did 
not prove decisive. Rather, it was a concern with fairness among backbench Liberals on 
the Reid Inquiry, the powerful influence of the small business lobby, and accidental 
political circumstances, that were decisive. Consequently, a powerful new and 
contingent impetus has been given to fairness in commercial dealings and to the judicial 
revival and extension of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis disputes the value of the all encompassing grand theories and the seemingly 
sacred rules advanced by economic elites in recent public policy debates. Economics 
does not, and cannot, provide the overarching theory of social action. Nor is there an 
ideal form of social or economic organisation against which to measure our institutional 
and organisational arrangements. Rather, a more pragmatic, experimental, and eclectic 
approach to policy development, is warranted, an approach which takes our traditions, 
our values, and the role of political compromise more seriously. 
Public policy debates in Australia, like those throughout the rest of the developed world, 
have been heavily influenced by `economic rationalism'. This is an approach to public 
policy development characterised by a strong faith in markets and a suspicion of 
government, a position closely aligned with much contemporary economic theorising. 
Indeed, economists are highly influential in contemporary public policy debates, an 
influence based on their claimed technical expertise and the alleged robustness of their 
theories. Economists dominate civil service recruitment to policy positions in many 
countries, including Australia. Consequently, such views have largely colonised the 
senior levels of the Commonwealth Public Service, particularly in the coordinating 
departments. This influence was manifested in the policy choices that resulted in the 
substantial downsizing of the Commonwealth public service following the election of 
the Howard government in 1996 and its major program cuts in the name of fiscal 
responsibility. 
The Fair Trading debate, a major policy debate at the Commonwealth level, extending 
over the last twenty -five years, is used in this account to illustrate the influence of 
economic rationalist thinking on recent public policy formulation. The Fair Trading 
debate culminated in the Reid Report in 1997, which in turn led to substantial 
amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 to prohibit unfair business conduct: an 
outcome which ran against the trend of economic rationalist rhetoric. This outcome was 
largely the result of contingent circumstances, in that the responsible Minister, who 
opposed such regulations, lacked the political skills to deflect the pressures for change 
generated by small business. The Minister was forced to resign his portfolio after it was 
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shown that he had a serious conflict of interest between his private interests and his 
responsibilities for fair trading issues. 
The Fair Trading debate was impoverished by a failure on the part of the major 
participants to appreciate that a dynamic and effective civil society is a precondition to 
an effective capitalist system. In such a system, the pursuit of individual and 
institutional choice and `self- interest' is heavily constrained both by internalised moral 
codes, and by externally imposed social sanctions. Here, answers to these questions are 
sought in recent politico /economic history, placing them in the context of a larger and 
deeper debate about the law, particularly the law of contract, and the moral foundations 
of our society. 
This examination of the Australian Fair Trading debate takes place against powerful 
currents in philosophical and moral discourse, currents that undermine the certainty of 
our knowledge and the foundations of our moral theorising. These currents are 
important because the Fair Trading debate raises fundamental questions about the 
relationship between our moral values, legal rules and the regulation of economic 
activity. Consequently, here, the Australian debate and the conceptual issues involved, 
are placed in their historical context, as such a historical context is necessary to a proper 
understanding of the debate. It will be found that certain crucial, but hidden underlying 
assumptions, are central to that debate. These assumptions are the autonomy of the 
economic system and the primacy of the economic over the social. They underlie 
claims made throughout the debate. These assumptions also underlie the development 
of the doctrine of freedom of contract, the central doctrinal objection to government 
regulation of unfair business conduct, a development that parallels the development of 
social contract ideas and relies on the same Natural Law Outlook. 
The debate also provides a useful illustration of the entrenched power of economic 
methodologies and values as the dominant evaluative consideration used in 
contemporary policy debate. This influence is reflected in the use, throughout, of the 
rhetoric of classical contract law, developed in the nineteenth century under the 
influence of positivism and the classical economists, the contemporary rhetoric of 
minimum effective regulation, concerns about the impact on transaction costs, and 
theoretical arguments about economic efficiency. Against this, there was no 
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corresponding attempt on the part of the government to evaluate the costs of unfair 
business conduct. Consequently, the debate remained largely at the speculative level, 
although there were appeals to anecdotal evidence by the small business lobby. What is 
also evident is that it was a debate that could not be settled on the basis of current moral 
theories based on individualistic premises, which are incommensurable and 
incompatible, but could only be mediated by the political process. Indeed, it can also be 
seen as part of a broader and more basic political controversy that cannot be resolved 
using current theorising based on individualistic premises. 
Contracts, broadly defined, and property rights are the central organising techniques of 
the market system. Indeed, the concept of contract is frequently used as the 
fundamental explanatory device in `explaining' the social order. The doctrine of 
freedom of contract is central to the conceptual framework within which economics and 
economic rationalism operate. It was a doctrine that developed within the English 
common law tradition, a tradition which Australia inherited, under the influence of the 
Natural Law Outlook. The development and subsequent decline of the doctrine of 
freedom of contract is one of the major intellectual movements of modern times. 
The development of the doctrine of freedom of contract, a development that parallels the 
development of social contract theory, followed the gradual breakdown of the medieval 
idea that people owed a wide range of duties to their feudal lord, other people, the 
Church and to God. Among those obligations was an obligation to behave justly in 
economic transactions. Thus the idea of a just price or wage was at the centre of 
medieval economic thought, even if the privileges of the medieval elite are now seen as 
exploitive. With the breakdown of these ideas, property holders, who had formerly been 
tenants of the crown, came to see themselves as owners, while ideas about the 
ownership also became more absolute. These changes made it easier for the propertied 
elite to see civil society as based on a social contract, not Divine Law. For both Hobbes 
and Locke, the primary function of the state was the maintenance and enforcement of 
rights of property and contract. Together with Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and the 
associated idea of a harmony of interests, these theorists provided the moral justification 
for the property and contract -based society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
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There was a close connection between economic liberal ideas and the rule of law as it 
came to be understood after 1688. The value of individual freedom and free choice was 
closely connected with the idea that the law should be regular, certain, and subject to 
interpretation by `independent' judges: thus the rule of law is, itself, a politically biased 
ideology. As the common law grew increasingly to recognise the generality of the 
binding nature of contracts, contracts began to be seen as being about promises, wills, 
and intentions and not about particular relationships or particular transactions. 
But the common law was not the only tradition in English legal practice. Equity 
consisted originally of a body of rules and procedures that grew up separately from the 
common law, and was administered in different courts. These courts exercised a 
jurisdiction which did not override the common law but which remedied its 
imperfections. The Chancery tradition was one of regulation, protection and 
paternalism. The rationalisation of legal practice in the nineteenth century led to the 
common law and equity being merged and administered by a single set of courts. Thus 
the Chancery tradition was gradually eclipsed as the doctrine of freedom of contract 
gained ascendancy, though it was never completely abandoned. At the same time, the 
role of juries in determining contractual damages, with their bias in favour of the 
underdog, was also gradually whittled away. This rationalisation of the law and the 
associated whittling away of equity was influenced by a new positivist legal literature 
looking for legal principles based on rational first principles and by the ideas of the 
classical economists. 
In addition, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, popularisers of economics 
began to propagate laissez-faire policies. These ideas may well have had more 
influences on judges and judge -made law than on the other organs of government. 
Nevertheless, the very heyday of the sanctity of contract was also the period in which 
the whole machinery of government was created in Britain virtually out of nothing. The 
growth of this machinery and its associated social legislation had a profound impact on 
the whole idea of a contract -based society. Thus, by the late nineteenth century the 
primacy of contract was under direct political attack in England. This change is perhaps 
most clearly marked with the passage of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, an act which was 
subsequently adopted virtually unchanged in every Australian State and Territory. Thus 
it is clear that, while the idea of freedom of contract as an absolute ideal gained 
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credibility and influence in the nineteenth century, it was eclipsed by the end of the 
century as the unjust consequences of reliance on this principle began to sink in. 
In respect of the Commonwealth of Australia, this increasing willingness of 
governments to legislate to regulate commercial activity is reflected in general attempts 
to regulate restrictive trade practices such as in the Australian Industries Preservation 
Act 1906. This Commonwealth act and its successors were rendered ineffectual by 
conservative judicial interpretations, partly under the continuing influence of the 
doctrine of freedom of contract. It was not until the Trade Practices Act 1974 that 
effective general Commonwealth legislation was directed against restrictive and unfair 
business practices, directly interfering with freedom of contract. 
There were approximately eighteen major reports, or legislative proposals, dealing with 
proposals to amend the Trade Practices Act 1974 to strengthen the regulation of unfair 
business practices. The most recent of these was a reference to the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (the Reid 
Committee) in June 1996. This committee produced a bipartisan report, Finding a 
balance Towards Fair Trading in Australia in May 1997. The Committee concluded 
that concerns about unfair business conduct towards small business were justified and 
should be addressed urgently. To this end the Reid Committee made wide -ranging 
recommendations designed to induce behavioural change on the part of big business. 
They included proposals for separate strong franchising legislation and very strong 
amendment of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to prohibit unfair business conduct. The 
strength and breadth of the Committee's recommendations came as a surprise to many 
observers as it ran directly counter to the rhetoric of deregulation surrounding recent 
public policy debate, including that contained in its own terms of reference. 
The report trigged a debate in the media, recycling the positions that had been advanced 
over the previous twenty -five years. Political fate took a hand in these proceedings 
when the responsible Minister, who was opposed to the Committee's recommendations, 
was forced to resign for a breach of the Ministerial Code of Conduct. Finally the 
Government in September 1997 accepted the thrust of the bulk of the Reid Committee's 
recommendations, including greatly broadened unconscionable conduct provisions. 
Since the enactment of the amendments the Australian Competition and Consumer 
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Commission, which is responsible for the administration of the Trade Practices Act 
1974, has actively sought to bring representative actions to test the extent of the new 
provisions. These changes further erode classical contract law, authorising the courts to 
examine a broad range of factual issues in contract disputes involving small business, 
involving both procedural and substantive issues, in a way inconsistent with the 
classical law. While the courts are still to react to the new legislation, there is a strong 
possibility that these legislative provisions, and in particular the requirement to act in 
good faith, will migrate to the common law. 
The Australian Fair Trading debate also picked up the issues raised during the 
development of the doctrine of freedom of contract. This positivist doctrine came to full 
development in the last half of the nineteenth century; the creation of judges and thesis 
writers influenced by social contract ideas, classical economic thought and the 
associated ideology of voluntariness. This classical view of contract involved a process 
of abstraction, generalisation and systemisation in a vain attempt to create a unitary 
scientific theory of contract, free of moral valuations. Thus, it was part of the 
Enlightenment's attempt to separate the public from the private realm. Central to this 
concept was the idea that contracts arose from the will of parties and not as a result of 
public law. The classical view of contract relied on a Natural Law obligation to honour 
promises, a claim that the rule of law provided norms independent of politics and 
conceived of courts as rule enforcers rather than settlers of disputes. All of this involved 
a commitment to rigid mechanical decision rules that were to be implemented in a 
mechanical manner, a replica of the determinism of Newtonian physics. But this was an 
idea that could not be sustained: contracts are clearly enforced for reasons of public 
policy, and are sometimes not enforced for similar reasons. In any event, the refusal to 
inquire into the circumstances surrounding contracts, that was associated with classical 
contract law, is inconsistent with its own will theory of contract. The realisation of this 
fact has led to the replacement of the will theory by an objective theory and then, in the 
United States, at least, with a process of doctrinal disintegration. Adding to the 
confusion is the realisation that the grounds for equitable non- enforcement also do not 
fit under a unified doctrine. Thus, contract theory exhibits the same confusion that 
exists in moral philosophy. Nevertheless there is a growing recognition in common law 
countries of an obligation of good faith and a duty of care in contractual obligations. 
These developments are consistent with a relational view of contractual arrangements. 
7 
Throughout the Fair Trading debate there was an almost overwhelming deference to the 
concern for `economic efficiency' over other values. Thus, justifications for regulatory 
action to deal with such unfair conduct have inevitably had to be couched in terms of 
economic efficiency benefits' and evaluated in these terms. Indeed, the issues of 
'uncertainty in commercial arrangements' and `freedom of contract' have been the most 
significant objections to stronger unfair trading laws. Nevertheless, none of the interest 
groups involved attempted any sophisticated analysis of the role of contract in the 
market system. While much was made of the danger of uncertainty in commercial 
dealings, many of the contracts involved provide the weaker party with little certainty 
about the environment that they faced. It seems unlikely that inexperienced small 
business people are engaged in a process of rationally allocating the risks associated 
with those relationships as claimed by neo- classical economics. In these circumstances, 
a sounder theoretical basis for describing contractual relationships is required, one that 
involves power as an important element. While the language of minimum government 
`intervention' was heard frequently, no one attempted a positive justification of the 
continued application of state coercive power in support of the institution of contract. 
On the contrary, it was the small business groups who were seen as demanding 
government regulation and who had to justify that demand. 
In regard to any broadening of the doctrine of unconscionability, it was argued that any 
change would involve the courts in the application of value judgements and that was 
undesirable. In particular, a rule was claimed to be preferable because it would promote 
consistency, predicability and uniformity in decision making. But no substantive 
argument was advanced to support the primacy of those values. It is questionable 
whether such a rule is defensible in the face of abundant evidence that has accumulated 
over the last century that the only possible rule, that contracts will always be enforced, 
has already been found wanting. It also involves a simplistic understanding of 
regulatory strategy, assuming that such a rule, is enforceable in practice. Given 
inequality in the distribution of financial resources, the expense and complexity of legal 
proceedings, and informational asymmetry, such an assumption appears heroic. In this 
context the idea of minimum and effective regulation might be said to be mutually 
inconsistent. Effective regulation relies ultimately on a comprehensive suite of 
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regulatory powers combined with the resources and the will necessary to back the use of 
those powers. 
THE UNDERLYING PERSPECTIVE 
The Australian Fair Trading debate involved two key assumptions, the perceived 
autonomy of market institutions, and the primacy of the economic over the social. 
These assumptions underpin the excessive faith in markets that characterises economic 
rationalism. Consequently the analysis can begin by looking at these two key 
assumptions in the context of some key reminders about the nature of society and social 
order. This involves a recognition that people are social animals whose social 
relationships are central to their sense of identity. The individual requires a stable and 
coherent social environment in order to survive, to prosper and to develop. This 
recognition must lead to a rejection of any attempt to assign explanatory primacy to 
either the individual or to the group. Indeed, our earliest hominoid ancestors lived as 
members of social groups and the evolution of the human involved a complex process in 
which the organised hunting of large animals, life in organised social groups, and the 
making and use of tools were interconnected. The whole pattern evolved together. 
Thus, our biological nature is not prior to culture, but is expressed through, and 
moderated by, culture. The process of socialisation, the acquisition of this cultural 
knowledge, is a process of `moralisation'. Indeed, human uniqueness consists of an 
ability to control our animality, through a system of discipline. It is the control of 
greed, broadly defined, which constitutes a principal achievement of culture over 
animality. And it is this system of social control, involving social norms, primary laws, 
and religious and ethical teachings, which makes complex organisation possible. The 
development of this system of social control has involved a long process of moral and 
social experimentation, to select ways of behaving that mitigates the war of all on all. 
This process of cultural development is not a once -for -all influence, but is ongoing. 
It has long been recognised that the maintenance of the social order involves a moral 
struggle within individuals and between individuals. Contemporary Christian theology 
talks about humankind's `tom condition' in referring to what has more traditionally 
been called original sin. This doctrine saw philosophical expression in Hobbes's war of 
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all on all, but secular discourse has largely forgotten this insight into the fragility of the 
social order. 
The maintenance of social order involved the creation of moral institutions backed by 
coercion. Nevertheless, convention is society's strongest preservative against anarchy 
and the tyranny of all- pervading punitive and coercive law. Neither conventions, nor 
laws, can be reduced to rationality or, indeed, to any other form of optimising 
mechanism. While morality is often conceived of as a system of rules, moral 
development proceeds along two different paths giving rise to two different moral 
languages, a language of rights that justify separation and a language of responsibility 
that sustains relationships. 
No dominant theory has emerged to explain the existence of social order and of our 
political and moral institutions. Indeed, the whole project seems to confuse the need to 
explain what happened with a desire to provide a theoretical or Euclidian justification 
for our moral judgements. While there are four dominant theoretical approaches to the 
social order problem - private interest, situational analysis, consensus and conflict 
approaches - there is no need to finally choose between these perspectives, as each can 
contribute to understanding. 
While there has been extensive academic discussion of the relationship between the 
economic system and the social system dating back to Smith, most recent neo- classical 
economists have tended to neglect the dependency of the economic system on the social 
system. This neglect is implicit in the whole neo- classical research program which is 
committed to explanation in terms of methodological individualism, reductionism, 
instrumental rationality, the Newtonian metaphor, and self- interest as the fundamental 
social force. The consequence is that society is assumed to be a form of contract, an 
understanding has its roots in the whole Enlightenment program. 
Nevertheless, this contemporary neglect of the relationship between the economic and 
social systems is surprising given the weight of earlier discussion. For example, Smith 
saw that the economic system depended on rules and institutions. Marx emphasised that 
the market consisted of social relationships, but saw the moral `superstructure' of a 
society as adapted to its sociotechnical or economic `substructure'. Weber saw 
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economic action as social, emphasising the autonomy of social orders, law, politics and 
religion. In his view, market exchange was exceptional, the most instrumental and 
calculating social action possible. Durkheim saw the division of labour as the principal 
vehicle for creating cohesion and solidarity in modern society, but with a structure of 
norms and regulations surrounding economic exchange and mading it possible. Polanyi 
takes up the same theme seeing the typical market as just one of many possible forms of 
organised exchange. He believed that a self- adjusting market could not exist for any 
length of time without destroying the human and natural substance of society. The later 
Hayek also makes clear that what he had called the `spontaneous' order of the market 
was dependent on the system of abstract rules, deep- rooted convictions and moral rules, 
the product of civilisation and the institutional infrastructure of the economic system. 
Granovetter reminds us that economic institutions are socially constructed and that the 
pursuit of economic goals is accompanied by non -economic ones. North noted that 
complex impersonal exchange is the antithesis of the conditions under which 
cooperation arises from rational self- interest in game theory. Like Elster and Coleman, 
he concluded that rational self -interest can not explain human sociability. 
It is concluded from that survey of views that the economy is a sub -system nested 
within a more encompassing social context, though this does not preclude the view that 
a process of mutual conditioning is involved. Thus, neither of the two fundamental 
assumptions underlying contemporary policy discourse, the autonomy of the market and 
the priority of the market over the social can be sustained. This involves a rejection of 
the reductionist and economic rationalist position that rational self- interest is the 
fundamental force sustaining society. It also involves a rejection of a social contract 
account of the social order. 
In developing its argument further, our account points to the fact that a search for an 
unassailable basis for society has long been part of the Western political and 
philosophical tradition. This has involved a search for an ahistorical account, partly 
because an historical, evolutionary account was not fully available until the emergence 
of Darwinism in the nineteenth century. But it is also because, in our intellectual 
tradition, such an historical account is not seen as providing an adequate philosophical 
or scientific explanation. 
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The polis of classical Greece provided one such intellectual model, while St Thomas 
Acquinas provided another. These models provide an explanation in terms of some 
ultimate good or Divine purpose. What is important for this study is the fact that the 
medieval Aristotelian concept of man as a political and social being gradually broke 
down and this brought with it a need for a new explanation. This change was associated 
with the decline of the moral and secular authority of the Western Christian Church as a 
result of the Reformation and the religious and political strife that followed. The 
succeeding intellectual climate was defined by Deism and a distancing of God from 
human affairs. Consequently, a direct transcendental grounding of human affairs was 
no longer seen as providing an adequate explanation. Following the Enlightenment's 
rejection of Christianity's claim to an historical revelation, that was the source of truth 
and value, the asserted authority to teach on faith and morals passed from ecclesiastical 
authorities to political and moral philosophers, who assumed such an authority because 
of their special knowledge of the Truth and of Natural Laws. What remained in Deism 
as a remanent of God's presence in the world was the faculty of reason, the holiness of 
rationally. There was an associated belief that Natural Laws had been created to ensure 
human happiness. Consequently the discovery of, and obedience to, such Laws was 
essential to human happiness. The development of natural moral theory is implicit in 
such an approach. It was an approach that progressively divinised Nature and human 
Reason, providing a secular source of meaning and justification as comprehensive and 
as dogmatic as the religion it replaced. 
This trend was also associated with the development of science and a desire to find a 
scientific and natural explanation of all phenomena. But in this era what was scientific 
was modelled on Galileo and Newton. Thus, Hobbes provided an explanation of the 
social and political order in which the pursuit of power and pleasure was the 
sociological equivalent of gravity. It was Hobbes, and then Locke, who created a new 
form of political theorising and who sowed the intellectual seeds of economic liberalism 
and ultimately economic rationalism. The breakdown of medieval ideas about social 
duties allowed ideas about property rights to become more absolute. Locke's theory, in 
which property rights were seen as being pre -social and a natural right based on Natural 
Law, served the interests of the propertied classes, and thus they came to see society as 
based on a social contract. With the power and economic interests of the social elite not 
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far from the surface it was a social contract in which the social obligations also 
associated with Natural law were soon overlooked and then forgotten. 
However, by the time of the Scottish Enlightenment there was a greater awareness that 
the existence of individuals in society was problematic. In trying to deal with this 
problem, the same type of political and moral theorising, the natural law outlook that 
was found in Hobbes and Locke, continued to be used . Thus, for Smith, the concept of 
moral affections and natural sympathy provided the direct grounding that had previously 
been provided by God. Smith's account was also thoroughly Newtonian in that moral 
sentiment balanced the force of self- interest. Indeed, for Smith, this balance was the 
result of Divine providence, Smith acknowledging the influence of Stoic philosophers. 
Civil society views under the Scottish Enlightenment's were directed against restricting 
reason to what we now call, following Max Weber, instrumental rationality. But the 
assumed unity of reason and moral sentiment began to unravel with David Hume. 
Indeed, for Hume, society was not founded to protect property rights. There was no 
social contract, nor was there any state of nature. The allegiance owed to the state and 
the obligation to perform contract were both based on self- interest. By the nineteenth 
century, the aspiration to create a science of morals and legislation became focussed on 
utilitarianism. It provided an alternative ahistorical `scientific' account of moral and 
political theory also based on a mechanistic Newtonian model in a somewhat similar 
way to Locke. Thus Bentham, like his predecessors in the Enlightenment tradition, 
started from an understanding of human nature and tried to deduce all institutional and 
legal arrangements from that nature. But the attraction of utilitarianism was undermined 
by a refusal of most people to believe that ideas of pleasure and pain were the only 
source of human motives. 
The social evolutionists of the late nineteenth century, the next theorists in this tradition, 
sought to provide an alternative account of the social and political order that was also 
both scientific and historical. In the process they abandoned the psychological 
reductionism that had characterised Hobbes and Locke and many subsequent theorists. 
In this social and political theorising, the uniformity of nature acquired a logical status 
and a numinous aura, which made it a substitute for the idea of God. Spencer, the most 
extreme of these theorists, was an evolutionary determinist who saw social competition 
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as part of the process of evolution. Thus competition and survival of the fittest were 
justified as a natural scientific law. Spencer was, therefore, an extreme defender of 
laissez-faire and of freedom of contract. Subsequently, it came to be realised that this 
form of evolutionary theorising justified any existing social and political system, and 
thus was thought wanting. It also foundered on a reluctance to derive an `ought' from 
an `is'. 
In summary, with Hobbes and Locke we saw the beginnings of a new type of political 
and moral theorising which sought its ground in the natural world, individualism and a 
so- called scientific perspective. While these ideas do not make a coherent whole, they 
constitute the complex of ideas, the tradition, on which economic rationalism dogma 
depends. Thus with Locke we see property rights and contract used to explain the 
existence of society. With such theorists as Mandeville, Hume and Smith we see the 
gradual transformation of self- interest from being a source of moral failure to a source 
of public good, albeit moderated by a dash of sympathy for others, and by competition. 
And through the alchemy of the Newtonian metaphor, these naturalist justifications for 
self- interest were turned into a formal theory. And with Spencer the moderation was 
removed and we see an attempt to justify naked self -interest and the survival of the 
fittest. All these theoretical efforts shared Locke's attempt to privilege the language of 
natural science over other vocabularies, something that is characteristic of contemporary 
economic rationalism. 
There has recently been a major revival in social contract theorising with Rawls and 
Nozick, who lie squarely within the above tradition. Indeed, the idea of social 
relationships as being contractual is at the core of the ideology of Western capitalism. 
The faith that is placed in this tradition, and this form, of political and moral theorising, 
this technique, cannot be sustained. Indeed, a decisive break is occurring in our world - 
view. The belief that truth was accessible through language has been undermined, 
because language has come to be seen as a self -contained system in which reference is 
to the system itself. At the same time, the Newtonian, mechanistic world -view has also 
been undermined by relativity and quantum mechanics. Even inanimate entities are to 
be understood as subjects that adapted to their environment. Consequently, reality can 
no longer be understood solely by analysis and reduction to component parts. 
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Understanding has to be approached in a holistic manner. Indeed, even when taking a 
holistic view there always is uncertainty as to the completeness of that view. The result 
has been a loss of any sense of objective certainty in the physical sciences or in the 
political -cultural sphere. 
The present author approaches this attack on Modernity from the perspective of a 
Christian in the reformed tradition, rejecting the Enlightenment's attack on revealed 
religion and the associated search for an alternative source of certainty. While absolute 
truth must exist that truth beyond human reach and our search for truth is personal, 
limited, and tainted by self -interest and sin. This view leads directly to a rejection of the 
absolutist claims of economic rationalism, and of rationalism more generally. 
Our justification of this position in a secular fashion involves a number of closely 
interrelated influences that support the Enlightenment faith; the problematic distinction 
usually made between positive and normative economics, the privileged epistemological 
status of science, the excessive faith in rationalism, the questionable status of 
economics, and the relevance of moral philosophy to public policy formulation. 
The first of these influences in modernist theorising, is the distinction social scientists 
have often made between science and normative theorising. It reflects the recent 
philosophical distinction between `is' and `ought', `facts' and `values'. In economics, 
the distinction between positive and normative economics dates from Nassau Senior and 
John Stuart Mill. This positivist turn may have been a reaction to the progressively 
widening of the scope of science, and a nostalgia for the Platonist demand for a single, 
universal scientific method. 
But it is a mistake to believe that explanatory theories occupy a privileged 
epistemological position compared to normative theories. Further, this account question 
whether any social science can be value free, or indeed, that science begins from a 
foundation where certain things are beyond doubt. The positivist distinction between 
facts and values can only be sustained if there is a value -free vocabulary that renders 
sets of `factual' statements commensurable. But there is no such vocabulary. Indeed, 
seventeenth century science and philosophy confused the fact that Galileo's vocabulary 
worked with an absence of metaphysical comfort. The resulting Cartesianism was a 
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philosophical fantasy in the spirit of Plato. It involved a state of consciousness 
combining inarticulate confrontation, and formulation through language. From this 
perspective the idea of value neutrality is simply another unsustainable aspect of 
Modernity. 
The privileged status of science is also under sustained attack. Certainly the 
hypothetico- deductive model of scientific investigation has been overthrown. Strict 
justification simply does not exist. It relies on belief in absolute distinctions between 
logic and language, language and reality, and theory and practice, beliefs that are 
untenable. Consequently, the belief that scientific knowledge is an accurate, let alone a 
full representation of what is out there has to be abandoned. Rather, knowledge is 
socially justified belief and there is no need to consider it as accuracy of representation. 
This is not some minor quibble within the philosophy of science but a fundamental 
attack on the entire Enlightenment project, the tradition founded by Descartes. The 
paradigm of human activity in the Western philosophical tradition has been knowing, 
the possession of justified true belief, or belief so intrinsically persuasive as to make 
justification unnecessary. Consequently, Western philosophy's central concern has 
been to construct a general theory of representation. But there is no `Archimedean 
point' that would enable one to have a foundation to all knowledge, and thus it is 
necessary to give up the desire for a uniform and normalised sense of truth. The search 
for a transcendent, indeed transcendental, form of justification is a consequence of the 
way Christianity and other forms of transcendentalism have shaped Western culture. 
The modern Cartesian -Kantian attempt to find non -historical conditions for any possible 
historical development provides intellectuals with a substitute for religion, justifying 
their activities as intellectuals and providing their lives with significance. 
One consequence of these pretensions is that we are the heirs of three hundred years of 
rhetoric about the importance of distinguishing sharply between science and religion, 
science and politics, science and art, science and philosophy and so on. These 
pretensions, and these distinctions, are absurd. Rather, justification is a social 
phenomenon, a conversation and not a transaction between a knowing subject and 
reality. Thus philosophy's attempt since the Greeks to explain `rationality' and 
`objectivity' in terms of the conditions of representation is a self- deceptive effort to 
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eternalise the normal discourse of the day. It forms part of an attempt to spell out the 
Greek claim that the crucial difference between men and beasts is that we alone can 
know universal truths, numbers, essences, the eternal. The alternative conversational 
approach, hermeneutics, is not a successor to epistemology but an expression of hope 
that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled. 
Indeed, the very project of modernity has lost momentum. As indicated earlier, the 
philosophers of the seventeenth century were responsible for new ways of thinking 
about nature and society. In particular, Galileo in physics, Descartes in epistemology, 
and Hobbes in political theory committed us to new and `scientific' ways, and the use of 
more `rational' ways of dealing with the problems of life. It was assumed that uniquely 
rational procedures existed for handling the intellectual and practical problems in any 
field of study, procedures which involved setting aside superstition, mythology and 
tradition and attacking problems free of local prejudice and transient fashion. But such 
philosophical theories overreach the limits of human rationality. 
In the state of general crisis that was the seventeenth century, the scope for reasonable 
debate was narrowed, limiting `rationality' to theoretical arguments that achieved a 
quasi -geometrical certainty or necessity. This narrowing involved a rejection of the 
humanist values of the Renaissance, its sceptical tolerance, and its practical doubt about 
the value of theory in such fields as theology, natural philosophy, metaphysics and 
ethics. For the humanist philosophers of the Renaissance, as for Aristotle, the good had 
no universal form. Consequently, sound moral judgement always respected the detailed 
circumstances of specific kinds of cases. In contrast to Aristotle's practical wisdom, the 
dream of seventeenth century philosophy and science was Plato's demand for 
theoretical grasp. As a consequence, these seventeenth century philosophers set aside 
any serious interest in the different kinds of practical knowledge, the oral, the particular, 
the local and the timely. Logical analysis was separated from and elevated far above the 
study of rhetoric, discourse and argumentation. Similarly, a distrust of human feeling 
reinforced the Cartesian or calculative idea of `rationality'. As argued above these 
rationalist dreams were always absurd. Consequently, the charms of logical rigour have 
to be unlearned. What is needed is not new, more comprehensive, universal and 
timeless systems of theory, but limits the scope of even the best -framed theories, and a 
rejection of the intellectual reductionism that became entrenched during the ascendancy 
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of rationalism. It calls for more sub -disciplinary, trans -disciplinary, and multi- 
disciplinary reasoning in the search for patterns that can provide some guidance for 
action. 
The next step in the argument is an examination of the implications of its critique of 
rationalism, and the associated rejection of the value free status of social theorising, for 
the self- understanding of economics. In response to these developments, some 
economists have begun to take a hermeneutical approach to economics, claiming that 
economists have begun to see that their talk is rhetoric. Some have also attacked the 
pretentious scientism in which economists couch their mutual persuasions, seeing 
economics as ideological, a belief system conditioned by its political and social 
premises. While these insights have encountered strong resistance, they have the effect 
of undermining the confidence that would otherwise be placed on the pronouncements 
of economists on public policy issues. 
It is at this point that we encounter the superficially helpful suggestion that economists 
should study moral philosophy if they are to offer policy advice. But such a strategy 
cannot escape the damming criticism of rationalism. The Enlightenment's search for 
basic principles of ethical action has run into the sand. The Enlightenment, having 
discounted the virtues and dismantled the metaphysical and teleological superstructures 
of the medieval world, has left a vacuum. All other sources of meaning and belief have 
been dismissed for the arena of public debate to the internal thought processes of the 
individual. They have been `privatised'. Consequently, no other tradition can assert 
itself as the sole claimant of a shared and public conception of what the good might be. 
Indeed, conflicting moral traditions are embedded in our moral vocabulary, culture and 
traditions. 
Indeed, contemporary moral philosophy is characterised by radical disagreement, 
interminable argument and incommensurable premises. There is no rational way of 
securing moral agreement in our culture, that economists can access through moral 
philosophy. The study of moral philosophy cannot protect economic analysis of public 
policy problems from value judgements. If economic analysis is not neutral the next 
step is surely not a further adventure into the complexities of moral theory. Rather, the 
questions that should be asked are what values are embedded in economic analysis, 
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itself, and how well do these values align with the values of the communities that 
economics serves. This might lead to an empirical investigation of agents' values. But 
it is already clear that such a turn will not yield a single, clear and consistent account. 
Nor may we be able to articulate the content of those moral values successfully through 
a rational account. Certainly, they cannot be reduced simply to rules. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether we already possess, or will ever possess, the moral vocabulary 
necessary to determine whether we are doing justice to others. We should not think of 
our distinctive moral status as `grounded' in our possession of mind, language, culture, 
feeling, intentionality, textuality, or anything else. All these ideas are simply reflections 
of our awareness that we are members of a moral community. Rather, what counts as 
moral sophistication is the ability to wield complex and sensitive moral vocabularies. 
This emphasis on the existing moral vocabularies stands as a healthy correction to the 
Platonic system building tendencies of Western rationalism. Indeed, Platonic 
presupposition have lead to everyday morality being depreciated as relativistic and 
inferior. Absolute claims are preferred because they deliver the illusion of moral clarity. 
They also convenient in that such a complete morality has to be presented by a higher 
authority or by morally elite figures. Such a view permits the use of morality and the 
manipulation of guilt as instruments of political control by the political elite. In the case 
of economic rationalism they are used to suppress the efforts of the disadvantaged to 
promote their own good. Indeed, the way in which social science organisations are 
established and maintained in contemporary society facilitates the use of social science 
as an ideological and manipulative instrument. 
REFLECTION 
Human laws, such as the law of contract, should be seen as tentative and imperfect 
social constructs, and not as absolutes, mystical or otherwise. This view challenges 
classical contract law and theory as it developed under the influence of positivism in the 
nineteenth century. But this positive tendency of nineteenth century law, and social 
science, including economics, had its origins in the Enlightenment project, a project that 
has come under damaging attack, and deservingly so. Consequently, the belief in the 
explanatory possibility of general laws capable of making predictive statements in the 
social sciences has fallen dramatically. Thus, we should be wary of grand theories and 
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sacred rules especially when they bear no close connection to reality. Rather, the social 
world should be seen as being complex, multi- factored and interdependent. Attention 
has also been directed to the collapse of the philosophical dualisms that have 
characterised all forms of theoretical debate since the Enlightenment. Our language 
cannot sustain these efforts to formulate categories that are mutually exclusive and final. 
Indeed, the idea that human reason could discover immutable metaphysical principles 
that could explain the true nature of reality is an illusion. 
The idea that legal or ethical reasoning could imitate geometrical forms of argument has 
also been called into question because moral or political choices were inevitable in long 
chains of deductive reasoning. Indeed, such forms of reasoning have, themselves, come 
under sustained attack. There are no laws of logic or mathematics that are attributable 
to the universe or to human reason. Logic and mathematics are purely tautological, the 
elaboration of the implications contained in the definitions used, according to socially 
created formal systems of thought. 
The total social environment may be too complex and the human mind too limited to 
fully understand the scope and operation of our social activities. The rejection of the 
possibility of `rationally' demonstrating the truth of ethical or political theories has left 
such ideas without a foundation - a convincing `theoretical' base. But this does not 
undermine the significance of such ideas for the stability of society. Nevertheless, it 
does mark a deep loss of confidence in scientific rationalism and its associated moral 
speculation. Consequently, it challenges the application of that speculation, particularly 
economic speculation, to public policy. Economic speculation in its Newtonian guise is 
simply one way among many of speaking about the world and there is no reason to 
afford it priority over other ways of moral speaking. All our theoretical language is 
metaphorical. It therefore cannot be real, it can only ever be, at most, an approximation. 
Thus any description can be valuable but is necessarily incomplete, and cannot exclude 
other description. This failure to achieve conceptual uniformity does not reduce us to 
impotency, however. It simply point to the fact that policy development is inherently 
experimental, in which the criteria of success are human inventions. 
Indeed, the Enlightenment's assumption of a rational and benevolent universe is 
fundamentally wrong. Freedom and change necessarily entail finitude, failure, 
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uncertainty, decay and sin. This is a view that undermines faith in the inevitability of 
unaided human progress. But it is a view that does not lead to any reinstatement of 
natural law, absolute human rights or Aristotelian virtue. Rather, it leads to a humble 
journeying, an uncertain search for the right and the good. It is always uncertain, it is 
always a groping. Dogmatism has therefore to be foresworn as we can only see a partial 
and distorted vision of the Kingdom. The kingdom that can be grasped is not the 
Kingdom. Reality always falls short of the Kingdom, though it is an image of the 
kingdom that inspires a striving for newness of life. Consistent with the above is a 
covernantal view of justice that involves a revelation of a just, merciful God who 
directly engages in the formation and sustaining of righteous living in community. 
The Enlightenment's search for a secular alternative to traditional religious authority is 
itself a religious search, serving the same dogmatic and legitimising functions as 
Bergson's static religion. Indeed, economic rationalism threatens to become the 
dominant, rationalist and fundamentalist religion of contemporary global capitalism, a 
religion with particular appeal to the powerful and the greedy because it does not 
challenge their values. It is leading to the commercialisation of all human activity and 
the atomisation of individuals and the destruction of competing values and groups. 
Money has become the source of salvation and meaning. Indeed, this similarity 
between economics and religion has frequently been noted. For the theologian the 
language of the business pages is familiar. Thus, the market has become the most 
formable rival to traditional religion. 
This critique has much in common with the critique of technological society advanced 
by Ellul and Winner. For them technique and its principle of efficient ordering is sacred 
in our society. Technique and efficiency have progressively mastered all the elements 
of civilisation so that the rationalisation of society has extended beyond the willingness 
of anyone to own responsibility. Efficiency has become its own end, beyond ethics. 
Technical means have become ends in themselves. Thus, autonomous technology is 
taking over the traditional values of every society, subverting and suppressing those 
values to produce at last a monolithic world culture in which all non -technological 
difference and variety is mere appearance. These technological influences have become 
so much a part of everyday life that they have become invisible. These influences pose 
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a particularly significant threat to liberalism as technological society is incompatible 
with representative government. 
We argue that this critique of rationalism, and economic rationalism, should lead to 
humility in policy development, accepting the limits of our abilities and of our 
techniques and speculations. In particular, such humility should lead a refusal to use 
economic concepts at such a high level of abstraction that they loose touch with 
empirical reality. It should also lead to postulating particular moral principles as having 
priority. Economics does not and cannot provide the overarching theory of social 
action. Nor is there an ideal form of social or economic organisation against which to 
measure our organisational arrangements. It should also lead us to avoid seeing the 
world through simple dichotomies, dichotomies like public v private, and state v market. 
Such dichotomies fail to recognise the interdependencies in our economic and social 
systems. Indeed, our economic and social systems are complex and may not be 
understandable through the reductionist method, as the whole may be greater than the 
part. Indeed, there is a fundamental mismatch between the reductionist way of looking 
and the nature of reality in complex systems - there is no perfect system to be 
discovered, no magic word that would remove our responsibility for ourselves, and each 
other. Thus, there is no right approach to policy or to organisational arrangements. The 
important question is `what works'? But it is a question that cannot be answered in 
isolation from our moral, religious and political traditions. 
The danger is that economic rationalism with its program of radical restructuring of 
social and economic arrangements may be undermining the institutional capital on 
which our social and economic system depends. Thus, it is important to recall that 
greed is one of the prime threats to our civilisation. But economic rationalism is 
justifying that greed. Importantly the application of economic rationalism to policy 
decisions cannot be reconciled with the ethical import of our Christian heritage, with its 
commands to love God, and to love one's neighbour as oneself. Taking something that 
is a good, like economic analysis, or markets, or human rights, or liberty, or law, and 
turning into something that is an absolute is the essence of idolatry. 
No 22 v 23 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL ORDER AND ITS REQUIREMENTS 
Without justice, all kingdoms are but bands of robbers. 
St Augustine City of God' 
INTRODUCTION 
Public policy debates in Australia, like those throughout the rest of the developed world, 
have been heavily influenced by what has become known in Australia as economic 
rationalism. While the term lacks precision it attaches to the recent use of economic 
concepts to justify a strong faith in markets and an associated distrust of the role of 
government. Pusey's account of a "new and minimalist laissez -faire state set in norms 
that come from a dominating neoclassical economic rationalism that is anti -statist, anti- 
union and either asocial or anti -social in its basic orientation to policy "2 serves as an 
adequate description of the policy orientation associated with that economic rationalism. 
An alternative term like `market fundamentalism' might have been preferable because 
such views are not solely the possession of the economics profession, nor are they 
necessarily held by a majority of economists, some of whom may be unfairly 
condemned by association. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that such views 
currently represent a dominant school within economics and, consequently, this thesis 
will defer to popular usage. 
Importantly, economists do speak on public policy issues with apparent authority, and 
they claim, at least to some extent, to derive that authority from their economic 
expertise. It is far from clear, however, that any such claim is legitimate. Nevertheless, 
economists have been active in public policy debates from the dawn of the profession, 
often in opposition to social action in support of the underprivileged. For example, for 
Malthus in 1798 economic science had found that man, with his inherent self- interest, 
was inert, sluggish and adverse from labour unless compelled by necessity to be 
otherwise ". The problem of the poor was the problem of population: there were too 
many poor; they were redundant. The only way to eliminate pauperism was to eliminate 
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the humanitarian reforms that permitted the poor to maintain themselves and to 
propagate? 
Ricardo4 supported Malthus in his opposition to the Poor Laws. 
"While the present laws are in force, it is quite the natural order of things that the 
fund for the maintenance of the poor should progressively increase till it has 
absorbed all the net revenues of the countryi'. 
Much more recently in 1943, Walker' noted the increasing influence of economists on 
public policy in Australia and more recently still Pusey' has taken to criticising it. 
Indeed, Markoff and Montecinos notes that this increasing influence is a worldwide 
trend and that in many countries economists have come to dominate civil service 
recruitment.' Certainly this has been the case in Australia particularly in the case of the 
central coordinating agencies - the Departments of the Treasury, Finance and Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. Those coordinating agencies, particularly Treasury and Finance, 
have long opposed interventionist programs' From these centres of bureaucratic power, 
economic rationalist views have largely colonised the senior levels of the 
Commonwealth Public Service.10 
This, of course, should come as no surprise given the key role played by the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet (especially since the abolition of the Public Service 
Board) in selecting Departmental Secretaries, and the tendency of `new brooms' to 
replace or sideline those whose views lack the `flexibility' or `rigour' said to be required 
by our economic circumstances. These processes seems to have been assisted by the 
curtailment of rights of appeal in respect of appointments to the more senior levels, a 
curtailment justified on the basis of improving efficiency. Indeed, these views appear to 
have substantially colonised private sector lobby groups operating in Canberra, who 
draw much of their staff from the ranks of the Commonwealth Public Service. 
The above account of the influence of `economic rationalism' within the 
Commonwealth Public Service is consistent with the account given by Pusey. This 
influence has continued beyond the time of his account and reached a new intensity with 
the election of the Howard government in 1996 and that government's `discovery' of a 
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serious budgetary shortfall. The resulting policy choices involved the Prime Minister's 
invention of a distinction between `core' and `non -core' election promises, major 
program cuts, and the substantial downsizing of the Commonwealth public service, all 
in the name of fiscal responsibility." Pusey's description of the organised destruction of 
corporate memory in many areas of the public service in the name of `flexibility, 
responsiveness and effectiveness' strikes a particular chord in this recent experience.'' 
Associated with that organised `forgetfulness' was the `voluntary' redundancy of large 
numbers of experienced and dedicated public servants. A cynic might conclude that 
these redundancies were deliberately engineered with a view to destroying the capacity 
of the Commonwealth Public Service to implement more `interventionist' and socially 
responsible policies. If so it has something in common with the malicious and 
organised intimidation of dissenting political opinion that we have seen in a much more 
extreme form in other polities. 
This thesis points to what has been termed the Fair Trading debate as contemporary 
policy debate involving fundamental questions bearing on the functioning of the 
capitalist system and the relationship between economics, ethics and the law. This 
particular debate, like many other contemporary policy debates, was impoverished by a 
failure of important participants in that debate to fully understand that the basic 
preconditions for an a effective capitalist system is a dynamic and effective civil society. 
In order to capture an adequate understanding of that dependency, it is necessary to go 
back to basics and consider how social order as such is possible. It is concluded that in 
an effective civil society the pursuit of individual and institutional choice and `self - 
interest' is heavily constrained both by internalised moral codes and by externally 
imposed social sanctions. 
Economic rationalists have also failed to understand the epistemological limitations of 
their discipline, the moral assumptions that they employ, and the implications of the 
existence of asymmetries of knowledge and power for the fairness of the market system. 
Looking further ahead it is suggested that economic rationalism involves the making of 
an organisational technology, the so- called market system, into a theology. An elite 
group of technologists, economics and their allies, is engaged in a foolhardy attempt to 
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remake civil society in the image of their idealised technology. In doing so, they run the 
risk of undermining the basis of both the economic system and of civic society. 
This view has significant implications for the regulation of economic activity in 
particular and for the relationship between civil society and the economic system in 
general. 
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY 
DEBATES 
Central to that impoverished understanding are two key, but hidden, assumptions that 
have been introduced into contemporary public policy debates by economic rationalists. 
This has been true of the recent Australian Fair Trading debate. That debate is 
particularly important because it raises in a stark fashion the relationship between the 
economic system and the social system and questions about the role of the state in 
supporting economic activity. Thus it provides an ideal vehicle to explore the influence 
of economic ideas on a fundamental legal institution. This chapter commences an 
examination of these two assumptions, that is the autonomy of market institutions; and 
the primacy of the economic system over the social. These assumptions critically 
determine how the fair trading debate is viewed. In particular it is the presence of these 
two assumptions that has allowed economic methodology to become the dominant 
methodology for the evaluation of public policy choices in our society. The vocabulary 
of economic with all its entailments now provides the dominant vocabulary for policy 
evaluation and consequently `economic efficiency' has become the dominant value 
served by government policy. 
To provide the framework in which these assumptions can properly be considered it is 
necessary to go back to basics and ask how social order is possible and what are the 
nature of the threats to that order? 
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THE BASIS OF SOCIAL ORDER 
This question has long been at the centre of philosophical and sociological inquiry.13 It 
is also closely related to the central questions of political life, namely, How should 
society be organised? How should the resources of society be distributed among its 
members? What is the extent of our responsibility for other human beings? How much 
should individual freedom be restricted, and in what ways? " In so far as these 
questions ask what ought to be, these questions are moral ones - they ask about what is 
good, what is bad, and involve the fundamental questions about who we think we are. 
While much contemporary discourse emphasises the primacy of the individual, 
contrasting a methodological or economic individualism with more corporatist notions, 
this thesis starts from a position which sees the individual embedded in society. Thus a 
theoretical discourse focussing on whether the individual is `prior' to society or vice 
versa is a sterile exercise. Individuals both constitute, and are constituted by, society. 
The human "I" only discovers itself in encountering another "I" and comes to maturity 
as a person in a community.15 In short, there is no "I" except in contrast to, and in 
relationship with, the "not -I ". As Stark argues: "Here we are challenged to realize that 
the self and society are also coequal and coeval; that they are ... twin- born.s16 And 
again, "Think society away, and Homo sapiens disappears; what is left is a speechless, 
mindless beast. "" 
There is no pre -social human nature. Social life is not an optional extra, something 
added onto human life, but is an essential part of it, including our origins, our coming 
together, our discovery of meaning and our continuing development.18 This means that 
there is no way to strip culture away in order to get to a more essential human nature in 
the way that many theorists since the Enlightenment have attempted to do.1° 
Consequently, individuals are only partially sovereign and autonomous. The formation 
of our values and even of our consumer preferences is a thoroughly social process. 
Consequently, neither the individual nor the social has legitimate explanatory or moral 
primacy 20 As Emmet21 argues: 
"we are too much members of one another to be able to detect just where other 
people's influence ends and our own efforts begin." 
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The extreme methodological individualism of the dominant school of neo- classical 
economics makes it difficult for economists to understand how economic action is 
constrained and shaped by the structures of social relations in which we are all 
embedded?2 The consequence has been a stubborn refusal on the part of economists to 
examine the formation of preferences on the basis of the doctrine of consumer 
sovereignty. McPherson23 goes so far as to claim that mainstream economics has been 
defined by the principle that the nature and origins of consumer tastes and preferences 
lie outside the proper domain of economic inquiry, while Boulding jokingly refers to the 
immaculate conception of the indifference curve 24 But beyond a certain very minimal 
level our wants can be changed. The neglect of the formation of our preferences is a 
direct consequence of economic theory's commitment to the `reason' side of 
Cartesianism. Economics does not explore the complex of motives or feelings that lie 
behind human choices, but rather explores the rational choices of `ideal' producers or 
consumers, investors or policy makers. In this rationalist world, calculation is 
enthroned as the distinctive virtue of human reason while the life of the emotions is 
repudiated 25 
Social Order is an Evolved Complex Moral Order 
Even our earliest hominoid ancestors seem to have lived as members of social groups. 
The evolution of the human race, and particularly the emergence of intelligence and 
symbolic capacity, entailed a complex in which the organised hunting of large animals, 
life in organised social groups, and the making and the use of tools were 
interconnected26. As Keesing put it, 
"the whole pattern evolves together; changes in physical structures and changes 
in behavior, both genetically and socially transmitted, are tied togetheri27. 
Kessing argues that our behavioural potentials appear to be many- sided, complex, 
culturally shaped and socially expressed: 
" ... the human behavioral repertoire entails countervailing tendencies. 
Humans probably do have behavioral tendencies to dominate, to compete, to be 
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aggressive (though probably not to be territorial in a strict sense). But they also 
have tendencies to share, to cooperate, to be altruistic. Institutions and customs 
may intensify competition, reinforce dominance, or express aggression in 
warfare and combat; but they may reinforce our propensities to share, cooperate, 
be egalitarian and peaceful" 2S. 
Each and every human custom is a system of ideas with a social and political history. 
These ideas may result partly as expressions of our psychobiological dispositions, but 
these dispositions will never provide adequate explanations of the meanings humans 
have built on them29. Our biological nature is not prior to culture rather it is expressed 
through culture. It means that our behavioural propensities depend on symbolic 
capacities and cultural learning for their focus and definition" 
This term culture is not always used in an entirely consistent or precise manner but high 
precision is not necessary for our purpose. For example, Geertz defines culture as 
"an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system 
of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitude 
towards lifei 31 
Culture in this sense is restricted to meanings, symbols, values and ideas and 
encompasses phenomena like religion and ideology. The definition Fukayama uses 
draws on both culture and social structure and comes closer to the popularly understood 
meaning of culture as inherited ethical habit.32 Culture in both senses is something we 
learn as children growing up in a society, and discovering how our parents and those 
around us interpret the world. This process of socialisation, the learning of a culture, is 
a process of sharing of knowledge. We share it with those from who we learn and it is 
this shared learning, which makes human social existence possible33. Culture is thus the 
system of knowledge by which people design their own actions and interpret the 
behaviour of others. This knowledge provides us with the standards we use for deciding 
what is, for deciding what can be, for deciding how one feels about it, for deciding what 
to do about it, and for deciding how to go about doing it34. The creation and sustaining 
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of such shared meanings is, itself, a social process in which moral knowledge is 
incorporated into a society's moral vocabulary and social discourse. 
As should be clear from the above, this social order is acknowledged to be a moral 
order; it determines how we should act. As Durkheim points out: 
"we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no right to 
free ourselves ... Thus, altruism is not destined to become, as Spencer desires, 
a sort of agreeable ornament to social life, but it will forever be its fundamental 
basis. How can we ever really dispense with it? Men cannot live together 
without acknowledging, and, consequently, making mutual sacrifices, without 
tying themselves to one another with strong, durable bonds. Every society is a 
moral society. "35 
The study of social life is therefore a study of social norms and the institutions in which 
they are embodied. It involves not simply regularities in conduct but regulated 
conduct?' It is shared values that act as the mortar that binds together the structure of 
each human community with rewards and punishments based on those commonly held 
values. And it is the pervasiveness of these values which gives each person a sense of 
belonging, a sense of community?' Indeed, human survival depends on cultural 
conformity to a limited number of patterns for organising behaviour. For most, 
conformity is a result of the internalisation of values, conceptions of what is desirable, 
providing security and contributing to both personal and social identity. Such values are 
criteria that people use to make choices. But such cultural knowledge is often tacit; it is 
so regular and routine that it lies below a conscious level. 
Sociability, then, is not simply a natural trait. Rather, social phenomena are due to both 
nature and nurture. But what is distinctive about human beings is our capacity to 
control our animality', a capacity that other species lack38 The process of nurture, the 
process of socialisation is a process of moralisation39. For sociality to survive requires 
a system of discipline that sets limits to, and works against the drives which we have 
inherited. Consequently, apart from culture, human beings are no more than another 
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animal. It is this control which makes human civilisation possible and it is only then 
that higher values can influence human conduct. Sahlins supports this proposition: 
"It is an extraordinary fact that primate urges often become, not the secure 
foundation of human social life, but a source of weakness in it ... In selective 
adaptation to the perils of the Stone Age, human society overcame or 
subordinated such primate propensities as selfishness, indiscriminate sexuality, 
dominance and brutal competition. It substituted kinship and cooperation for 
conflict, placed solidarity over sex [and] morality over might.'0 
This viewpoint is widely held, being consistent with the sociological tradition 
represented by Durkheim. Hume makes a similar argument: 
"It is certain that self -love, when it acts at its liberty, instead of engaging us to 
honest action, is the source of all injustice and violence ... We must allow that 
the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises 
artificially, though necessarily, from education and human conventions ...'1 
For Stark, it is the control of greed broadly defined, a control exercised by the social 
norms, which in particular constitutes a crucial victory of culture over animality.42 He 
sees what he calls society's primary laws as emerging out of those social norms, and 
forming a subset of those norms. These norms, a society's ethos, are not only taught to 
us by our parents, they are communicated to us by fairy tale, fable, saga and legend, 
symbolism and ceremony, and by literature both artistic and educational. These norms 
always operate in conjunction with ethical and religious teachings. Indeed, for Stark, 
religion is behind the other ethos -building institutions. At the very least, the religious 
sanction has functioned as a mechanism filling gaps left by custom and law. This is 
because the pressures making for law- abiding cannot be comprehensive because only 
crude offenders are detected, they leave the inner dispositions largely unaltered, and 
cannot insist on the performance of good deeds. 
In these circumstances, the belief that our moral conduct will ultimately be rewarded or 
punished by some transcendent judge provides a powerful incentive for moral 
conformity. Indeed, Stark, drawing on Bergson and his concept of static religion, 
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doubts whether society and culture could survive without a metaphysical prop of some 
kind. Even in our partly secularised society, religious conceptions have not been 
eliminated. Not only do traditional religious views survive in a significant proportion of 
the population but powerful religion substitutes such as the deification of nature, and of 
history have a similar influence. It is for this reason that Plato made citizenship rest on 
the maintenance of orthodox belief, while his guardians, in their priestly role, were to 
develop a theology and maintain the moral standards of the community.43 In this regard, 
this thesis will argue later that economic rationalism derives much of its force from the 
fact that it operates in a similar fashion to justify the values of the market system and of 
its adherents 
For Stark, drawing on the American social evolutionist, Sumner, the development of 
social norms and institutions has been the result of a long process of moral and social 
search and experimentation: 
"What Sumner saw at work, in the lap of society, was a process of selection 
separating by way of trial and error, useful and disappointing expedients, and 
leading to the adoption of the former and the discarding of the latter. The guide 
in this never resting and never ending stream of experimentation is not pure but 
practical reason, not ratiocination, but, rather, common sense. General 
principles of action may and do in the end emerge, but they are merely abstract 
formulations, summings up, of concrete experiences. "44 
The conviction that humans themselves have created the social system within which 
they have their being is central to this point of view. Indeed, for Stark, the self- creation 
of society is the greatest of all social phenomena. What has been selected in this 
historical process of evolution has been ways of behaving that mitigates the war of all 
against all. Hayek also describes an historical, evolutionary process of trial and error for 
the development of social rules.45 Successful action results in the rule being selected, 
whereas unsuccessful action results in the rule being discarded. Indeed, for Hayek most 
knowledge is obtained in the continuous process of sifting a learned tradition. 
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Importantly if humankind has made society in the process of its own evolution it is not 
the pure product of `nature' whatever that word might mean. Equally, if humankind has 
made society, it has also made the economic system. Importantly, the process described 
by Sumner appears a typical innovation process involving the accumulation of 
numerous, incremental changes leading to significant change overall. It is also clear 
from the above that culture is not a once -for -all influence but is an ongoing process 
continuously constructed and reconstructed during human interaction 46 Consequently, 
history matters. The entire cultural and consequently the institutional environment 
(laws, rules, conventions, norms etc.) within which the institutions of governance are 
embedded is the product of history.' 
During the course of his argument, Stark draws a strong distinction between humankind 
and other animals. This strong distinction is inconsistent with more recent research into 
primate behaviour. It would appear that the situation is more complicated than Stark 
and many others allow, there being no necessary opposition between the influence of 
instinct and of learning. Among recent commentators, Reynolds48 explicitly rejects the 
proposition that human evolution has been characterised by the replacement of instinct 
by culture. Rather, human behaviour and animal behaviour more generally appear to 
involve a complex interaction between instinct and experience. He argues that there is a 
great deal of behavioural continuity and that the instinctive systems that function in 
animals have parallels among humans. There appears to be a `progressive' development 
of social behaviour, particularly among primates. We also appear to share much of the 
same emotional equipment. Reynolds concludes that a theory of human evolution that 
presupposes the development of reason at the expense of emotion, or of learning at the 
expense of instinct, conflicts with the evidence. Importantly, he argues that the 
relationship between reason and emotion is not one of hierarchy but of specialisation by 
function, the brain integrating different kinds of information into a unified course of 
action. Consequently, the progressive evolution of primate cognition did not depend 
upon the replacement of innate behaviour by learned behaviour but by the selection and 
control of innate behaviour by conceptually stored information. However, the 
comparative evidence also supports progressive changes in the capacity for 
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conceptualisation, in instrumental skills, and in the volitional control of behaviour over 
the course of human evolution. 
Consequently, this recent research does not undermine the argument that social life is 
only made possible through the disciplining of what Stark calls our animal nature.49 
Indeed, not only have our instincts been tamed, but they have been transformed into 
factors making for social cohesion. None of this involves any necessary inconsistency 
with the view that there is some limited, innate human tendency towards cooperation. 
Nevertheless underneath human culture, animal nature is still present and needs 
permanent control. At best socialised man is semi -moralised up to a moderate standard 
of law -abidingness. Every society must therefore guard against antisocial conduct; it 
must have and apply sanctions, which will eliminate, in so far as this is possible, 
criminal behaviour in the widest sense of the word. Unfortunately, we adjust to social 
life in two ways, by intemalising and operating its norms and by internalising and 
manipulating them. Normal growing up unavoidably involves learning how to seem 
social as well as how to be social - not only how to serve, but how to hold our own, to 
manipulate and how to exploit. 
The Maintenance of Social Order Involves Moral Struggle 
The maintenance of social order involves a struggle within the individual and between 
individuals, a struggle to control our behavioural tendencies to dominate, to compete, to 
be aggressive, those behavioural tendencies which Stark reduces to greed and lust. That 
this is consistent with our daily experience is widely acknowledged. For example, E A 
Ross warns us "society is always in the presence of the enemy".5° But this is not a new 
intuition. As early as the fifth century, the Bhagavadadgita, a popular religious poem 
forming part of the Hindu Scriptures, claims: 
"What distinguishes men from animals is the knowledge of right and wrong. 
The world is dharmaksetra, the battleground for a mortal struggle. The decisive 
issue lies in the hearts of men where battles are fought daily and hourly. "51 
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For the Christian Church also moral evil is omnipresent. As St Paul says about the 
middle of the first century AD: 
"I have been sold as a slave to sin. I cannot understand my own behaviour. I 
fail to carry out the things I want to do, and I find myself doing the very things I 
hate ... for though the will to do what is good is in me, the performance is not, 
with the result that instead of doing the good things I want to do, I carry out the 
sinful things I do not want. "52 
Again, contemporary Christian theology talks about humankind's "tom conditions53 in 
alluding to what has more traditionally been called original sin. These are claims about 
how the human world is. As the contemporary theologian David Tracey would have it: 
"The one piece of Christian doctrine that is empirically demonstrable is that 
there is something awry with the world. "54 
Indeed, the mainline Christian tradition has historically puzzled over the problem that 
evil, although not a metaphysical necessity, is an inevitable matter of fact. Every human 
being eventually, indeed inevitably, sins 55 
In his The Sociology of Religion, Stark demonstrates that the Greek conception of 
hubris, the human bent towards self- aggrandisement, pride, and all associated forms of 
egotism, is comparable with, and runs parallel to, the Judaeo -Christian conception of 
original sins'. A shadow lies over every human being. We do not have the ethical 
stamina which we need, and it is this tragic flaw which Greek drama displayed on the 
stage. Of course, the Greek concept of hubris emphasised the tragic dimension of this 
darker side of human beings. Hubris in this sense is not pride but the self -elevation of 
the great beyond the limits of its finitude 57 Thus while there is some difference of 
emphasis, the moral metaphysics of the ancient Athenians is not entirely different from 
the moral metaphysics of the Christian Church. Like the Christian Church it taught its 
audience that humankind is weak, fallible, and inclined to sin. 
Of course, the traditional Christian view sees this human brokenness not simply in terms 
of one's alienation from one's fellows, but more importantly, in terms of humankind's 
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alienation from God and consequently from the rest of creation. In this view, evil is the 
result of a human turning from God. Receptivity to the presence of God is replaced by 
ego projections. Consequently, every human is apt to fail when put to the test. This 
tragic flaw is seen as the cause of humankind's inability to build a truly satisfactory 
society, a truly integrated social whole. As Pope John Paul II said in Centesimus 
AnnusSB: 
"A man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience 
of self -giving and of the formation of an authentic human community .. . 
A society is alienated if its forms of social organization, production and 
consumption make it more difficult to offer this gift of self and to establish this 
solidarity between people." 
The Christian tradition goes on to suggest that an effective social order is only possible 
through a covenant relationship with God, a relationship which is both corporate and 
individual. 
It is largely this doctrine of original sin, St Augustine's theological anthropology, as 
transmitted through the Protestant reformers, which found philosophical expression in 
Hobbes's war of all on a1159. In Hobbes's frequently cited views, in a state of nature: 
"there is no place for industry; because the fruits thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of commodities that 
may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving 
and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the 
earth; no account of time; no Arts; no Letters; no society; and which is worst of 
all, continuous fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short.s60 
For Hobbes, it was only as a consequence of the discipline enforced by government that 
a civilised life was possible. 
The more optimistic view that human kind and human structures are perfectible, such as 
is found in Rousseau, reflect what was in the fifth century, and again at the Council of 
Trent in the sixteenth century, condemned as the Pelagianism heresy. Rousseau thought 
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that human beings were endowed by nature with compassion for their fellow humans, a 
view he may have derived from Adam Smith and David Hume. Nevertheless, while 
generally holding that humankind in a state of nature was inherently good, Rousseau 
conceded that human beings were wicked and that the weight of human experience 
made it unnecessary to prove that this was so. He believed that human society induced 
people to hate each other to the extent that their interests clashed and to inflict each 
other with every imaginable evil. For Rousseau it was not true that private interests 
were linked to the public interest, but that they excluded each other. The laws of society 
were a yoke which everybody wished to impose on others, but not themselves 61 
The point of this for current purposes is not theological but empirical; these traditional 
theological concerns about human sinfulness have been absorbed into secular discourse 
and then largely forgotten. They incorporate a profound insight into the human 
condition, an insight pointing to the fragility of our social order, an insight which we 
will ignore to our peril. Certainly, in our daily life we do not, and cannot ignore the fact 
that to be human is, inter alia, to be proud, to be vain, to want to dominate others, to get 
angry, to be vindictive, to be violent, to be vengeful, to be greedy, to be dishonest, to be 
untruthful, to be weak -willed, to be easily lead, to be self -destructive, to be frightened, 
to be confused and to become discouraged. Of course, we find it easy to see these faults 
in others. What is frequently overlooked is the insidious and ever present influence of 
these influences on our own actions, on our own values and on social values more 
generally. Reinhold Nielbuhr expresses it as follows: 
"The children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond the self. 
They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self- interest. 
The children of light are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher 
law than their own will .... It must be understood that the children of light are 
foolish not merely because they underestimate the power of self -interest among 
the children of darkness. They underestimate this power among themselves."62 
We cannot ignore this reality in our institutional arrangements. Indeed, Rousseau's 
importance lies in reminding us of potentially adverse consequences of these tendencies 
for our social, political and economic arrangements, an insight shared by Marx. The 
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consequence of these tendencies is that even our moral vocabulary can be subverted into 
an instrument of immoral conduct. 
The Maintenance of Social Order Also Involves the Creation of Moral Institutions 
Clearly punishment, or the threat of punishment, is necessary for a general climate of 
obedience to social norm. Thus there is an element of force in all forms of property, 
marriage and religion. In smaller and simpler communities unorganised social pressure 
may have been sufficient to maintain the social control necessary to guard against a war 
of all against all63 though some genetically encoded sense of hierarchy may also have 
been important. What is perhaps more certain is that in its beginnings law was hardly 
differentiated from other forms of social pressure 64 There can be no law without some 
capacity for coercion. The evolution of larger, more complex, more anonymous 
societies involved splitting the social code into two parts, custom and law, with 
organised law enforcement by persons forming part of a govemmental apparatus. This 
perspective sees the state as having grown out of a basic social need for a coordinating 
mechanism especially to ensure safety and order with the state as the guardian, and 
enforcer of the key norms 65 Indeed Stark argues that society solved one of its most 
difficult problems by placing a monopoly of the means of compulsion in the hands of 
the state.66 Thus, despite all claims and appearances to the contrary, the law is a 
liberator not an oppressor, and so is the state as the ultimate enforcer of the law. But 
these moral functions can easily be subverted so that the state becomes an oppressor. 
This experience provides the motivation for much political philosophy, and for political 
programs aimed at regulating the role of the state itself. 
But unorganised social pressure in support of key norms, and the organised enforcement 
of law and is not enough to ensure social order. We cannot do without a sense of guilt, 
the guilt flowing from the breach of internalised norms.67 The survival of a community 
depends on its moral cohesion and that moral cohesion cannot be maintained by the 
coercive force of the law alone: secular restraints are not enough to deter evil, anti -social 
or merely illegal acts. Indeed, the healthier the society, the less it relies directly on legal 
sanctions - ideally, life in society should be lived above the law, not by it. The 
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Australian theologian Bruce Kaye in particular emphasises that social interaction 
degenerates when it is construed narrowly in terms of legal obligations. The law is a 
framework and a guide as to the character of the civic system, but is not the adequate 
dynamic for the civil community. Similarly within organisations, an effective dynamic 
goes beyond narrow legal definitions. The ethos or culture of such organisations is a 
vital motivating and shaping factor in the civil community that the organisation exists to 
create and serve. Thus if a corporate enterprise construes its place in the civic system 
and in particular in the market economy, in narrow legalistic terms, it will not create the 
civil community within its own life, or in its relationships to the host society, that will 
enable it to fulfil its basic purposes. More prosaically much contemporary management 
literature points to the role of goals, values and missions perform in maintaining 
organisational efficiency 68 
Voluntary efforts to behave morally and to uphold the law; are necessary for complex 
social organisation for otherwise law enforcement would become impossible as well as 
tyrannical. These inward voluntary limitations, so necessary for corporate life are the 
product of conscience, conviction, and inward persuasion and belief, and cannot be 
directly imposed from without. Convention is thus society's strongest defence against 
both anarchy and the tyranny of an all- pervading disciplinary and coercive law. 
Dunstan's account emphasises the role of institutions as the means by which moral 
insights are given stability and permanence.69 Without such institutions moral insights 
would be lost in time of need. This emphasis on conventions places a primary emphasis 
on morality as a common possession rather than as a matter of individual choice or 
decision. 
For Dunstan, such conventions incorporate expectations as well as imposing limitations. 
We take the predicability necessary for social life for granted because we assume that 
we know what to expect of one another in roughly comparable situations. We can do so 
because a large part of our socialisation, our elementary social and moral education, 
involves training in the meeting of such mutual expectations. Such expectations involve 
a prescriptive element because social situations are understood as relationships in which 
certain conduct is expected as appropriate to the roles of the people involved.70 Such 
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learned roles are themselves socially constructed. Fidelity, in this context, means 
meeting the expectations appropriate to one's role. In this context simply following the 
moral rules including obeying the law is not enough. Personal integrity requires one to 
be on guard against formalism and to be conscious of the live, human, ethical reality 
behind such obligations. In times of rapid social change such expectations may be fluid 
or imperfectly understood but there is a recognisable continuity and cohesion in them. 
Frequently there are conflicts between these roles and their accompanying obligations 
and consequently the need for moral judgement cannot be avoided." Such role 
behaviour and the mutual support of people in their groups are a deep part of everyday 
life being bound up with our awareness of ourselves as agents. Thus Mead believed that 
a person is built up of internalised roles, so that the expectations of others become the 
self- expectations of a self- steering person.72 
These conventions make great demands on us because they stem from our beliefs about 
what the community believes to be of worth. They include specific beliefs about the 
worth of people regardless of their specific characteristics; beliefs about the value of 
human relationships and the common interest in the truths upon which they stand. Such 
beliefs have a history, and in the case of Western societies can be traced in the twin 
roots of our culture, Greek philosophy and the Judaeo- Christian religion. But a fully - 
grown religious ethic, like that of the Judaeo -Christian tradition, goes far beyond mere 
utilitarian considerations into the supreme worth of sacrifice, in the transcendence of 
self in subordination and service to the other. 
These learned moral traditions are complex and often tacit. Such moral judgements are 
neither simple deductions from principles nor simply calculation of consequences. 
Rather such moral judgement involve a skilled performance.73 This is because our 
moral abstractions express general aims, which can not be made operational in a 
straightforward way through clear -cut `means to ends' calculation, though such 
abstractions supply a general orientation for living. And as we have already seen there 
are conflicts in the roles we perform. Importantly, there are also conflicts between the 
abstractions we use. Downie, for his part, emphasises the emotional element in social 
morality: the ties generated by kinship, common religion, custom, language, traditional 
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ways of earning a living, traditional loyalties of all kind, and more generally shared 
broad cultural traditions." 
There are limits on the degree of variability in social rules. Social moralities must have 
certain structural features in common. Downie, drawing on Hart, lists a number of 
obvious truths as limiting the scope for variety: our lack of self- sufficiency, our limited 
benevolence, our approximate equal power, our limited understanding and skills and 
limitations imposed by the environment and scarcity.75 Consequently we require means 
of limiting violence, exploitation and competition and means for encouraging 
cooperation. All of this implies that there is necessarily a strong element of 
consequentialism in social morality. But this does not mean that social morality is, or 
must be, limited to an examination of the consequences of action because the beliefs on 
which we act extend our moral values well beyond such consequentialism. 
Not only are there social rules and expectations but there are social rules about social 
rules. Downie, again drawing on Hart, describes second -order rules of recognition, of 
change, of empowerment and procedure. For their part, Brennan and Buchanan76 
emphasise the importance of rules at the constitutional level. They argue that the 
natural predilection for conflict in the interests of players is substantially moderated in 
the choice over rules, but this seems to presuppose the existence of sufficient social 
capital to enable discourse about such rules. It is these second -order rules and moral 
principles that help us determine the moral legitimacy of government action. There is 
no reason to believe, however, that these add up to a coherent, consistent system. Nor, 
as Brennan and Buchanan point out, is there any reason to believe that the forces of 
social evolution will always ensure the selection of the best rules. 
While there is wide divergence of view about the basis of our moral and legal principles, 
there appears to be strong support for the proposition that those moral and legal 
principles along with a sense of community provide crucial elements in the governance 
structures of our societies. 
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CURRENT THEORIES EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL ORDER 
The above provides an evolutionary account of the development of social order 
supplemented by a discussion of some of the elements that make up that social order. In 
Chapter 4, an historical account will be given of various attempts to explain that social 
order. Such an account is important to subsequent discussion of the fair trading debate 
in Australia over the last twenty -five years. 
Among many theorists, however, our evolutionary account will not seem satisfactory as 
an explanation of our social order however much the theorist agrees that something like 
that described actually took place. What will often be sought is a satisfying theoretical 
explanation, which is necessarily ahistorical, and which attempts to tease out what is 
really going on in society, what are the laws that determine the way things are. This 
involves making a distinction between occurrences which are not necessarily associated, 
that is, contingent, and occurrences that are concomitant, that is, that occur closely 
together, and which are taken to involve some causal relationship. Consequently, such 
an attempt at causal explanation involves a belief in the existence of some underlying 
influence or structure or law which creates an objective order, which our culture obliges 
us to observe, and which can be abstracted from historical reality with all its contingent 
elements in a way analogous to theoretical accounts in the physical sciences. The extent 
to which there are such underlying structures is problematic, however, given that this 
level of abstraction cannot be subject to falsification as in the physical sciences, ie it 
cannot be subjected to empirical procedures. The value of such theorising as a means of 
explanation is therefore problematic and the danger is that dialectic is simply substituted 
for `proof'. Such theorising can be distinguished from a theoretical account that 
provides a justification for what exists or what is thought to be desirable. The latter 
does not usually involve an examination of the moral judgements that we actually make, 
and the values that underlie them, but rather an appeal to some plausible principle in an 
attempt to legislate what those moral judgements should be. Often these genuine 
attempts at explanation and judgement are associated with the theorist's desire to 
legislate particular judgements, explanatory or normative, about fundamental political 
and social institutions. The progression of such ideas involves an attempt to 
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differentiate a particular theorist's efforts from those of others. The whole project 
appears tainted by an unrealistic a- priorism, a search for unicausal explanations, and the 
drawing of tenuous distinctions. 
No dominant theory has emerged from such efforts to explain the existence of social 
order and of our political and moral institutions. There are four dominant theoretical 
approaches to the social order problem; the private interest doctrine, situational analysis, 
the consensus doctrine and the conflict approach." 
The private interest theory assumes, as its name implies, that individuals are guided 
entirely by considerations of self- interest. Spencer is cited as a holder of an extreme 
version of this approach, believing that the pursuit of self- interest formed a self - 
regulating mechanism in society. Hobbes and Weber are self- interest theorists who 
emphasise the inevitability of conflict. In contrast to Hobbes, however, for Weber, 
competitive struggles often generate social regularities. George Homans, the best 
known contemporary exponent of a private interest approach, works with an exchange 
model based on free market principles. According to Homans, social interaction is 
social exchange involving such rewards as esteem, admiration, and respect and such 
costs as boredom, embarrassment, and expenditures of time . It is the informal rules 
governing these exchanges that provide for social order. However, the problem with 
such private interest theories is that that they are unable to explain how there could be 
sufficient similarities among individuals and enough continuity over time to have 
created organised societies. Nor, as is argued shortly, is it possible to explain all 
adherence to rules and laws by the calculation of benefits derived from them, or from 
fear of punishment. The existence of shared social norms is ignored, indeed, such 
theories have no room for moral notions like `wrong', `bad' or `immoral. 
Consequently, such theories omit the moral dimension in human relations; moral 
discourse is not even possible. 
Erving Goffman, a situational analyst also sees people as narrowly self- interested, 
acting out their roles as public means to private ends. Consequently, society is a 
pseudo -moral system in which everyone is busily engaged in the exchange of 
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impressions. However, situational morality stresses the importance of the properties 
and structures of situations in influencing social conduct. What is missing from 
Goffman's account is an adequate account of what it is to be human. He has no serious 
notion of human beings possessing a sense of personal identity. Missing is any 
commitment to moral standards other than those found in one or another social 
situation. Nor can he account for moral rules opposed to any derived from those social 
situations. 
The vast majority of sociologists, including Durkheim and Parsons, are described as 
consensus theorists. For these theorists, social order is made possible by a consensus 
about shared values and meanings. Thus for Parsons, "Institutions or institutional 
patterns" are defined as: 
"Normative patterns, which define what are felt to be, in the given society, 
proper, legitimate, or expected modes of action or of social relationship... They 
are patterns supported by common moral sentiments. "78 
People are motivated to observe these normative standards through socialisation and 
social control and through the feelings of self- respect, guilt and shame. Phillips argues 
that such models are unable to account for social conflict, making too much of control 
mechanisms and too little of human spontaneity and inner conflict. It is also criticised 
as a tacit commitment to the status quo. More importantly, it is argued that such 
theorists are not committed to morality as such, but only to a moral system that yields 
order. Such theories can say nothing, therefore, about the moral status of a particular 
society. Thus fears about moral relativism are raised to dispute this tradition. Despite 
theses criticisms of the consensus approach there is much in that approach that is useful. 
In particular, Phillips agrees with Durkheim and Parsons and most other sociologists 
that individuals are motivated to act in accordance with normative standards. The 
internalisation of those standards helps provide much of the restraining control 
necessary for social order. Social order is made possible by consensus within a social 
system about normative standards. And, motivation to observe these standards can best 
be assured by the mechanisms of socialisation and social control. However, Phillips is 
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concerned that consensus theorists never consider the possibility of rationally justifying 
those dominant moral standards. 
Conflict theorists like Coser and Collins place a strong emphasis on power 
relationships, coercion, competition, and the mechanisms of political allocation. They 
point to constraint, conflict over values and coercion. Indeed, for Coser such conflicts 
are functional in that they help to structure the larger social environment by assigning 
positions to the various subgroups within the system and by helping to define the power 
relations between them. 
For Collins, however, social life is mainly a fight over the control of resources. What 
ought to concern us, according to Collins, is how various factors of power, coercion, 
control of resources and the like produced particular moral values and beliefs in the first 
place. For Collins, ethics are ultimately arbitrary, simply a device for dominating 
others. In the process Collins assumes that moral principles have only instrumental 
value. His doctrine makes it impossible to treat one another as moral beings. Phillips 
goes on to give an account of Goulder's critique of the functionalist concern with social 
order. Phillips reduces this critique to a criticism of the functionalist concern for quiet 
values like temperance, wisdom, knowledge, goodness, cooperation or trust and faith in 
the goodness of God. But nowhere does Goulder formulate and defend his own values. 
This thesis shares Phillips' admiration for much in the consensus theories represented 
by the sociological tradition. But there is no need to reject in their entirety the other 
perspectives outlined. Clearly there is some truth in the transactions view of human 
society, it simply fails to provides anything like a complete account. Indeed, from the 
perspective developed in Chapter 2, it leaves out the bits that are most important. 
Similarly, there is clearly much conflict in social life and no account can ignore that 
conflict. Power relationships and coercion are an ever -present feature of social life. 
Indeed, the Christian tradition, with its emphasis on original sin, points to the possibility 
of abuse of power relations and of moral rules themselves. Thus there is no need adopt 
a unicausal approach 
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One important theorist not fitting the above is the rational choice theorist, Jon Elster.79 
He does not believe that the social norms can be reduced to any single principle. In 
particular, he insists that social norms cannot be reduced to rationality or, indeed, to any 
other form of optimising mechanism. Such a view cannot deal with the problem of free 
riding and the voluntary provision of public goods. Indeed, the rational self- interest of 
individuals may lead them to behave in ways that are collectively disastrous. He even 
suggests that a form of irrationality, what he calls magical thinking, plays an important 
role in many decisions to cooperate. Consequently, Elster briefly entertains the idea that 
civilisation owes its existence to a fortunate coincidence. He goes on to argue that 
altruism, envy, social norms and self interest all contribute in complex, interacting ways 
to order, stability and cooperation and thus provide the cement of society: 
"Every society and each community will be glued together, for better and for 
worse, by a particular, idiosyncratic mix of these motives.i80 
As already noted, the trouble with all such intellectual speculation is that, remote from 
the possibility of empirical falsification, it remains, at the end of the day, speculation. 
While ideas might be refined, and inconsistencies in particular arguments eliminated, 
conflicting ideas cannot finally be resolved. In addition we slip so easily and 
unconsciously between causal explanations and justification that explanations advanced 
as causal explanations rapidly take on normative power. Clearly it is important to have 
a vision of who we are to provide some grounding for our decisions. But there is a 
danger that we can become trapped in a fundamentalist implementation of a particular 
vision, to the exclusion of other perspectives. Marx is instructive in this regard: 
"Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves a false conception about 
themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged 
their relationships according to their ideas of God or normal man, etc. The 
phantoms of their brains have gained the mastery over them. They, the creators, 
have bowed down before their creatures. Let us liberate them from the 
chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are 
pining away. "si 
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But such images are unavoidable if we are to have any discourse at all. And Marx's 
criticism can be applied with particular potency to his own thinking. 
Another approach to explaining the existence of social order seeks an empirical 
grounding and involves an examination of the development of moral values in growing 
children. Piaget conceived of morality as a system of rules for social behaviour, and the 
essence of morality as the respect which individuals acquires for these rules. Piaget's 
account of moral development in children up to the age of twelve focuses primarily on 
its cognitive aspects, but it is not purely a cognitive process. Rather, it is an interactive 
process during which children's understanding of rules change. Thus Piaget's account 
involves a three -stage progression in a child's moral understanding: constraint, followed 
by cooperation, giving rise to generosity. Piaget sees generosity as a refinement of 
justice manifest in the concept of equity, which he considers a fusion of justice and love. 
Piaget noted that altruism, empathy and sharing are all evident in the behaviour of very 
young children but also noted that the legal sense is far less developed in young girls 
than in boys. In contrast, girls show a greater capacity for tolerance and innovation in 
their play. Gilligan suggests that girls avoid conflict rather than develop rules for 
limiting its extent and that Piaget was unduly influenced by his study of boys 82 
Kohlberg extended Piaget's study of moral development in children into adolescence 
modifying Piaget's theory in the process. His is also an interactive theory with three 
levels of development: (i) the preconventional where rules and social expectations are 
external to the self, (ii) conventional where the self has internalized the expectations of 
others and (iii) postconventional where the self is differentiated from the rules and 
expectations of others, and values are defined in terms of self- chosen principles. These 
are further subdivided into two stages. Importantly, he sees the postconventional level 
as involving, firstly, a contractual -legalistic orientation and, then, a universal -ethical 
principle orientation. He suggests that very few people develop to such a stage. His is a 
unitary conception of morality as justice, by which he means equality in a democratic 
society. His account emphasises the role of social institutions in which the basic values 
of a society are embodied, down playing the influence of direct teaching. This could be 
seen as running counter to Freud and the sociological tradition with their emphasis on 
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the internalisation of social values, but there is no necessary opposition between these 
accounts: they involve a difference of emphasis towards the role of conscious moral 
reasoning and away from the unconscious, and from tacit moral knowledge. In 
commenting on Kohlberg's theory, Phillips concludes that cognitive moral development 
at every stage of moral reasoning is inescapably influenced by unconscious 
mechanisms, and by moral precepts that are acquired earlier and consciously available, 
and by the moral values and norms of the group and of the wider society 83 
Nevertheless, this difference in emphasis does reflect Kohlberg's commitment to a 
rational, unitary account of a morality based on the concepts of justice and rights in 
which the rational individual standing alone is the ideal moral agent, entering with 
rights into fair contracts with others. However, he fails to present any persuasive 
evidence linking moral reasoning and actual behaviour. Indeed, there seems no reason 
to suppose that the capacity to engage in higher levels of moral reasoning leads to moral 
conduct. If this were so, we would expect there to be a disproportionate percentage of 
academic moral philosophers among those who engage in heroic good works and who 
we `canonise'. 
Current work in developmental psychology influenced by L S Vygotsky and A R Lura 
on the role of spoken language in the shaping of a child's capacity to think and act 
perspective undermines Kohlberg's Platonist aspirations 84 Instead of children's mental 
equipment being part of a permanent `human nature' with which all humans alike 
confront experience the internalization of speech is now seen as the means by which 
children acquire their native culture and thus their moral values 85 
Gilligan a contemporary developmental psychologist, argues that Kohlberg's 
perspective reflects the concern of adolescents justifying by reason their separation from 
those to whom they were formerly bound. Its limitation lies in its failure to see a world 
of relationship, compassion and care. Whereas justice emphasises the autonomy of the 
person, care underlies the primacy of relationship. Indeed, Kohlberg's theory involves a 
general neglect of the emotional and behavioural aspects of moral development. In 
opposition to Kohlberg, Gilligan suggests that moral development proceeds along two 
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different but intersecting paths that run through different modes of experience and give 
rise to different forms of thought: 
"Whereas the analytic logic of justice is consonant with rational social and 
ethical theories and can be traced through the resolution of hypothetical 
dilemmas, the ethic of care depends on the contextual understanding of 
relationship." 86 
This ethic of care develops through relationships that give rise to an understanding of 
interdependence and is sustained by the ability to discern connection. The fundamental 
tension in human psychology between the experience of separation and the experience 
of connection is reflected in the age -old dialogue between justice and love, reason and 
compassion, fairness and forgiveness. This tension underlies the conflicting 
conceptions of the human with which we began this chapter. Gilligan argues that these 
discrete experiences give rise to two different moral languages: a language of rights that 
justify separation, and a language of responsibility that sustains relationship. A focus 
on the first language at the cost of the second opens the way to manipulation, 
exploitation and the rationalization of hurt. 
Gilligan's account provides a timely reminder of the dual nature of our Christian 
inheritance, especially since the Reformation: in Christian language, the life of faith is 
both corporate and individual. The Christian life is to be lived in community, but it is a 
life to which individuals as well as communities are called and in which individual 
conscience is respected. Clearly, there is a tension between these two pillars. The 
individualistic aspect of Christian belief, including belief in an individual soul has been 
translated into our current secular emphasis on individualism, both as an explanatory 
mechanism and a normative ideal, through the Enlightenment and subsequently through 
our Liberal traditions. 
While rejecting his account Kohlberg's emphasis on the role of moral reasoning serves 
to reminds us that social norms are subject to reflection, criticism and revision. Clearly 
moral philosophers play a role in that reflection, criticism and revision, but their 
speculations are also based on the ideas and circumstances of their societies. They help 
crystallise those ideas 87 Recent emphasis on the individual has led, however, to 
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considerable neglect of the social side of that reflection and of human life more 
generally. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter started off by pointing to the influence of the economics profession and 
what is called `economic rationalism' on public policy as being a cause of some 
concern. The Australian Fair Trading Debate, a policy debate that has extended over the 
last twenty -five years, is a contemporary policy debate that raised fundamental 
questions bearing on the functioning of the capitalist system and the relationship 
between economics, ethics and the law. Thus it provides an ideal vehicle to explore the 
influence of economic ideas on a fundamental legal institution. It is suggested that 
economic rationalists have introduced two key, but hidden assumptions into that debate, 
the autonomy of market institutions and the primacy of the economic system over the 
social. It is argued that as a consequence the vocabulary of economics with all its 
entailments now provides the dominant vocabulary for the evaluation of public policy 
choices. 
In order to examine those assumptions the thesis has commenced with an examination 
of the basis of social order starting from a position that sees the individual embedded in 
society. Thus it considers that that there is no such thing as a pre -social human nature 
and that the formation of our values and even of our consumer preferences is a 
thoroughly social process. In support of this it points our earliest hominoid ancestors as 
having lived as members of social groups and of our evolution as involving a complex 
in which the organised hunting of large animals, life in organised social groups and the 
making and use of tools were interconnected. Thus it sees the evolution of the human 
body as being inseparable from the evolution of human culture. That culture is 
something we learn as children discovering how our parents and those around us 
interpret the world. This evolved social order is widely acknowledged to be a moral 
order, an order that determines how we should act. The study of social life is therefore 
the study of social norms and the institutions in which they are embodied, not simply 
regularities in conduct but regulated conduct. These regulations set limits to, and works 
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against, the drives that we have inherited. It is argued, in particular, that its is the 
control of greed broadly defined which constitutes a crucial victory of culture over 
animality, a victory which permitted complex organisations to emerge. Central to this 
view is the idea that human beings as they have evolved created the social system in 
which they have their being. This evolution of human culture was not a once and for all 
process but is an on going process. 
The maintenance of any social order then involves a moral struggle between individuals 
and between individuals, a struggle to control our behavioural tendencies to dominate, 
to compete, and to be aggressive. But there are severe limits to our successful control of 
these tendencies. This fact has been widely acknowledged throughout human history, in 
widely differing cultures, particularly in the context of religious teachings. In particular 
it is reflected in the Christian doctrine of original sin, a doctrine that was secularised by 
Hobbes in his war of all on all, and then largely forgotten. But it is a doctrine that 
incorporates a profound insight into the human condition, an insight which we ignore to 
our peril particularly in the design of our institutional and organisational arrangements. 
It is unorganised social pressure, organised enforcement of law and our own sense of 
guilt flowing from any breach of internalised norms that provides the moral coercion 
that permits the social system to survive. 
It has been noted in passing that such an evolutionary account of the existence of the 
social order will not seem a satisfactory account to some theorists who will be looking 
for an ahistorical account analogous to the theoretical accounts given in the physical 
sciences. While doubts are entertained about the value of such accounts, and no 
dominant theory has emerged, a brief overview has been given of the types of theories 
being advanced in contemporary discourse. It is concluded, however that there is no 
need to adopt an unicausal approach, and that all of the accounts discussed provide 
some insight into the human condition. Of particular importance is the account given 
by Jon Elster, who has concluded that the social norms cannot be reduced to any single 
principle, and, in particular, cannot be reduced to rationality or any other form of 
optimising mechanism. This brief survey of competing theories ends with an account of 
the approaches of prominent development psychologists, who have attempted a more 
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empirical approach based on the moral development of children. In particular, 
Kohlberg's unitary, rationalist conception of morality as justice is discussed and 
discounted as not providing a convincing account. Gillian's alternative account of the 
moral development of children suggests that moral development proceeds along two 
different but intersecting paths that run through different modes of experience and give 
rise to different forms of thought, an analytical logic of justice and an ethic of care. 
In any event it is clear that no society can survive without stable moral traditions backed 
up by effective means of coercion. However our day -to -day moral vocabulary derives 
from several different and incompatible moral tradition. Consequently, the moral 
foundations of modem society are incoherent and fragmented. This would seem to 
poses a significant threat to that social system and some commentators have sensed a 
deterioration in the social, intellectual and philosophical capital of the Western civil 
order. 
Having concluded that human civilisation is always under threat from what used to be 
called human sinfulness, including human greed, the next Chapter will continue the 
examination of the assumptions that underlie much contemporary policy debate which 
this chapter commenced, ie the assumption of the autonomy of the economic system and 
the primacy of the economic over the social. That Chapter will examine the relationship 
between the economic system and the social order that has just been discussed. It will 
suggest that the economic system, like society itself, is also a social artefact and, far 
from being autonomous, is dependent on the systems of social control discussed above. 
54 
Notes 
Augustine, St, 1972, City of God, Book IV, Chapter 5, Section 4, Pelican Classics, p139 
'- Pusey, M, 1991, Economic Rationalism in Canberra, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, p6 
' see Malthus, Thomas, 1973, in Leonard D Abbott, ed, Masterworks of Economics, voll, McGraw -Hill, 
1973, p260 and Kenneth Lux, 1990, Adam Smith's Mistake, How a Moral Philosopher Invented 
Economics and Ended Morality, Shambhala, Boston, 
° Lux, 1990, p42, citing Rajani J Kanth, 1986, Political Economy and Laissez -Faire, Rowman & 
Littlefield, Totowa NJ, p88 
s To be fair to Ricardo, it should be noted that he was talking about the incentive then existing for 
employers to underpay their employees in the expectation that the poor laws would supplement their 
wages so as to provide those employees with the minimum for subsistence. However, Cowherd has 
shown that the increased costs of relief that was the source of these concerns was the result of increased 
unemployment following the end of the Napoleonic Wars and not the Poor Laws themselves. See 
Raymond D Cowherd, 1977, Political Economists and the English Poor Laws, Ohio University Press, 
Athens 
Walker, E Ronald, From Economic Theory to Policy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943, 
Ch 1 
Pusey, 1991 and Michael Pusey, 1993, Reclaiming the Middle Ground, Discussion Paper No 31, Public 
Sector Research Centre, The University of New South Wales, Kensington 
Markoff, J, Montecinos, V, The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists, Journal of Public Policy, 13, I, 37 -68, 
1993 
9 see Whitwell, Greg, 1986, The Treasury Line, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. As Pusey, 1991 notes Australia 
has a relatively small public sector, low taxation and public expenditure and low levels of welfare 
expenditures. 
Pusey 1991 points to social selection and social background as a key mechanism. The author, on the 
basis of nearly thirty years experience in policy positions within 8 policy Departments, agrees, 
emphasising the top -down control exercised over the selection process for SES officers, and the tendency 
for senior bureaucrats to `clone' themselves and their views in making selections for such positions. This 
has a flow effect at lower levels. The result has been substantial pressure for conformity, and the 
exclusion of the more outspoken critics of economic rationalism from senior positions. 
" The possibility of tax increases to cover the budgetary shortfall does not seem to have been canvassed, 
certainly not publically. 
" Pusey, 1991, p11 
13 Phillips, Derek L, 1986, Towards a Just Social Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1° Schwartz, Barry, 1986, The Battle for Human Nature, Science, Morality and Modern Life, WW Norton 
& Company, New York 
Bruck, Michael von, 1986, The Unity of Reality, trans James V Zeitz, Paulist Press, New York, 
16 Stark, Werner, 1978, The Social Bond, An Investigation into the Bases of Law -abidingness, Vol II, 
Antercedents of the Social Bond, The Ontogeny of Sociality, Fordham University Press, New York, p66 
"Stark, Werner, 1983, The Social Bond, Vol IV, Safeguards of the Social Bond, Ethos and Religion, 
Fordham University Press, New York, p191 
x Simons, Robert G, 1995, Competing Gospels, Public Theology and Economic Theory, E J Dwyer, 
Alexandria, 
Rabinow, Paul, 1983, Humanism as Nihilism, in Norma Haan et al, Social Science as Moral Inquiry, 
Columbia University Press, 1983 
55 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M, 1994, The Return of Instititional Economics, in Smelser, Neil J and Swedberg, 
Richard ,eds, The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Russell Sage Foundation, New York 
'-' Emmet, Dorothy, 1966, Rules and Relations, Macmillan, London, p122 
Granovetter, Mark, 1991, The Social Construction of Economic Institutions, in Amitai Etzioni and Paul 
R Lawerence, Socio Economics, Towards a new Synthesis, M E Sharp, New York, 
McPherson, Michael S, 1983, Want Formation, Morality, and Some "Interpretive" Aspects Of 
Economic Inquiry, in Norma Haan et al, Social Science as Moral Inquiry, Columbia University Press, 
New York. 
24 Boulding, Kenneth E, 1970, Economics as Science, McGraw -Hill, New York 
Toulmin, Stephen, 1990, Cosmopolis, The Free Press, New York. 
=` Keesing, Roger M, 1981, Cultural Anthropology, A Contemporary Perspective, Holt, Rinehart and 
Wilston, second edition, Fort Worth, 
Keesing, 1981, p16 
Keesing, 1981, p21 
Keesing, 1981, p22 
0 Keesing, 1981, p28 
51 Fukayama, Francis, 1995, Trust, The Free Press, New York, p34 
Fukayama, 1995, p34 
Spradley, James P and McCurdy, 1994, Conformity & Conflict, Readings in Cultural Anthropology, 
eighth edition, Davis W, Harper Collins College Publishers, New York 
i4 Spradley & McCurdy, 1994, p69 
,e Durkheim, Emile, 1993, The Division of Labor in Society, Trans, George Simpson, The Free Press, 
New York, pps 227 -228 
n Emmet, Dorothy, 1966, Rules, Roles and Relations, Macmillan, London 
Spradley & McCurdy 1994 
Stark, Werner, 1976, The Social Bond, Vol I, Antecedents of the Social Bond, The Phylogeny of 
Sociability, Fordham University Press, New York, 
Stark, Werner, 1983, The Social Bond, Vol IV, Safeguards of the Social Bond, Ethos and Religion, 
Fordham University Press, New York, 
4° Sahlins, M D, 1960, The Origin of Society, Scietific American, 203, No 3, September, pp77 -86 
41 Hume, David, 1966, Treatise of Human Nature, Claredon Press, London, pp187 -205 
' Stark, 1983 
43 Campbell, Lewis and Benjamin Lowett, 1987, Plato's Republic, Garland, New York 
44 Stark, 1978, p198 
n Frowen, Stephen F, ed, 1997, Hayek: Economist and Social Philosopher, A Critical Retrospect, 
Macmillan, London 
n Williamson, Oliver E, 1994, Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory, in Smelser, Neil 
J and Swedberg, Richard , eds, The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 
4' Williamson, 1994, 
41 Reynolds, Peter C, 1981, On the Evolution of Human Behavior: the argument from animals to man, 
University of California Press, Berkeley 
56 
Stark, 1976 
' Ross, E A, 1901, Social Control, Macmillan, London, p190 
51 The Bhagavadgita, translated by S. Radhakrishnan, Harper Torchbooks, New York 1973. 
52 Romans 7: 14 - 20 
5' Bruck, Michael von, 1986, The Unity of Reality, trans James V Zeitz, Paulist Press, New York, 
'4 Tracey, David, 1976 Chicago University Lectures, as reported by Edwin Byford, private 
communication 
" Tracey, David, 1996, Blessed Rage for Order, Seabury Press, New York, 
5` Of course, mainstream contemporary Christianity would interpret the story of the fall as myth rather 
than as history. The story of the Fall in Genesis is not a historical account of the origin of human 
sinfulness, but rather as an expression of the insight that sin originates in human pride and self -will. 
Tillich, Pau1,1963, Systematic Theology Vol III, University of Chicago Press, p93 
" John Paul II, 1995, Centesimus Annus, St Paul Publications, Sydney, p77 
11 Simon, 1995 
` 'Hobbes, Thomas, 1968, [1651], Leviathan, Pelican Classics, London, Chapter XIII, p186 
'Rousseau, Jean -Jacques, 1975, The Social Contract, Penguin Books, London 
Nielbuhr, Reinhold, 1944, The Children of Light and Children of Darkness, Charles Scribner and Sons, 
New York, pp 10 -11 
" Stark, Werner, 1978, The Social Bond, Vol II, Antecedents of the Social Bond, The Ontogeny of 
Sociality, Fordham University Press, New York, p124 
f 4 Llewellyn, Karl N, 1931/32, What Price Contract, Yale Law Journal No 40, pps704 -751 
Stark, 1978, p201 
Stark and Sumner believe that class- dividedness, and even class -warfare can be fully accommodated 
within the framework of their analysis. Stark agrees that each class or group in society has its own mores 
and that the upper strata tend to force their own customs on the lower strata. Indeed, he acknowledges 
that chiefs, kings, priests, warriors, statesmen and other functionaries have often used their authority to 
promote their own interests. In any event, there is no need for us to deny the possibility that dominance 
played a role in the historical processes which created societies and states. And, of course, it would be 
entirely consistent with Stark, and with the liberal tradition, to argue that our desire to acquire such 
dominance requires control. Indeed, the coercive nature of social control necessarily raises the question 
of the legitimate limits of such cohesion, a question of central concern for this analysis. 
fi7 Dunstan, G R, 1974, The Artifice of Ethics, The Moorhouse Lectures 1973, SCM Press, London, 
" See for Example, Senge, Peter, M, 1992 The Fifth Discipline, Random House, Milsons Point 
'9 Dunstan 1974 
Dunstan 1974 
11 Emmet, 1966 
" Gerth and Mills, 1954, Character and Social Structure, Routhledge & Kegan Paul, London 
see Dunstan, 1974 and Emmet, 1966 
74 Downie, R S, 1972, Roles and Values, An Introduction to Social Ethics, Methuen & Co Ltd, London 
" Downie, 1972, 
7' Brennan, Geoffrey and James M Buchanan, 1985, The Reason of Rules, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 
57 
" see Phillips, Derek L, 1986, Towards a Just Social Order, Princeton, New Jersey for a summary of 
contemporary theories. 
Parsons, Talcolt, 1949, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill, p203 
Elster, Jon, 1989, The Cement of Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
° Elster, 1989, p285 
'1 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engles, 1970, The German Ideology, International, New York, Preface 
'Gilligan, Carol, 1982, In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 
Phillips, 1986 
Phillips, 1986 
h5 Toulmin, Stephen, 1990, Cosmopolis, The Free Press, New York 
Gilligan, Carol, 1983, Do the Social Sciences have an adequate theory of Moral Development ?, in 
Norma Haan, Robert N Bellah, Paul Rabinow and William M Sullivan, eds, Social Science as Moral 
Inquiry, Columbia University Press, New York, 
8' Downie, 1972 
58 
CHAPTER 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
Is society mainly a market place, in which self -serving individuals 
compete with one another - at work, in politics, and in courtship - 
enhancing the general welfare in the process? Or do we typically 
seek to do both what is right and what is pleasurable, and find 
ourselves frequently in conflict when moral values and happiness 
are incompatible? Are we, first of all, "normative- effective" 
beings, whose deliberations and decisions are deeply affected by 
our values and emotions. Amitai Etzionil 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter commenced to examine two key, but hidden assumptions, which 
have underpinned much recent public policy formulation, the ideas that the economic 
system is autonomous and that the economic system has priority over the social system. 
These two assumptions have played a central role in recent public policy discussion on 
the issues of Fair Trading in Australia. That debate involves fundamental questions 
relating to the functioning of the capitalist system and the relationship between 
economics, ethics and law. Consequently, the Fair Trading Debate provides an ideal 
vehicle for exploring the influence of economic ideas on a fundamental legal institution. 
In fact these the two assumptions critically determine how the Fair Trading Debate is 
viewed by key players in that debate. More broadly these two assumptions have 
allowed economics to become the dominant methodology and vocabulary for the 
evaluation of public policy choices in our society. As a result `economic efficiency' has 
become the dominant value served by government policy. 
The discussion so far has centred around the question of how social order originates. It 
has been shown that there is broad consensus that the social order is a moral order that 
developed with the evolution of the human race. Thus it was concluded that there was 
no pre -social human nature, and consequently the study of social life involves the study, 
not simply of regularities, but the study of regulated conduct. It is our shared values 
that acts as the mortar that binds together our communities, backed by formal and 
informal means of coercion and by our own sense of guilt. Importantly, it is the control 
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of our greed that constitutes one of the prime victories of culture over our animality. 
But that victory is less than complete and consequently the maintenance of a peaceful 
society involves constant moral struggle. Consequently, it was concluded that in an 
effective civil society the pursuit of individual and institutional choice and `self- interest' 
is heavily constrained both by internalised moral codes and by externally imposed 
social sanctions. It was also concluded that that order was constantly under threat from 
what used to be called human sinfulness, particularly human greed. 
In this chapter, the discussion will focus the relationship of dependence between the 
economic and social systems, pointing to the neglect of this relationship by economic 
rationalists. 
NEGLECT OF THE DEPENDENCY OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ON THE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM BY NEO- CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
This thesis disputes the assumptions that the economic system has temporal and 
conceptual autonomy and that the economic system has primacy over the social. Any 
complex exchange economy needs, and presupposes, an already existing state of general 
pacification in order to function. Such an economy and its associated institutions are 
not natural phenomena - they do not arise spontaneously2. They are social artefacts. 
Indeed the dichotomy between the social system and the economic system used here is, 
itself, a social artefact and is largely a product of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
As Brennan and Buchanan confirm, most recent economists have tended to neglect the 
dependency of the economic system on the social system: 
"These economists have tended to neglect the importance of rules under the 
sometimes naive presumption that the `market will out,' regardless of 
institutional constraints. "3 
Less charitably, it could be suggested that this neglect reflects the imperialist 
pretentiousness of the dominant neo- classical tradition in seeking to explain all social 
phenomena. These imperialist tendencies appear even among economists aware of the 
importance of social norms for the economic system. For example, Ben -Ner and 
Putterman4 label religious prophets as "moral entrepreneurs" presumably on the basis 
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that the language of economic explanation is more `scientific' and thus more privileged 
than the traditional religious description. Similarly, these tendencies can be seen in the 
recent attempts of economists to include our moral concerns within the framework of 
`preferences' and thus within the framework of instrumental calculation. However, an 
economic approach to our moral values, based on the traditional self- interest model, is 
simplistic and misleading not simply because of the neglect of altruistic behaviour. 
Hirschman argues against the use of such a simplistic model of human behaviour: 
"What is needed is for economists to incorporate into their analyses, wherever 
that is pertinent, such basic traits and emotions as the desire for power and for 
sacrifice, the fear of boredom, pleasure in both commitment and unpredictibility, 
the search for meaning and community, and so on. "5 
Certainly, minor revisions to the neo- classical model such as allowing bounded 
rationality or allowing individuals to have altruistic preferences will not be enough to 
correct this form of modelling .6 This is because it is simply not true that society 
consists of a set of independent individuals, each of whom acts to achieve goals that are 
independently arrived at, and that the functioning of the social system consists of the 
combination of these actions of independent individuals? This billiard ball view is 
crudely derived from a number of interrelated influences. Firstly, the only perceptible 
actors in society are individuals .8 Secondly, as we will see in subsequent chapters, the 
political and moral philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Adam 
Smith and the other classical economists included, influenced by a mechanical 
cosmology, built such a view from the Reformation's emphasis on individual 
conscience. Thirdly, and largely as a consequence of the first two, individuals are more 
isolated in modern society than in the past. Nevertheless, in modem societies 
individuals still do not act independently, nor are their goals arrived at independently, 
and their interests are still not wholly selfish. The contemporary account of the 
individual as used in much moral and political philosophy and economics simply does 
not give a rich enough account. 
As indicated above, the standard response to this argument is to claim that moral values 
are incorporated into individual preferences. However, this effectively denies the 
pervasive, conflicting, and regulatory influences of culture in an attempt to preserve the 
methodological individualism essential to neo- classical modelling and the primacy of 
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voluntariness essential to its normative use. As we have already argued in Chapter 2, 
morals are a community construct. It is the assumed conventional dichotomy between 
the individual and the group that is misleading. It eliminates the tacit, interactive, 
dynamic relationship between individuals and between those individuals and the 
cultures within which they are embedded. Indeed, treating values as a kind of 
preference is simply an ad hoc strategy to insulate that theory from falsification by 
eliminating its predictive power and rendering it empty. It also eliminates the 
distinction embedded in language between selfish and unselfish behaviour .9 But the 
neglect of these considerations is central to the whole neo- classical research program. 
That program is strongly committed to explanation in terms of methodological 
individualism, reductionism, instrumental rationality, the Newtonian metaphor and its 
associated mathematic modelling, and self- interest as the fundamental social force. 
Indeed, the Newtonian metaphor, which is associated with a natural law outlook, is the 
dominant metaphor in contemporary economics. These constitute the neo- classical 
image of what it is to be properly `scientific'. These commitments are fundamentally 
normative and misleading rather than positively scientific. Inherent in that commitment 
is a view of society as a social contract. This is not simply a result of the positivist 
movement in economics and philosophy for the best part of the twentieth century, but 
has deeper roots in the whole Enlightenment program about which more will be said in 
the next chapter. It provides a particularly good example of how a particular intellectual 
paradigm or tradition locks us in to a particular way of looking and discussing. 
While contemporary neo- classical economists have largely neglected the relationship 
between the economic and social systems, this is not true more generally. It is to the 
discussion of that relationship by prominent theorists to which the thesis now turns. 
What has been said by others who have not neglected the issue 
The neglect noted above is surprising given the extent of the discussion of the 
relationship between the social and economic systems since the time of Adam Smith. 
Smith was well aware of the dependency of the economic system on legal rules and 
institutions. For example, in The Wealth of Nations, he says: 
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"only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable 
property which is acquired by the labour of many years or perhaps of many 
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security.'" 
Earlier in The Theory of Moral Sentiments he wrote that the individual 
"in the race for wealth and honours and preferments . .. may run as hard as he 
can, and strain every nerve and muscle, in order to outstrip his competitors. But 
if he should jostle or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is 
entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair -play, which they cannot admit of.s11 
And Smith recognised that justice is less a product, than a producer, of permanent 
human interaction, a presupposition as much as a consequence of the experience of 
interchange and cooperation. Indeed, Robins, in talking about Smith's views, suggested 
that the "invisible hand" is "the hand of the law- giver, the hand which withdraws from 
the sphere of the pursuit of self- interest those possibilities which do not harmonize with 
the public good. "12 Nevertheless Smith was also a Newtonian, seeing the economic 
system and the social order as an equilibrium system involving two fundamental social 
forces, self- interest and sympathy. Thus Smith under the influence of his friend David 
Hume could be seen as the father of the application of the Newtonian metaphor to 
economic analysis, just as earlier Hobbes was the father of the application of the 
Newtonian metaphor to political theory. 
In his analysis, Marx pointed out that commodities do not go to the market and make 
exchanges on their own account. For Marx, value was not inherent in a commodity but 
was rather a relation between persons expressed as a relation between things. 
Consequently, Marx emphasised that the market consisted of social relationships. 
Nevertheless, Marx, in his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, claimed 
that the economy constitutes the `real foundation' of society, and on this foundation `the 
legal and political superstructure' is based.13 In other words, the moral `superstructure' 
of a society is adapted to its sociotechnical or economic `substructure'. In Capital, 
Marx claims to lay bare the `natural laws' of capitalist production, and is guilty of the 
same error as the bourgeois economists he criticised, the reification of economic 
categories and their elevation into universal laws. 
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In contrast, the economic sociology tradition regards the economic process as an 
organic part of society, constantly interacting with other forces.14 Weber, for example, 
sees economic action as social and emphasises the autonomy of the social orders, law, 
politics and religion, vis -a -vis the economy. In opposition to Marx, he argued that it 
was not underlying economic forces that created cultural products like religion and 
ideology, but rather culture that produced certain forms of economic behaviour.15 In 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,16 he argued that the early Puritans, in 
seeking to glorify God alone and in renouncing the acquisition of material goods as an 
end in itself, developed certain virtues like honesty and thrift that were extremely 
helpful to the accumulation of capital. Weber went on to argue that the reinforcement 
of social virtues like honesty, reliability, cooperativeness, and a sense of duty to others, 
had the effect of heightening the capacity of adherents to cohere in new communities.17 
This was helpful to economic development because small sectarian communities created 
natural networks through which businessmen could hire employees, find customers, 
open lines of credit, and the like. Nevertheless, Weber saw market exchange as 
exceptional in that it represented the most instrumental and calculating type of social 
action that was possible between human beings. For Emmet,18 the fruitful way of 
interpreting Weber's views is in terms of the mutual conditioning of one by the other, 
and this is consistent with the organic outlook of contemporary economic sociology. 
For Durkheim, the division of labour serves a much broader function than the creation 
of wealth and efficiency.19 For him, it is the principal vehicle for creating cohesion and 
solidarity in modern society. As the division of labour advances, people cease to bond 
together on the basis of their similarities (what he called mechanical solidarity) but on 
the basis of the duties and rights arising out of the interdependency produced by the 
division of labour (organic solidarity). It is these duties and rights that hold society 
together. Consequently, morality was central to the whole cohesion of society. 
Durkheim went on to argue that a whole structure of norms and regulations surround 
economic exchanges and make them possible. In particular, without some generally 
shared feelings about honest dealings, contracts would be unenforceable. 
Durkheim insisted that even a well- functioning exchange economy was in constant 
danger of being hollowed out by fraud and force. Indeed, Durkheim in his preface to 
the second edition of The Division of Labor in Society published in 1902, was 
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concerned about the state of juridical and moral anomy [lawlessness], which attended 
economic life in his day: 
"The most blameworthy acts are so often absolved by success that the boundary 
between what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is just and what is 
unjust, has nothing fixed about it, but seems susceptible to almost arbitrary 
change by individuals. An ethic so unprecise and inconsistent cannot constitute 
a discipline . . 
"That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evident, since it runs 
counter to the aim of society, which is to suppress, or at least to moderate, war 
among men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a higher law. To justify 
this chaotic state, we vainly praise its encouragement of individual liberty. 
Nothing is falser than this antagonism too often presented between legal 
authority and individual liberty. Quite on the contrary, liberty (we mean genuine 
liberty, which it is society's duty to have respected) is itself the product of 
regulation. I can be free only to the extent that others are forbidden to profit 
from their physical, economic, or other superiority to the detriment of my 
liberty. But only social rules can prevent abuses of power. It is now known 
what complicated regulation is needed to assure individuals the economic 
independence without which liberty is only nominal. 
"If in the task that occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule than that 
of our well -understood interest, how can we learn to depend upon 
disinterestedness, on self -forgetfulness, on sacrifice? In this way, the absence of 
all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects beyond the economic 
world, and consequently weaken public morality. "20 
Polanyi takes up much the same theme. For him the human economy was embedded 
and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non -economic. The latter were vital 2' 
Consequently, Polanyi objected to what he called the economistic fallacy of equating 
the whole of the economy with the market. By doing so the true nature of the economy 
is distorted. In The Great Transformation,22 Polanyi disputed Adam Smith's claim that 
humans had a natural propensity to truck and barter. In The Economy as an Instituted 
Process,23 he argued that historically there were several different ways of organising an 
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economy: through reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange or a combination of all 
three. Even within markets, prices that fluctuate frequently, due to competition, 
represented a fairly late stage of development 
Thus the market economy was an institutional structure that was insignificant up to 
recent times. Nevertheless, the division of labour was a phenomenon as old as society 
and sprung from differences inherent in the facts of sex, geography, and individual 
endowment. Polanyi believed that historical and anthropological research justified the 
view that the economy is, as a rule, submerged in social relationships. Economic actors 
do not act to safeguard their individual interests in the possession of material goods but 
to safeguard their social standing, claims, and assets. Material goods are valued only in 
so far as they serve this end. In tribal society, an individual's economic interest is rarely 
paramount as the community keeps its members from starving. It is the maintenance of 
social ties, on the other hand, that is crucial. Disregarding the accepted code of 
behaviour would involve cutting oneself off from one's community. In any event, in 
the long run all social obligations are reciprocal and serve the individuals long -term 
interests. In a society characterised by reciprocity, the idea of profit is barred and 
haggling is decried while freely giving is acclaimed as a virtue. As Polanyi said: 
"Broadly, the proposition holds that all economic systems known to us up to the 
end of feudalism in Western Europe were organized either on the principles of 
reciprocity or redistribution, or householding, or some combination of the three. 
These principles were institutionalized with the help of a social organization 
which, inter alia, made use of the patterns of symmetry, centricity, and autarchy. 
In this framework, the orderly production and distribution of goods was secured 
through a great variety of individual motives disciplined by general principles of 
behavior. Among these motives gain was not prominent. Custom and law, 
magic and religion co- operated in inducing the individual to comply with rules 
of behavior which, eventually, ensured his functioning in the economic 
system."24 
Consequently, Polanyi believed that what economists saw as the typical market was just 
one of many possible forms of organised exchange. To Polanyi, two watershed events 
in European history were responsible for the emergence of the modern market economy: 
the creation by the mercantilist state of "internal markets" and the radical elimination of 
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all market regulation beginning in the early nineteenth century in England. To him the 
result was unspeakable misery for the common people until actions were finally taken to 
protect society from "the self -regulating market." Indeed he traces many of the key 
tragic events of the twentieth century to the radically utopian attempt in mid -nineteenth 
century England to transform all of society into one giant market. 
For Polanyi, the control of the economic system by the market has overwhelming 
consequences for the organisation of society; it means no less than the running of 
society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social 
relations, social relations are embedded in the social system. Indeed, a self -regulating 
market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an 
economic and political sphere. To include human beings (labour) and their natural 
surroundings in the market system is to subordinate the substance of society itself to the 
market. Consequently for Polanyi, a market economy can exist only in a market 
society. Indeed, the very idea of a self- adjusting market implied a stark utopia. He 
believed that such an institution could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society 25 
Interestingly, Hayek, a strong supporter of market processes and a minimalist state in 
his later writings, makes it clear that what he had called the `spontaneous' order of the 
market was dependent on the system of abstract rules, deep- rooted convictions and 
moral rules, which are the product of civilisation and which represented the institutional 
infrastructure of the economic system 26 Indeed, for Hayek, informal rules such as 
custom and conventions are probably even more important in daily economic life than 
the formal ones. Hayek was conscious of the complexity of that social system arguing 
that: 
"No single human intelligence is capable of inventing the most appropriate 
abstract rules because those rules which have evolved in the process of growth 
of society embody the experience of many more trials and errors than any 
individual mind could acquire. "27 
Another more recent economist to write on the issue was Granovetter. He argues that 
economic institutions, like all institutions, do not arise automatically in some form made 
inevitable by external circumstances, but are socially constructed. 28 They are 
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constructed by individuals whose action is both facilitated by and constrained by the 
structure and resources available in the social networks in which they are embedded. 
Just as for firms and economic groups, how industries are organised is a social 
construction that often might have been otherwise. He also reminds us that economic 
action, like all action, is socially situated, and cannot be explained by individual 
motives alone; it is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relations rather than 
carried out by atomised actors. Like Polanyi, he points out that the pursuit of economic 
goals is accompanied by such non -economic goals as sociability, approval, status, and 
power. 
Indeed, while much economic literature focuses attention on the role of our mortal 
codes in permitting the exchanges involved in any complex division of labour, we 
would do well to remind ourselves that most economic activity occurs in groups, and 
without an effective social order, no large -scale group activity would be possible. 
Collectives are the important decision -making units in contemporary society. 
Consequently, Simon finds it puzzling that neoclassical economics places markets at the 
centre of the stage with all economic phenomena, all social phenomena, to be explained 
by translating them into, or deriving them from, market transactions based upon 
negotiated contracts.29 In criticising this approach, Simon points to the absence of 
adequate empirical testing and an absence of an adequate consideration of the literature 
on organisations and decision -making. Because organisations are the dominant feature 
of the economic landscape, Simon suggests that the term `organisational economy' 
might be a more appropriate description than `market economy' 3° He also points out 
that the boundary between markets and organisations varies greatly from one society to 
another and from one time to another, arguing that these variations need to be explained. 
Further, he argues that we should begin with empirically valid postulates about what 
motivates real people in real organisations, pointing to four well documented 
organisational phenomena, authority, rewards, identification and coordination. 
Consequently, for Simon, prices are only one of the mechanisms for the coordination of 
behaviour, either between organisations or within them. 
North approaches this issue from the perspective of an economic historian interested in 
explaining economic growth and the differential performances of economies. In 
Institutions, Institutional; Change and Economic Performance,31 he argues that a proper 
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understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation has been missing 
from economic analysis. While many economic historians emphasise the role of 
technological innovation in the development of human society and in economic growth, 
North places his emphasis on the development of institutions. He defines those 
institutions as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and this 
brings us back into the sociological stream discussed earlier. North sees human 
cooperation as a fundamental theoretical problem that needs to be explained because 
complex, impersonal exchange is the antithesis of the condition under which 
cooperation arises from rational self- interest in game theory. In any event, he sees a 
vast gap between the relative clean, precise, and simple world of game theory and the 
complex, imprecise, and fumbling way by which human beings have gone about 
structuring human interaction. He also now disputed that evolutionary pressures will 
lead to institutions that are "efficient" in the neo- classical sense. He also points out that 
historically the growth of economies has occurred within the institutional framework of 
well -developed coercive polities because it is difficult to sustain complex exchange 
without a third party to enforce agreements. 
The difficulty in enforcing agreements has always been the critical obstacle to 
increasing specialisation and division of labour. Enforcement poses no problem when it 
is in the interests of parties to live up to an agreement. But without institutional 
constraints, self- interested behaviour will foreclose complex impersonal exchange, 
because of the uncertainty that either party will find it in their interest to live up to an 
agreement. Transaction costs will reflect this uncertainty by including a risk premium, 
the magnitude of which will turn on the likelihood of defection. North argued that 
throughout history the size of this premium has been too large to allow complex 
impersonal exchange and has therefore limited the possibilities for economic growth. 
For North, it has been the evolution of institutions that has limited these costs and in the 
process created a hospitable environment for the complex exchange necessary for 
economic growth. Uncertainties surround such complex exchange. They arise as a 
consequence of both the complexity of the problems to be solved and our limited 
problem -solving abilities. In all societies, from the most primitive to the most 
advanced, people impose constraints upon themselves to give a structure to their 
relations with others. In these circumstances, history matters because the past and the 
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present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's 
institutions. Consequently, today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the past. 
Such institutions include both formal rules and informal constraints such as convention 
and codes of behaviour. Institutional constraints include both what individuals are 
prohibited from doing and under what conditions some individuals are permitted to 
undertake certain activities. The rules and informal codes are sometimes violated and 
punishment is enacted. Therefore, an essential part of the functioning of institutions is 
the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment. Taken together, 
the formal and informal rules and the type and effectiveness of enforcement shape the 
whole character of the social and economic system. Institutions affect the performance 
of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production. Together with 
the technology employed, they determine the transaction and transformation costs that 
make up total costs. 
In the course of his analysis, North makes a crucial distinction between institutions and 
organisations. While organisations, like institutions, provide a structure to human 
interactions, he differentiates the rules from the players. Both what organisations come 
into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional 
framework. In turn, they influence how the institutional framework evolves. Indeed, 
such institutions (from conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of behaviour to statute 
law, and common law, and contracts between individuals) are evolving and are 
continually altering the choices available to us. Such evolution is a complicated process 
usually involving incremental change. Even discontinuous changes (such as revolution 
and conquest) are never completely discontinuous because of the embeddedness of 
informal constraints in societies. Although formal rules may change overnight as the 
result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. 
These cultural constraints connect the past with the present and the future and provide a 
key to explaining the path of historical change. 
The institutions necessary to accomplish economic exchange vary in their complexity, 
from those that solve simple exchange problems to ones that extend across space and 
time and numerous individuals. The greater the specialisation and the number and 
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variability of valuable attributes associated with a good or service, the more weight 
must be put on reliable institutions that allow individuals to engage in complex 
contracting with a minimum of uncertainty. Exchange in modern economies consisting 
of many variable attributes extending over long periods of time necessitates institutional 
reliability, which has only gradually emerged in Western economies. North believes 
that formal rules make up only a small, although very important, part of the constraints 
that shape choices in those economies. In our daily interaction with others, whether 
within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, the governing 
structure is overwhelming defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and 
conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but these are 
seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions. 
It is clear that exchange is not simple in tribal societies. In the absence of the state and 
formal rules, a dense social network leads to the development of informal structures 
with substantial stability. Indeed, informal constraints are pervasive features of modem 
economies as well. These informal constraints involve extensions, elaborations, and 
modifications of formal rules, socially sanctioned norms of behaviour; and internally 
enforced standards of conduct. Cooperative frameworks of economic and political 
impersonal exchange are at the heart of social, political and economic performance. 
While formal rules can help, it is the informal constraints embodied in norms and 
internally imposed codes of conduct that are critical. In short North32 does not believe 
that the rational choice paradigm can explain the historical and contemporary record of 
economic growth. 
In a complementary account, Fukayama33 also sees what he calls spontaneous 
sociability as critical to economic life. His view of the role of moral values in 
promoting organisational innovation and economic development owes much to the 
earlier work of Weber and Polanyi. Communities of shared values, whose members are 
willing to subordinate their private interests for the sake of larger goals of the 
community, alone can generate the kind of social trust that is critical to organisational 
efficiency. Consequently, the ability to create large, private business organisations in 
such societies as Germany, Japan, and the United States is related to the fact that they 
are high -trust societies with abundant social capital 
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Echoing North's34 and Williamson's35 focus on transaction costs, Fukayama argues that 
widespread distrust imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that 
high -trust societies do not have to pay. Justified expectations of honest conduct in 
transactions reduce costs incurred finding buyer or seller, negotiating a contract, 
complying with government regulations, and enforcing that contract in the event of 
dispute or fraud. There is less need to spell things out in lengthy contracts; less need to 
hedge against unexpected contingencies; fewer disputes, and less need to litigate if 
disputes arise. Indeed, in some high -trust relationships, parties do not even have to 
worry about maximising profits in the short run, because they know that a deficit in one 
period will be made good by the other party later. Importantly, a high -trust society can 
organise its workplace on a more flexible and group- oriented basis, with more 
responsibility delegated to lower levels of the organisation. Such a society will be 
better able to engage in organisational innovation, since the high degree of trust will 
permit a wide variety of social relationships to emerge. Workers usually find their 
workplaces more satisfying if they are treated like adults who can be trusted to 
contribute to their community rather than like small cogs in a large industrial machine 
designed by someone else. On the other hand, low -trust societies must fence in and 
isolate their workers with a series of bureaucratic rules. Consequently, the ability of 
companies to move from large hierarchies to flexible networks of smaller firms will 
depend on the degree of trust and social capital present in the broader society. This is 
important in contemporary discussions of the development of electronic commerce and 
the associated possibility of creating virtual organisations using new communications 
technology. A low -trust society may never be able to take full advantage of the 
efficiencies that these developments offer. 
Fukayama argues that the most effective organisations are based on communities of 
shared ethical values 36 Such communities do not require extensive contract and legal 
regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives members of the group 
a basis for mutual trust. In this regard, Williamson warns us against seeing trust in 
purely calculative terms, as to do so can have corrosive effects on the relationships 
involved37. Groups can enter into a downward spiral of distrust when trust is repaid 
with what is perceived as betrayal or exploitation. 
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Fukayama, like Stark and Weber, points out that traditional religions, or ethical systems 
like Confucianism, constitute the major institutionalised sources of such culturally 
determined behaviour because their shared moral languages give their members a 
common moral life. To some extent any moral community, regardless of the specific 
ethical rules involved, will create a degree of trust among its members. Certain ethical 
codes tend to promote a wider radius of trust than others do by emphasising the 
imperatives of honesty, charity, and benevolence towards the community at large. 
Fukayama continues his discussion in terms of social capital which he defines as a 
capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. 
Social capital differs from other forms of human capital insofar as it is usually created 
and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical habit. 
The social capital needed to create this kind of moral community cannot be acquired, as 
in the case of other forms of human capital, through a rational investment decision. 
Rather, it requires habituation to the moral norms of a community and the acquisition of 
virtues like loyalty, honesty, and dependability. The group, moreover, has to adopt 
common norms as a whole before trust can become generalised among its members. In 
other words, social capital cannot be acquired simply by individuals acting on their 
own. It is based on the prevalence of social rather than individual virtues. 
Fukayama also argues that those societies with a high degree of communal solidarity 
and shared moral values should be more economically efficient than more 
individualistic ones. The larger organisations become, the greater the tendency is for 
individual members to become free -riders. The stronger the social solidarity, the more 
readily it is that members will identify their own well -being with that of the group and 
the more likely that they will put the group's interests ahead of their own. In the words 
of Kenneth Arrow: 
"Now trust has a very important pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust is an 
important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of 
trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately 
this is not a commodity that can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, 
you already have some doubts about what you've bought. Trust and similar 
values, loyalty or truth -telling, are examples of what the economist would call 
`externalities'. They are goods, they are commodities; they have real, practical, 
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economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to 
produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in high esteem. But 
they are not commodities for which trade on the open market is technically 
possible or even meaningful." 38 
Indeed, Arrow goes on to argue that the whole economic system would break down if it 
were not for reinforcement agents and incentives based on morality. But Elster 
specifically rejects this as an adequate account of all social norms on the grounds that 
not all norms are Pareto improvements, some norms that would make everybody better 
off are missing, and the fact that a norm does make everybody better off does not 
explain why it exists 39 The last of these would require the demonstration of a feedback 
mechanism in which the benefits of the norm to contribute to its maintenance. In this 
regard, Elster suggests that a form of social selection, as opposed to individual 
selection, could provide an adequate feedback mechanism. Similarly, Coleman40 
concluded that rational choice theory cannot explain the process by which norms are 
internalized. Furthermore, the psychologist Daniel Batson41 has conducted a series of 
experiments which have gone a long way to disproving that all altruistic behaviour can 
be explained by the desire to avoid unpleasant feelings or self -punishment or to gain 
social approval, a sense of efficacy, or shared pleasure; a conclusion supported by field 
research. 
In the light of the above, we would argue that our moral institutions as well as our legal 
institutions provide essential infrastructure for the social system in general and the 
economic system in particular. Although it has long been recognised that infrastructure 
is an essential part of the economic system, discussion of that infrastructure is mostly 
limited to physical infrastructure, a limitation associated with a very poor understanding 
of the concept of capital. Coleman42points to the properties of social capital that 
distinguish it from the private, divisible, alienable goods treated by neo- classical theory. 
Importantly, while it is a resource that has value in use it cannot be easily exchanged. 
Social capital is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it but is 
an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded. Social capital does 
not primarily benefit those whose efforts bring it into existence, but those who are part 
of the particular structure. The result is that most social capital is created or destroyed 
as a by product of other activities. It also means that the importance of social capital is 
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frequently unrecognised. Of course, the comprehensive legal framework for economic 
organisation, including property rights and contract, developed by complex societies, 
also form an essential part of that apparatus of social control and as such are an essential 
precondition to any complex division of labour - no one would argue that trust or moral 
obligation alone could take their place. These institutions are an essential part of any 
complex market system. But these institutions rest on a bedrock of ethical habits. As 
Durkheim argues, contracts, which appear to be voluntary calculated deals among 
uncommitted individuals, effectively draw on prior shared bonds which are not subject 
to negotiation, and of which the parties are often unaware 43 
CONCLUSION 
Earlier it was argued that two key assumptions had been introduced into contemporary 
public policy debates by economic rationalists These were the autonomy of the market 
and primacy of the market over the social. It has been argued that the complex 
exchange necessary to a highly specialised division of labour requires a pre- existing 
state of social peace. That state of peace is dependent on our evolved cultural systems 
with their informal norms and formal rules backed by formal and informal means of 
coercion and by our own sense of guilt at the breach of internalised norms. 
Consequently, the market is a sub -system nestled within a more encompassing societal 
context. But of course these systems are not independent of each other: they interact 
and condition each other. Indeed, social and economic institutions cannot be clearly 
distinguíshed.44 Nevertheless, the process of economic competition is not self - 
sustaining; its very existence, as well as the scope of transactions organised by it, is 
dependent to a significant extent upon the societal "capsule ", within which that 
competition takes place 45 But the advocates of social contractual theory work with a 
model of society which is a replica of the market. Their attempt to model society's 
moral infrastructure as a social contract is an attempt to reduce all social phenomena to 
what is, itself, a particular social phenomenon. It is a contract which takes the simplest 
of transactions as its paradigmatic example.46 But a simple exchange transaction 
provides only a poor model for complex long -term contracts. By trying to generate the 
rules of economic life internally, by viewing them as having emerged from rational, 
self- maximising individuals, such theorists have effectively assumed what they have set 
out to explain. 
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Such a view argues that our long -term interests require the capacity to discipline our 
appetites, the suppression of our animality, but this argument does no more than 
incorporate some of our moral values within the concept of self -interest. While it 
highlights the frequent presence of considerable tension between our immediate desires 
and our long -term interests, those long -term interests incorporate only some of our 
moral values. In any event, this concept of self -interest is not descriptive of the real 
behaviour of real individuals, amounting to no more than idealisations both of 
individuals and of their self -interest, idealisations which fly in the face of daily 
experience. In any event, as argued earlier, there is no historical basis for the view that 
fully formed individuals preceded communities and their shared rules, roles and beliefs. 
Indeed, contemporary society could not exist without the complex of social and 
religious norms which sustain it. The development of that society, indeed the formation 
of complex communities generally along with and their associated norms and 
institutions, has been a long process of social evolution along with the development of 
supporting religious and philosophical beliefs. Of course it can be said that this process 
of social evolution produced what amounts to a tacit social contact, but such an 
assertion would be mere sophistry, devoid of content. 
This chapter has set out to examine two key assumptions underlying contemporary 
policy debates, the perceived autonomy of market institutions and the primacy of the 
economic over the social. These claims seem to reflect a too ready tendency to resort to 
dichotomous terms and to reductionism. They have been rejected on the basis that the 
suppression of our animality and our "self- interest" through social values, rules and 
socially defined roles play key roles in sustaining our social institutions and our 
economic system. And the proposition that 'self- interest' is the fundamental ordering 
principle operating in society has also to be rejected, and it has to be rejected even when 
self- interest is attenuated through competition. Indeed, the very claim is a scandal to 
those in the mainstream Christian tradition as well as to many other religious traditions. 
The competition process itself is both constrained and sustained by social and legal 
rules. The complex division of labour in modem societies involves a complex of 
relationships and institutions, which cannot be reduced to transactions. Rather: 
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"State, law and society are entwined in mutually reinforcing virtuous 
connection; rather than mutually reinforcing vicious competition. Or so it is 
when we are in luck.i47 
The next chapter will extend this examination of the perceived autonomy of market 
institutions and the primacy of the economic over the social. It will firstly focus on the 
history of the concept of the social contract and the associated doctrine of freedom of 
contract as the central paradigm in economic rationalism. It will also point to the 
growing difficulty encountered in trying to justify these theoretical ideas as the original 
Divine basis of Natural law was securalised and attempts made to naturalise it. This 
leads readily into the question of how economists perceive their own enterprise and how 
that enterprise fits in with the Enlightenment project. 
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CHAPTER 4: A CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC RATIONALISM 
"I perceive," said the Countess, "Philosophy is now become 
Mechanical." "So Mechanical," said I "that I fear we shall quickly 
be asham'd of it; they will have the World to be in great, what a 
watch is in little; which is very regular, & depends only upon the 
just disposing of the several parts of the movement. But pray tell 
me, Madam, had you not formerly a more sublime Idea of the 
Universe ?" FonteneIlei 
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by 
scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current 
standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing 
conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to 
be understood. Michael Oakeshott2 
INTRODUCTION 
At the conclusion of chapter 3, it was argued that the proposition that self- interest as the 
fundamental ordering principle operating in society cannot be sustained. This is in 
contrast to many economists who generally argue that the existence of social groups can 
be explained as the result of voluntary contact between individuals who have made the 
rational calculation that cooperation is in their long -term self -interest. This view begs 
the question of whether individuals are actually capable of determining what is in their 
long -term self- interest. In contrast, we argue that civilisation required the suppression 
of self- interest through social norms and that, in practice, our decisions are deeply 
affected by our values and our emotions. Consequently, the complexity of relationships 
and institutions in modem societies, which make the division of labour possible, cannot 
be reduced to voluntary transactions. 
We also argued in chapter 3 that our moral codes and our legal system provide 
infrastructure essential for the social system in general and the economic system in 
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particular. While it has long been recognised that infrastructure is essential to the 
functioning of the economic system, economists generally have taken that infrastructure 
for granted, limiting their consideration of infrastructure to physical infrastructure. But 
this limitation involves a very narrow understanding of the concept of capital, a limited 
understanding that is beginning to break down. Thus, we now have a recognition, 
among some economists, of the importance of `human capital' to the functioning of the 
economic system, though that concept is frequently confined to embodied marketable 
knowledge and skills. But this is far too narrow a view of the skills required for 
successful human interaction, both economic and social. The development of that 
human capital involves the process of socialisation and moral education. But the 
content of that socialisation has been invented in the process of social evolution and 
involves some vision, or visions, of the `good society'. 
It is clear that religious and intellectual speculation have played an important part in the 
development of such visions. Such speculation involves the attempt to see beyond the 
historical to what, in the rationalist, scientific tradition, are conceived of as more 
radically fundamental, underlying forces. Such a vision, and its associated speculative 
reasoning structure, attempts to lay down the form that moral justification should take. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, these are not new questions. Rather, they are as old as 
philosophy and its fascination with deductive political and moral theories. Indeed, even 
the idea of the invisible hand, beloved of economists, was old in 1759 when Adam 
Smith used the phrase. Just how old may come as something of a surprise. In his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith says: 
"that the ancient Stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the 
all -ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event 
ought to be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the universe, and 
as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the 
vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as 
their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, 
were made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of 
nature.' 
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Indeed, the idea originates with Hesiod in the seventh century BC, one of the earliest 
Greek epic poets and the first known individual to Western civilisation to have 
incorporated precepts into poetry .5 
In Chapter 2, we provided an evolutionary account of the emergence of social order 
along with a brief summary of the various ahistorical theories which have been used to 
account for social order. These ahistorical approaches have not led to, nor are they 
likely to lead to, any consensus. Indeed, it has been argued that the history of the social 
sciences has been dominated by three competing opinions: 
society is merely a collection of individuals (nominalism); 
society is an integrated whole, that the term society stands for a reality 
(philosophical realism); and 
society is neither a fiction nor a fact, but an entity ever in the making, a process.6 
The first view is based on a mechanical, atomistic metaphor and leads to mechanistic 
analogies and social theories in which supra -individual forces must be explained in 
terms of individual behaviour. It sees the social system as an equilibrium system. It is 
this view that drives neo- classical economics. But this perspective, in denying the 
existence of a super -individual entity, still has to account for our understandings of such 
entities. Simply to suggest that such understandings are mistaken would be inconsistent 
with that perspective's own methodological individualism by denying the primacy of 
the meanings and intentions of individuals? The second view, which is based on an 
organic metaphor, is the way that ancient Greek and medieval philosophers viewed 
society. Society is conceived of as an organism similar to the human body, a view 
lending itself to biological analogies. Important historically in this regard is the view of 
God as the head and society as the body. 
Both of these views yield useful insights into certain aspects of society. Yet both 
exclude essential elements of the social order and, therefore, do not provide an adequate 
account. The third view of nature as process, or as evolution, arises primarily out of the 
relatively recent experience of change in social and economic life within the lifetime of 
reflective commentators. Change consequently came to be seen as a fundamental factor 
that had to be explained. This process view better accounts for both the integration of 
the social order and the independence of the individuals that comprise it 8 
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What is clear is that we are heirs to a dominant tradition of moral and social argument 
based on a mechanical metaphor that continues to influence our policy development 
processes. Consequently, it is appropriate to turn to a more detailed account of the 
origins of the various social doctrines, including social contract theory, that influence 
contemporary economic thought, and contemporary public policy development. Such 
an account is necessary to any proper understanding of the origins of economic 
rationalism and its critique. 
THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS OF 
MODERNITY AND MARKET IDEOLOGY 
The polis of classical Greece was one such intellectual model 9 It was only in the polis 
that real human existence was deemed to reside. In medieval times, St Thomas 
Aquinas provided a Christianised Aristotelian model, a hierarchical edifice in which 
humans served Godly ends. A later, ethical vision of the social world was provided by 
Calvin and his followers. These theories involved an account of social existence in 
terms of a vision of ultimate good. In the Christian versions, the explanation was in 
terms of a Divine purpose. Common to all these visions is a transcendental, if not 
transcendent, source of moral action as the basis of social existence. 
What is important, for this account, is the fact that the medieval concept of man as a 
political and social being, necessarily involved in a network of social relations, which 
had been derived from Aristotle, gradually waned. This decline brought with it a need 
for a new explanation. This change was associated with the decline of the moral and 
secular authority of the Western Christian Church, partly as a result of the struggle for 
power between religious and secular authorities in medieval Europe, and partly as a 
result of the Reformation and the religious and political strife that followed. Tawney 
describes this change as follows: 
"The difference between the England of Shakespeare, still visited by the ghosts 
of the Middle Ages, and the England which emerged in 1700 from the fierce 
polemics of the last two generations, was a difference of social and political 
theory even more than of constitutional and political arrangements. Not only the 
facts, but the minds which appraised them, were profoundly modified ... The 
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natural consequences of the abdication of authorities which had stood, however 
imperfectly, for a common purpose in social organization, was the gradual 
disappearance from social thought of the idea of purpose itself. Its place in the 
eighteenth century was taken by the idea of mechanism. The conception of men 
as united to each other, and of all mankind to God, by mutual obligations, 
arising from their relations to a common end, ceased to be impressed upon 
men's minds."10 
Progressively, and certainly by the eighteenth century, the intellectual climate had come 
to be defined by Deism and an associated distancing of God from human affairs 11 
Under this Deist view, while God had actively created the Universe and consequently 
was the final cause of the physical and social order, God had then turned His back, 
leaving it to operate automatically by laws built in at the outset. This involved a 
different vision of God from that the Judeo- Christian revelation, that of the Stoics, a 
God fitting the Newtonian mechanical world view, the starter of the cosmic clock, a 
God filling the gaps between the rapidly expanding natural forms of explanation and 
social and physical reality. Thus, the Enlightenment rejected Christianity's claim of a 
historical revelation which had absolute significance, a sacred mystery that was the 
source of truth and value.12 In this rejection, the magisterium of the church - its 
claimed authority to teach on faith and morals on the basis of a commission from God - 
passed imperceptibly from ecclesiastical authorities and their theologian advisers, to 
political and moral philosophers who claimed an authority to teach on social and 
political arrangements because of their special knowledge of the Truth and of Natural 
Laws. What remained in Deism as a remanent of God's presence in the world, an echo 
of the Almighty, was the facility of reason, the holiness of rationally. 
This Deist view is still a vision of a benevolent God, Natural Laws having been created 
to ensure human happiness. Consequently, the discovery of, and obedience to such 
Laws was essential to human happiness. The development of natural moral theory is 
implicit in such an approach. It is also teleological in that it imputes a purpose to social 
phenomena. This trend is directly associated with the development of science and a 
desire to find a scientific and increasingly more natural explanation of the social order. 
This established the intellectual milieu that determined what was accepted as a valid 
explanation. In this climate, the transcendent grounding of the social order was no 
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longer seen as providing an adequate explanation. While not yet totally abandoning 
belief in and a reliance on the benevolence of God, human attributes or `human nature' 
increasingly were seen as the ultimate determinant of the regularities and uniformities in 
social life and to support a vision of the social good. This appeal to nature and reason 
was an appeal to nature and reason as a source of authority justifying social, political 
and economic arrangements. It was a process that progressively divinised Nature and 
human Reason, providing a secular source of meaning and justification as 
comprehensive and as dogmatic as that provided by the religion it replaced. Clark calls 
this project, sprung from the Enlightenment, the Natural Law Outlook. It was a project 
with three essential elements, a belief in social physics, naturalism and the derivation of 
a natural moral theory.13 Universality and sacrosancity are implicit in this outlook. 
For example, Thomas Hobbes, one of the early thinkers of Modernity and the first of the 
major contract theorists, had a strong interest in the new philosophy and science of the 
seventeenth century.14 Indeed, Hobbes had with a materialistic and mechanistic theory 
using the Newtonian metaphor even before Newton. He aimed to develop a science of 
politics comprised of universal propositions proven as conclusively as the propositions 
of Euclid. This new type of political theorising, which became typical of modernity, 
incorporated a new and distinctive view of the way in which people should relate to the 
world. The individual is conceived of as an isolated mind and will with a vocation to 
bring the world under the control of reason, a way of thinking that privileges the 
rational, wilful subject.15 Of course, Newton, the seminal figure in the science of the 
seventeenth century, gave this natural law outlook widespread scientific credibility. 
Newton emphasised the independence of scientific discoveries from theology and 
metaphysics, even though the belief in a Divine order was central to his beliefs.16 Thus, 
he believed that the rational and the natural were synonymous. Consequently, the 
structure of nature, God's design, could be discovered by reasoning, particularly 
mathematical reasoning, applied to observation and experimentation. But he also 
believed that this method was important for moral philosophy and for salvation for that 
also was part of God's design. 
Hobbes' theory involved a mechanics of the mind and a mechanics of society in which 
strivings within our bodies determined our actions in our relationships with each other. 
For Hobbes, the sociological counterpart to the concept of gravity was the unceasing 
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pursuit of power and pleasure. This is a theme that reappears latter in Bentham in his 
utilitarian account of morality. It was Hobbes, and then Locke, who sowed the 
intellectual seeds of economic liberalism. Importantly this tradition breaks with 
Aristotle and Acquinas and their view of humans as inherently social and political 
animals. Rather, they postulate theories that are highly individualistic and pre -social, 
and that are voluntaristic, consensual and rationalist 17 Nevertheless, they are theories 
with roots in earlier political theorising where the idea of contract was used to 
undermine the quasi- divine pretensions of kings and emperors.18 
This use of the idea of contract can be traced to the Old Testament, to Roman law, and 
the political practice of medieval Europe, where kings were often elected and ruled in 
accordance with pre- existing laws and customs.19 In particular, among the Germanic 
peoples the idea of a pactum governing their monarchy was derived from the idea of a 
covenant which in turn was derived from the social and religious history of the ancient 
Mid -East as recorded in the Old Testament. In such a covenant, Divine authority was 
invoked as a witness to morally binding agreements. These agreements were often in 
the form of a suzerain treaty between a stronger political leader and a weaker one but 
also covered mutual pledges between more equal partners. The Old Testament relates 
how this "basic, `mutual,' oath -bound creation of responsible relationships" was 
recognised to be a close analogy of the way in which God relates to humanity and a 
model of how we should relate to each other under God 20 And it involves a revelation 
of the nature of a just, merciful God who directly engages in the formation and 
sustaining of righteous living in community. 
The development of social contract theories was also closely associated with the 
religious, social and political developments in the surrounding societies. Thus, contract 
ideas provided radical Protestants with a means of justifying their political dissent. For 
example, contractarian ideas were congenial to Calvinists engaged in struggle against 
ruling secular authorities opposed to their religious beliefs. The Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos, which appeared in 1579, attributes the obligations of a ruler to his vocation or 
Divine calling. Consequently, the covenant between ruler and people was not simply 
between ruler and people, it was between ruler, subjects and God and expressed the will 
of God.21 It was the influence of Calvinism, with its propensity to think of obligations 
in terms of covenants, combined with the importance of Calvinism in the political 
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conflicts in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, which first raised contract theory 
to a central position in political theory.22 
In particular, the popularity of the contractualist ideas in seventeenth century Britain is 
directly attributable to the influence of Puritanism, the English brand of Calvanist 
Protestantism. Contractarian ideas were used by politicians and propagandists to justify 
rebellion during the Civil War provoked, in part, by the religious policies of Charles I. 
For example, this Puritan contractualism is reflected in The Agreement of the People, a 
proposed contract drawn up in 1648 and 1649 by the Levellers, the radical democratic 
party in the English Civil War 23 Similarly, covenant and social contract ideas, 
particularly the social contract ideas developed by Locke, were used to justify the 
second expulsion of the Stuarts in 1688, and, indeed, became part of the prevailing 
ideology. 
In the period of the civil war, the Whigs wrested from the Crown a new freedom of 
property, having feared for their property in the face of the Stuart Kings' efforts to raise 
revenue.24 Changing ideas about the nature of property rights came to a head at the 
same time as changing ideas about the relative rights of Crown, Lords, and Commons. 
While in medieval times the relation between the Crown and its tenants combined both 
rent and taxes, the ideas of rent and taxes had gradually became separated. 
Consequently, the abolition of feudal tenures in 1660, and the creation of new excise 
taxes, marked a fundamental shift in ideas about land as private property. The great 
lords ceased to be tenants of the crown but owners, while freeholders also began to see 
themselves as owners. In medieval times, people owed a wide range of duties to their 
feudal lord, to other people, to the Church, and to God. Consequently the possession of 
property involved temporary custodianship, not ownership, and carried duties as well as 
rights. At the same time, it was the duty of those in authority to stamp out usury and to 
ensure that prices and wages were just. Now, however, ideas about the ownership of 
property were tending to become more `absolute'. Indeed, for the propertied classes 
over this period, England was largely a property owners' association.25 The landless 
classes were excluded from the political process and it was against them that 
government protection was required. These changing ideas and the associated theories 
of Hobbes and Locke were also related to the emerging market society.26 The 
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consequence was that the logic of capitalism, the logic of rationalisation and the 
Enlightenment's faith in material and moral progress became intertwined.27 
Consequently, the propertied elite found it easy to conceive of civil society as based on 
a social contract, not on socially defined moral obligations backed by Divine Law 28 
Gradually, the concept of contract replaced custom as the source of law and social 
obligations, including the obligations associated with commercial contracts. There was 
an ambiguity in this theorising.29 It is not entirely clear whether Hobbes and Locke 
were discussing the origins of political society or criteria for judging it. It does seem 
that both believed that theirs was an historical account. It is now clear that they were 
not accurate historical accounts. Subsequent contract theorising, like that of Kant and 
Rawles, is defended as an analogy in which contract is used to try to deduce the ideal 
form of political organisation3° As such, they are clearly normative theories. It also 
seems clear from the political use made of it that Lockes' social contract theory was 
also seen as normative. We might note in passing that the standard criticism of such 
theories is that they presuppose a universal human nature that determines the 
distinguishing characteristics of the `state of nature' that lead to a need for a universal 
contract. However, the wide differences in values and practices that have been 
observed in practice undermine belief in such a universal human nature. Social contract 
theorists have not relied upon an account of human nature based on empirical evidence, 
but on an arbitrary, idealised model that assumes that human beings are motivated by 
self- interest and that they are rational in their pursuit of that self- interest. As we have 
already seen, these are the assumptions under which neo- classical economics operates. 
What was new was the idea that contractual relationships were created by the free 
choice of the individuals involved, not the idea that such relationships involved mutual 
rights and duties. Thus for Hobbes, a price agreed by the parties was a just price merely 
by virtue of the agreement. Importantly for our account, for Hobbes the obligation to 
abide by one's promises, a cornerstone of all social contract theory, is an obligation of 
natural law which corresponds to the self- interest and common interest of all men 31 
For Hobbes, civil society was created by men acting freely, even when it was imposed 
upon them by conquest. The overriding requirement for law meant that rational men 
would and did assent to surrender their `natural liberty' even to a conqueror. This 
aspect of Hobbes' doctrine appears to reflect Hobbes' commitment to peace, a 
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commitment reflected in his submission to Cromwell in 1651 after the defeat of the 
Royalists. But this aspect of Hobbes' doctrine was unattractive to his English 
contemporaries as it implied that everything done was done voluntarily. It also 
questioned the legitimacy of the execution of Charles I. 
Locke's ideas were much more acceptable as he modified Hobbes' account to provide a 
justification for resistance to tyrants in the name of individual rights, liberty and 
property. Indeed, Locke was closely associated with the Whig cause and their struggle 
against James II that culminated in the latter's fall in 1688. Indeed, Locke, the great 
defender of property rights, was the philosophical spokesman of the great Whig 
landowners, the landowning classes, and the rising bourgeoisie 32 And Locke owed his 
influence to that defence. But Locke was the first contract theorist to give an adequate 
account of the state as a territorial unit as an amalgamation of land already owned by the 
contractors. 
In Locke's state of nature, people are naturally free and equal and are not in a constant 
state of war. Rather, they are acquiring property. They own their own person and they 
own their labour. It was through this labour that the common property of mankind was 
appropriated to individual use. It was the hard working who acquired the most 
property. While in the state of nature there were severe limits to the unequal division of 
property, the invention of money made possible for great inequalities of wealth to 
develop. In using money, people had tacitly agreed to such an unequal distribution. 
And in establishing civil society, individuals agreed to surrender some of their right to 
protect that property. Consequently, for Locke, the principal role of government is to 
protect property rights, rights that predate government itself. Since it is transparently 
obvious that no one had, in fact, assented to such a contract, Locke relies on the notion 
of tacit consent to support his contractual views. 
This theory drew heavily on the concept of Natural Law, a Natural Law deriving from 
Divine Law, to explain, in particular, the limits on the powers of government. The 
obligation to keep promises and agreements derives directly from that Natural Law. 
Indeed, Locke drew on the Anglican theologian, Richard Hooker, the creator of the 
distinctive Anglican theology, the via media. For Hooker, society was natural: it did not 
occur spontaneously but resulted from the deliberate seeking of communion and 
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fellowship in political societies. Government and laws were also the result of 
agreement 33 For Hooker, the universe was ruled by Natural Laws appointed by God, 
governing both the physical universe and moral questions. They were discovered by 
reason and were not solely to be found in scriptures or in church teaching. This vaguely 
religious justification of property also helped to make Locke's ideas more attractive to 
the English governing classes 34 Nevertheless, over time this concept of Natural Law 
came to be stripped of its associations with Divine Laws, and Nature ultimately came to 
denote human appetites. 
Both Locke and Newton were strong influences on the Scottish Enlightenment, of 
which Adam Smith was a leading figure. Important to this account is also the influence 
of the dominant Protestant Natural Law Philosophers, Hugo Grotius and Samuel 
Pufendorf. It is through these influences that the Natural Law Outlook was transmitted 
to Smith. Their philosophy was a continuation and an extension of certain strains in 
Scholasticism, in particular, their distinction between positive law and natural law. 
Natural law was seen as the earthly manifestation of Divine Law, revealed through 
nature and reason, while positive law was created by humans 35 Both were also leading 
contract theorists in their own right, as well as leading legal theorists. For Grotius, 
natural laws worked through a social instinct implanted in humans by God. 
Importantly, he attempts to make the natural law independent of revelation. Smith, 
himself, acknowledges the influence of Grotius on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
while he appears to have also followed his lead in his Lectures on Jurisprudence.36 For 
Pufendorf, the study of moral philosophy was the study of natural law, a natural law that 
was generally the same as the Biblical injunctions to love God and one's neighbour as 
oneself. It was through Pufendorf and Locke, that the natural law tradition provided the 
foundation for the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Importantly, 
Cumberland's major work,A Treatise on the Laws of Nature, was a systematic attack 
on Hobbes's claim that humans were not naturally suited to society.37 He held, on the 
contrary, that self- interested actions promote public welfare. It was this critique that 
Locke picked up. 
The Scottish Enlightenment's idea of civil society was an attempt to develop a synthesis 
between a number of developing oppositions seen in social life. New forms of social 
action based on self- interest, and the concept of the self, made it necessary to imagine a 
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moral order that could accommodate interpersonal relations based on the principle of 
rational self- interest.38 These dichotomies between the individual and the social, the 
private and the public, egoism and altruism, as well as between a life governed by 
reason and one governed by the passions, have become constitutive of our being in the 
modem world 39 What was new in this vision of civil society was its understanding of 
human interaction as a moral sphere where moral attributes were derived from the 
nature of humans themselves, and not a transcendent reality. The concept of moral 
affections and natural sympathy were now provided the grounding that had previously 
been provided by God. 
In his Treatise on Human Nature and again in an essay, Of the Original Contract, David 
Hume attacked Locke's social contract ideas .4° Nevertheless, Hume agreed that, at first, 
government was founded on contract because men were so equal in physical ability that 
they could be subject to authority only by their own agreement. However, Hume 
rejected the contractarian account of legitimate political authority. There was no state 
of nature. It was a mere philosophical fiction. Nor was society formed by a social 
contract constituted by promises. Rather, societies evolved and formed gradually. Even 
if there had been some initial agreement, the subsequent obligations of its citizens did 
not, and cannot, be derived from any original agreement, to which they were not parties, 
nor from any renewed agreement of their own. Similarly, he rejects the notion of tacit 
consent. In practice, allegiance does not depend on choice as emigration is not usually a 
real alternative. 
For Hume, the duty of allegiance owed to a state and the obligation to perform contracts 
are both based on self- interest and neither is derived from the other. Similarly, Hume 
rejects the idea that society is founded to protect property rights. The concept of a 
property right is itself an artificial concept depending upon morality and justice and 
these are notions created and recognised by society. Property rights cannot pre -date 
society. Indeed, for Hume, the whole contractual edifice of political theory is 
unnecessary. Both justice in general, and rights of property in particular, as well as the 
obligation to perform a promise, derive from convention, in the same way that the use 
of money or language derive from convention. 
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While his direct influence was small, his indirect influence, through Adam Smith and 
Bentham, was significant. But what was to stop this individualistic, self- interested 
society from degenerating into the Hobbesian war of all on all? There were two 
answers offered to this question by eighteenth century thinkers 41 The first was that it 
was enlightened self- interest, not unbridled licence, which was involved. For example 
Hume assumed that most of the educated would realise that it was in their interests not 
to pursue short-term advantage at the expense of longer -term interest. Those who did 
not would be dealt with by the law and would adjust their behaviour. Thus, for Hume, 
obligations which originally come from self- interest are generalised until they are seen 
as general moral obligation, independent of particular cases. The second answer 
claimed that there was a natural harmony between individual interests and the public 
interest. Provided that a proper framework of law and order and property rights was 
maintained, the pursuit of individual self- interest would further the national good. 
Adam Smith is associated with this second answer. For example, in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, he argued that increased commercial dealings lead to greater respect for 
commercial arrangements, because the more dealings a person has, the more does self - 
interest demand that she honour these arrangements 42 Smith elaborated the doctrine of 
the harmony of interests in The Wealth of Nations. In the process, he also drew upon 
the Natural Law Outlook derived, as we saw above including from Locke. For Smith, 
moral sentiment balanced any attempt to describe rational self -interest in terms of 
Reason disengaged from the `passions', or of the self freed from the eyes of others. 
Thus, Smith is no admirer of mere selfishness: 
"The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interests 
should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society. 
He is at all times willing too, that the interest of this order or society should be 
sacrificed to the greater interest of the state or sovereignty, of which it is only a 
subordinate part. He should, therefore, be equally willing that all those inferior 
interests should be sacrificed to the greater interest of the universe, to the interest 
of that great society of all sensible and intelligent beings, of which God himself 
is the immediate administrator and director. "43 
Indeed, for Smith, the desire for recognition by others was the motivating force of 
economic activity. Therefore, the individual self could never be totally disengaged from 
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society, nor could reasoned self- interest be abstracted from those passions which, 
through the moral sentiment, rooted man in society.44 Thus, there was a recognition of 
the interdependence of individuals, and the social embedding of individual existence. 
Similarly, this civil society tradition was inconsistent with any restriction of reason to 
what we would now call instrumental rationality. 
Despite his popular identification with laissez -faire ideas, Smith took no crude minimal 
view of the functions of government. In his view, the state had three principal purposes: 
to protect citizens from external enemies; to protect citizens from force and fraud; and 
to erect public works and institutions which were in the public interest but too costly to 
be carried out by individuals. Importantly for this account, Smith rejects any dogmatic 
prohibition on State interference with contracts: 
"Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a violation of 
natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, 
which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be 
restrained by the laws of all governments .. . The obligation of building party 
walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural 
liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade here 
proposed."45 
Consequently, it is clear that Smith was not advocating a society simply based on 
selfishness and greed. On the contrary, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
discusses the basis of moral feelings or sentiments and their relationship with justice. 
Smith argues that though men have natural sympathy for each other, and are led by that 
sympathy to act with benevolence, these motives are insufficient to curb men's natural 
propensity to act in their own interests. Thus, for Smith, Justice is the supreme virtue as 
it counteracts human selfishness. Importantly, for Smith also, the `invisible hand' was a 
consequence of Divine design, of a benevolent providence that had so arranged human 
nature so as to produce this outcome. 
However, in the early nineteenth century, the desire to create a science of morals and 
legislation, the central ambition of positivist social thinking since the seventeenth 
century, became centred on utilitarianism, a development of elements of Hume's 
thought 46 By attributing to humans certain fundamental inclinations, utilitarians 
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claimed to have given morals and politics an empirical foundation. These tendencies 
provided a substitute for the fictional natural rights on which Locke and earlier theorists 
had relied. In the process, utilitarians provide an ahistorical scientific account of moral 
theory based on a mechanical Newtonian model in a somewhat similar way to Locke, 
that is, one based on a natural law outlook. Thus, Bentham starts from his particular 
view of man and deduces all institutions and legal arrangements from his properties. 
While Bentham made random use of historical examples, it is doubtful that utilitarian 
theorists provide an account of the process by which society was formed 47 This 
utilitarianism was pragmatically attached to classical political economy. 
Bentham provided an alternative legal philosophy to social contractarianism, though he 
did not extricated himself from the natural law outlook that had been associated with 
contractarianism and the Enlightenment more generally. In particular, he used the idea 
of a state of nature similar to Locke's and retained his individualism. However, there 
was a change of emphasis because, for Bentham, the law maker was to create and adjust 
laws to create an artificial harmony of interests between individual action and the public 
good. Similarly, in Utilitarianism, Mill also argues that there is no natural harmony of 
interests and that it is the law- maker's role to create such harmony 48 For Mill, the 
principles of Justice are principles of long -run expediency. This alternative view was 
mirrored in the growth of legal positivism whereby law was not the result of a social 
contract but of a hierarchical power relationship. The source of authority was 
customary obedience. It also reflected a growing scepticism with universal principles of 
human nature, a scepticism which many contemporary economists seem to have 
overlooked. Of course, there was great dissatisfaction with the initial utilitarian 
account. Indeed, support for utilitarianism was undermined by a refusal to believe that 
pleasure and pain were the only sources of human action, a belief that seems to 
contradict everyday experience. Nor can it explain why people find pleasure in 
different things 49 
The social evolutionists sought to provide an alternative account that was both scientific 
and historical. In the process they abandoned the psychological reductionism that had 
characterised Hobbes and Locke and many subsequent theorists. For Spencer, the 
leading social evolutionist,50 the principle of utility was no rule but the articulation of 
the problem to be solved 51 Indeed, the theory of evolution undermined the notion of a 
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universal human nature on which deductive utilitarianism depended. Spencer drew on 
the increasingly secularised Natural Law tradition; a secularisation which reflected the 
increasing rejection of earlier religious certainties. Thus, for Spencer, the universality 
of natural causation provided a substitute for the puritanism of his childhood, with 
progress a substitute for the eschatological promises of Christianity. Indeed, in much 
nineteenth century thought, the uniformity of nature had acquired a logical status and a 
numinous aura that made it a substitute for the idea of God. In the process, moral 
qualities were bestowed on the universe. 
Spencer saw the idea of evolution from the simple to the complex as a process deriving 
from the fundamental laws of matter and motion, to manifestations of force. Indeed, for 
him, only classical mechanics, or what has previously been described as the Newtonian 
metaphor, provided an adequate scientific understanding of reality. In this he was 
typical of his age, the age immediately before the rise of relativity and quantum 
mechanics in physics. He attempted to apply evolution to all phenomena in the 
universe, particularly to the social world. Indeed, he was an evolutionary determinist 
with progress occurring through inevitable stages according to inflexible laws: 
"Either society has laws, or it has not. If it has not, there can be no order, no 
certainty, no system in its phenomena. If it has, then, are they like the other laws 
of the universe - sure, inflexible, ever active, and having no exceptions ?i52 
He saw social life as a struggle similar to the struggle for survival in the natural world. 
Consequently, he saw social competition as part of the process of evolution. 
Importantly, nothing could be done in the long -term to stop the process of competition 
and the attempt to do so, to alleviate social conditions, merely assured the short-term 
survival of the unfit. This doctrine had much in common with Malthus's belief that the 
poor were redundant 53 Thus competition, and the survival of the fittest, was justified as 
if it were a natural scientific law. This elevation of competition served to justify 
Spencer's strong opposition to social legislation, a function it continues to serve. In this 
view a lack of success is associated with lack of virtue. There was some ambiguity, 
however, as to whether the fittest meant the best, or merely an adaptation to existing 
circumstance. Of course, this ambiguity goes to the heart of the difficulty with this type 
of theorising. If it is the best, then why? The answer to that question adds another layer 
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of moral theorising. If it is merely adaptation to existing circumstances then why is that 
adaptation moral? 
Freedom of contract was a necessary part of Spencer's theory. It was the supreme 
mechanism for maintaining social order with the absolute minimum of compulsion and 
coercion. Thus Spencer's views can be seen as an extreme version of contractarianism 
in which the state is nothing more than a large partnership 54 Restriction on the freedom 
of contract interfered with the natural order of things and enabled the unfit to survive 
longer than they would otherwise so. Importantly, Spencer regarded the claims of 
social institutions other than economic institutions as alien to the human personality, 
from which it will ultimately free itself. Consequently, Spencer opposed a wide range 
of social reforms on the ground that it constituted an interference with the freedom of 
contract. Surprisingly, Spencer saw his views as being consistent with the utilitarian 
formulae of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This pseudo- science was not 
particularly influential in England. It was, however, very popular in the Unites States 
for a long time and had a formidable influence on American thinking and law 55 Thus 
Murphy writes: 
"Spencer's influence on American thought in the second half of the nineteenth 
century was particularly strong. He formulated his laissez -faire philosophy in 
such a way that it appealed `at once to the traditional individualism and the 
acquisitive instincts of Americans, who were able without too great 
inconsistency to regard whatever they did, individually, as in harmony with 
evolution and whatever government or society did, collectively, as contrary to 
natural law.' "56 
Vestiges of this doctrine remain in some extreme justifications of the market system and 
of its social inequality that are met in economic rationalism. 
To sum up, we saw with Hobbes and Locke the beginnings of a new type of political 
and moral theorising. This theorising sought its ground in the natural world, 
individualism and the so- called scientific perspective. While the various theories that 
have been recounted do not, of necessity, make a coherent whole, they nevertheless 
reflect the same Enlightenment ambition to produce a secular, naturalist, and rational 
justification for our moral allegiances and social arrangements. As such, it represents a 
tradition of thought sharing certain presupposition and ways of conceptualising, and in 
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which the participants frame their thoughts in relationship to earlier thinkers in the same 
tradition 57 This Enlightenment ambition has failed for reasons that will be explored 
shortly .58 
This tradition, nevertheless, constitutes the complex of ideas, the background mood, on 
which market ideology and economic rationalism rely. Thus with Locke we have a 
view of property rights as being prior to society, a natural right, but a natural right based 
on divine law. We also see the contract metaphor used to explain the existence of 
society. With such theorists as Mandeville, Hume, and Smith, we see the gradual 
transformation of self- interest from being a source of moral failure to a source of public 
good, albeit moderated by competition and by a dash of sympathy for others. In the 
process, the Divine underpinnings were gradually removed to be replaced by Nature and 
Reason, concepts that were, themselves, increasingly deified. And through the alchemy 
of the Newtonian metaphor, these naturalist justifications of self- interest are turned into 
a formal moral theory in the form of utilitarianism. And of course it is this 
utilitarianism which underlies much economic theory. With Spencer, the moderation, 
which was in Smith, was removed and instead the attempt is made to justify naked self - 
interest under the rubric of the survival of the fittest. They all share what Rorty calls 
Locke's unfortunate desire to privilege the language of natural science over other 
vocabularies.59 
More recently, we have seen a major revival in contract thought as a consequence of 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice.6° Interestingly, Rawls' idea of a reflective equilibrium as a 
way of evaluating our sense of justice, and as a theory of moral sentiments, is a 
deliberate echo of Adam Smith 61 It has already been argued that the concept of social 
relationships as contractual is taken for granted by economic rationalists and by 
economists generally. Indeed, Gauthier claims that such a view lies at the core of the 
ideology of Western capitalism 62 This ideology, this metaphor, this claim to 
conceptual priority, is now part of the deep, pre- reflective structure of self - 
consciousness, the way in which we conceive of ourselves as human, relate to each 
other, to structures and institutions and to the natural world. Society is conceived of as 
merely instrumental, meeting no fundamental human need 63 It also involves a view of 
ourselves as insatiable appropriators engaged in a competitive search for power, with 
rationality, itself, understood as related instrumentally to the satisfaction of individual 
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interests. Gauthier sums up the historical development of this ideology in the following 
terms: 
"What is to be appropriated is first thought of as real property, land or real 
estate. The distinction between land and other forms of property is then denied, 
and what is to be appropriated becomes the universal measure of property, 
money. Finally, in a triumph of abstraction, money as a particular object is 
replaced by the purely formal notion of utility, an object conveniently divested 
of all content. The rational man is ... simply the man who seeks more. 
"Thus it follows that not only the individualistic instrumental conception of 
rationality, but more precisely the individualistic utility- maximizing conception, 
is part of the ideology of the social contract. "64 
Of course, the more that is sought is the secular rationalist equivalent of grace. 
The maximising conception of rationality entailed by contractarianism and the natural 
law outlook precludes the very possibility of rational agreement, because it undercuts 
the internal constraints necessary to maintain contractual relationships. In the past, 
radical self- interest has usually been considered a primary threat to society, to be 
repressed by religion, law, morality and tradition. As has been argued in Chapter 3, the 
contractarian tradition, contemporary economics, and more especially, economic 
rationalism have failed to understand the extent to which the social, political and 
economic order has been sustained by motives different from those contained in the 
contractarian conception of human nature. The faith that is placed in this contract 
tradition, and this form of theorising, cannot be sustained. 
THE MODERNITY DEBATE 
The critique of this form of theorising draws on what is called the modernity debate.65 
This is a debate that questions the claims of the Enlightenment tradition, of which the 
above social contract theories form a central part. Thus, it challenges the natural law 
outlook, or what Lyotard calls the mood of modernity, and its associated grand 
narratives 66 It is also a rejection of the claimed privileged status of science and 
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rationality, the belief in universals, and in a common human nature, absolute truths, 
universal values, the dominance of technology, and the perfectibility of human nature.67 
Indeed, the Australian theologian, Duncan Reid68 sees a paradigm shift, a decisive 
break, occurring in our worldview. This paradigm shift has two interrelated aspects. 
The first involves a shift away from Western, political, cultural and economic 
predominance. This shift is accompanied by a change within the Western scientific 
worldview and a sense of disillusionment with the technology it has given us. The 
Newtonian mechanistic worldview has been undermined. Physics has come to 
understand reality, not in terms of discrete particles, but as a complete network, the 
most basic elements of which were not entities or substances, but relationships: 
"All entities, even inanimate entities, constituted as they were by their 
`experiences' of being in relationship, could now be understood as subjects 
which adapt to their environment. Reality was no longer to be `grasped' solely 
by analysis and reduction to component parts. Understanding had to be 
reinterpreted in a less dominating, more participatory way, as the perception of 
parts interacting in the context of an indivisible totality. "69 
This has been accompanied by a crisis of meaning in Western epistemology: 
"The whole Western philosophical tradition had worked on the assumption that 
knowledge (hence truth, as meaning or essence of being) was accessible through 
language. But now the word ... has been unseated from its place of honour. 
Language, rather than an inadequate but in principle perfectible attempt to refer 
to some intelligible metaphysical reality beyond itself, has come to be seen as a 
self contained system in which reference is to the system itself.i70 
The common thread in these two crises is the loss of any sense of objective certainty in 
the physical sciences or the political -cultural sphere. As a consequence, we have to 
deal with a new and profound sense of historical relativism and the belief that there can 
be no over - arching `absolute' or unifying principle which can reconcile all the 
relativities of human thought and experience. 
The present author approaches this debate from the perspective of a Christian in the 
reformed tradition.71 Thus, from the very beginning, the author rejects a central tenant 
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of the Enlightenment's project, its attack on revealed religion and its rejection of a God 
actively involved in human history, and the associated search for an alternative source 
of certainty. God exists and, therefore, absolute truth must exist, providing an absolute 
basis for hope and morality. But God's transcendence places that truth beyond human 
reach 72 Consistent with the Christian doctrine of original sin, our search for truth is 
personal, limited, and tainted by self- interest and sin. This view leads directly to a 
rejection of the absolutist claims of economic rationalism, and of rationalism more 
generally. Indeed, for the author, the absolutist claims of economic rationalism, and its 
mean -spirited rejection of the role of government coordination, particularly in the 
alleviation of economic distress, cannot be reconciled with the Christian revelation. 
This view also leads directly to a rejection of the claims of the doctrine of freedom of 
contract, which is to be discussed in Chapter 5. This view will be taken up again in 
Chapter 8. 
The following account will, however, follow a secular path drawing on prominent 
participants in the critique of the Enlightenment, particularly Rorty, Toulmin and 
Macintyre. The two approaches do, however, lead to similar outcomes, though the 
author's beliefs rescue him more directly from anxiety about the alleged horrors of 
moral relativism. The account is organised around a number of closely interrelated 
issues. These are the distinction usually made between positive and normative 
theorising, particularly in economics, the privileged status of science, the excessive faith 
placed in rationalism and thus the questionable status of economics as a science and the 
relevance of moral philosophy to public policy formulation. In the following sections a 
critique will be developed addressing each of these issues. 
THE DISTINCTION BETEEN POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE THEORISING, 
PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMICS 
The struggle of Enlightenment philosophers to give a naturalistic, individualistic, 
`scientific', and universal account of our moral codes was recounted above. Intertwined 
was the attempt to insulate that account from any Divine authority, while at the same 
time, trying to base those codes on empirical observation of human nature. The natural 
law tradition, so central to Locke's justification of his social contract theory, became 
increasingly secularised over several centuries, until with Spencer we finally arrive at 
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the unambiguous claim that moral judgements must be based on scientific principles. 
The effect of that particular attempt was merely to justify any existing moral and 
political arrangements. Since then much social thought has been preoccupied with 
finding a method that would either determine values objectively or avoid questions 
about values altogether 73 
Notwithstanding the ambitions of Hobbes and Locke and their successors to found our 
moral judgement on science, social scientists recently have generally made a distinction 
between science and normative theorising. Thus, it is often claimed that value 
judgements lack the objective validity of science, and science must, as a methodological 
ideal, be kept free from them.74 Similarly, economists have usually drawn a distinction 
between `positive' and `normative' economics. It has, of course, been readily admitted 
that the application of the `positive' science of economics to actual public policy 
problems was a normative issue. This normally took the form of suggesting that it was 
in the choice of ends that the normative issue arose, while positive economics could 
safely address the best way of achieving those specified ends. The idea that ends and 
means are usually intertwined escaped notice. 
In any event, the distinction between positive and normative can be traced to Hume who 
held that there was a watertight distinction to be made between the realm of facts and 
the realm of values: 
"I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead 
of the usual copulation of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition 
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or 
ought not, expresses some new relation of affirmation, 'tis necessary that it 
should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do 
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the 
readers. .. "75 
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In economics, the distinction dates from Nassau Senior and John Stuart Mill,76 and was 
confirmed by Weber77 and Robbins.78 More recently, Lipsey and Harbury in their 
introductory textbook make the same distinction 79 Interestingly, Nassau Senior 
considered that any policy advocacy was outside the proper role of economics 80 But 
the very idea that it was improper for an economist to make valuations is, itself, a 
valuation depending on some selected standard of judgements' The erection of this 
conceptual dichotomy is a typical Enlightenment methodology, while the rejection of 
such dichotomous thinking is part of the postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment. 
In this connection, Macintyre points out that the distinction itself relies on the 
Enlightenment's dismantling of the Aristotelian teleological tradition of the Medieval 
world, so that it became possible to conceive of the individual as prior to and 
independent of social roles. But in the medieval world the argument that an `ought' 
could not be deduced from an `is' was clearly wrong,S2 and remains clearly wrong in 
any world where socially defined roles continue to exist S3 
One possible basis of the distinction is the Cartesian mind -body dualism where facts 
belong to the `objective' realm of the body, whereas `values' belong to the subjective 
realm of the mind.84 Alternatively, the distinction can be derived from a positivist view 
of science that considers all statements other than those that are either empirical or 
logical or mathematical as without content. Both positions are deeply problematic. 
Toulmin sees this positivist turn as a reaction to the progressively widening scope of 
science and a nostalgia for the Platonist demand for a single, universal, scientific 
`method'.85 This method was to be found in the claims of classical physics to impose its 
explanatory patterns on all branches of science. The idea that economics, while being a 
scientific discipline, is also a moral discourse, is inconsistent with this demand. 
Under the influence of Max Weber and of the logical positivists, this distinction was 
transformed into a dualism between facts and values, between the descriptive and the 
prescriptive, between the empirical and the normative. Only judgments relating to the 
regularities of empirical phenomena could be true or false, while normative judgments 
could not be considered in this way. Weber argued that the norms of science are 
universal, while value judgements lack this universality. 
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However, explanatory theories do not occupy a privileged epistemological position 
compared to nomiative theories 86 There is little in the social sciences that meet 
Weber's test of universality, while there are many value judgements which do meet the 
requirements specified by Weber, a shared method and adequate data. They are 
therefore, in Weber's terms, `scientific'. However, it may be preferable to speak of the 
`rational justifiability' of a proposition, rather than use the honorific title `scientific'. It 
is the shared standards for truth and knowledge claims that are important. But, these 
standards are socially determined. What is seen as true or scientifically justified is the 
result of an organised and contingent consensus among an intellectual or scientific 
community. Consequently, a normative claim is just as susceptible to justification as 
any empirical or theoretical claim. The consequence of this line of argument is that the 
conceptual distinction between positive and normative serves no convincing intellectual 
purpose, while serving to privilege a particular type of discourse, a political tactic in the 
broad sweep of discourse. 
Science is a learning process, a social process, which develops in some subcultures, and 
is characterised by the acceptance of an ethic, a strong value system.87 Knowledge of 
the social system is an essential part of the social system itself. Consequently, 
objectivity, in the sense of investigating a world that is unchanged by the investigation 
of it, is not achievable. Science no longer merely investigates the world; it 
simultaneously creates the world that it is investigating. What it creates becomes a 
problem of ethical choice. Even the epistemological content of science has an ethical 
component. Under these circumstances the concept of a value free science is untenable. 
Myrdal endorsed this point of view: 
"Through out the book [The Political Element in the Development of Political 
Theory] there lurks the idea that when all metaphysical elements are radically 
cut away, a healthy body of positive economic theory will remain, which is 
altogether independent of valuations... This implicit belief in the existence of a 
body of scientific knowledge acquired independently of all valuations is, as I 
now see it, naive empiricism. Facts do not organise themselves into concepts 
and theories just by being looked at; indeed, except within the framework of 
concepts and theories, there are no scientific facts but only chaos. There is an 
inescapable a priori element in all scientific work. Questions must be asked 
before answers can be given. The questions are all expressions of our interest in 
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the world; they are at bottom valuations. Valuations are thus necessarily 
involved already at the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical 
analysis, and not only at the stage when we draw political inferences from facts 
and valuations. "88 
Valuations are critical to the determination of facts, to all stages of inquiry. 
Consequently, value commitments are inevitable in the social sciences. In particular, 
every social science carries an implicit definition of what it is to be human to provide a 
focus for its research and to distinguish its field from those of the logician, physicist, or 
biologist 89 But there are no grounds for deciding what is an acceptable definition. 
Thus the argument that neo- classical economics is a formal system, which merely 
explores the implications of the assumptions, the idealisations on which it is based, can 
not be convincing. No one develops such a system for pure pleasure, but to provide a 
guide to policy decisions, or as a justification of their ideological beliefs. The 
assumptions, themselves, incorporate normative valuations. Indeed, social science is a 
moral science by the very nature of the problems it deals with. Scarcity, conflict, 
inequality, domination, exploitation, and war necessarily create problems for a stable 
and legitimate social order. In any event, social science is part of the Enlightenment 
tradition that instrumentalised nature and now tends to instrumentalise human society 
itself. 
From this perspective, the claim for the value neutrality of science, particularly social 
science, is simply another questionable aspect of Modernity. For Rorty, the positivist 
distinction between facts and values can only be sustained if there is a value -free 
vocabulary that renders sets of `factual' statements commensurable 90 But there is no 
such value -free vocabulary. Indeed, in choosing Galileo's vocabulary as a model, 
science and philosophy confused its apparent lack of metaphysical comfort, and moral 
significance, with the fact that it worked within a particular narrow compass. 
Consequently, they sought to eliminate subjective elements by avoiding terms that 
could not be linked definitionally to the terms denoting primary qualities in Galileo's 
and Newton's vocabularies. This is the seventeenth -century myth of nature's own 
vocabulary, the idea that only a certain vocabulary is suitable for describing human 
beings or human societies, the only vocabulary in which they can be understood. Thus, 
for Rorty, the issue between those who aspire after an objective, value -free, truly 
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scientific social science and those who think it should be acknowledged as something 
more hermeneutical is not a disagreement about `method' but a disagreement about the 
sort of terminology to be used in moral and political reflection 91 To say that something 
is better understood in one vocabulary than another is simply a claim that a description 
in the preferred vocabulary is more useful for a particular purpose. 
Indeed, the growth of scientific and quasi -scientific knowledge has not been as socially 
beneficial as the Enlightenment imagined it would. The ethos of scientific rationality 
has consistently undermined and eroded the particular, the local, the implicit, and the 
traditional in the name of individual human emancipation 92 As scientific knowledge 
and technical expertise have grown ever more specialised, scientific experts are often 
able to wield power and authority through their monopolisation of esoteric knowledge 
and the prestige which this knowledge brings. Similarly, the uncritical pursuit of social 
scientific knowledge works to reinforce the existing powers in society that fund that 
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The common thread in this critique is the realisation that social science has an intrinsic 
connection with the moral and political life of society 9' While the social scientist has 
an obligation to view reality as dispassionately as possible, our perceptions of reality 
and our assumptions about it are radically moral. There is no neutral platform of pure 
science utterly free from value commitments. Indeed, social science is a product of the 
development of a particular kind of society and its lexicon. The development of 
Enlightenment economics clearly took place in parallel with the development of the 
market system and serves to justify that system morally and scientifically. 
There is a growing body of opinion that sees social science generally, and economics in 
particular, as moral inquiry. This position is consistent with the account of social order 
and the interrelationship between the economic and the social system given in Chapters 
2 and 3. The distinction becomes far less convincing when placed along side the actual 
public policy questions on which economists provide advice. Inevitably, they involve 
leading normative questions. For example, the choice of methodological individualism 
as the basis of economic and political theorising is clearly a normative choice. The 
nature of property rights developed by a society also clearly involve normative choices. 
Pareto optimality, as a criteria for policy choice, is dependent on, and biased in favour 
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of, the existing distribution of power, wealth and property rights, and thus is not neutral. 
Likewise, the choice of the goal of maximising the value of output is a normative one. 
Similarly, the price structure is not neutral, being a function of the distribution of 
income, wealth and power 95 In the case of the Fair Trading debate, the question of the 
regulation of unfair conduct was a normative one, and the arguments used were also 
normative. In that debate the advocacy of economic efficiency as the goal of public 
policy was plainly a moral choice. 
The policy world is also one in which the end /means distinction used to defend the 
value neutrality of economics quickly breaks down. Thus while the distinction could 
have served to draw attention to the normative content of policy advice, in practice it 
has been used to camouflage the moral judgements of economists, and the normative 
presuppositions of the market system, behind the cloak of alleged scientific objectivity. 
Consequently, while the idea, and ideal, of value neutrality still persists, there is far less 
confidence in it than before. For example, Hausman and McPherson agree that the 
simple picture of the economist providing value -free technical information does not fit 
the economist who is asked for advice.96 They argue that economists should care about 
moral questions for at least the following four reasons: 
1. Behaviour, and hence economic outcomes, is influenced by the moral values of 
economic agents. Economists rarely describe moral commitments without 
evaluating them, and they affect that morality by how they describe it. Thus they 
should think about the morality that should be accepted, as well as the morality that 
is, in fact, accepted in society. 
2. Standard welfare economics rests on strong and contestable moral presuppositions. 
The standard definition of a social optimum compares social alternatives exclusively 
in terms of their outcomes (rather than the rightness of their procedures) and 
identifies the goodness of outcomes with satisfaction of individual preferences. 
These commitments are neither neutral nor uncontroversial. Consequently, they 
question the moral basis of the concern with efficiency, and whether it is any less 
controversial than the moral commitments that lie behind equity. 
3. Politicians and non -economists talking about welfare employ concepts that do not 
easily translate into the language of standard economic theory. Ideas of fairness, 
opportunity, freedom, and rights are more important in policy making than 
individual preference rankings. Equating welfare with the satisfaction of 
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preferences (which may be short- sighted or ill- informed) begs questions of justified 
paternalism. They question the quality of a world in which our humanity was 
always under the control of rational calculation. 
4. In practice, positive and normative concerns are often intermingled in policy advice. 
They point out that economics embodies a commitment to a certain mode of modelling 
and to a normative theory of prudence. The theory of rationality is already a fragment 
of the theory of morality. But the view of rationality that economists endorse - utility 
theory - may not even be compatible with moral behaviour, and does not provide a rich 
enough picture of individual choice to permit one to discuss the character, causes and 
consequences of moral behaviour. While they claim that economists need not aspire to 
provide a general theory of human action, this is precisely what many economists 
implicitly assume that they can do. 
THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF SCIENCE 
The previous section recounted the attempt to distinguish between scientific and 
normative discourse on the assumption that scientific discourse was more privileged 
than normative discourse, an attempt that was strongly rejected. The account now turns 
to consider what can be said about the status of science in general, and of economic 
`science' in particular? The standard view in the middle of the nineteenth century was 
that scientific investigations begin in the free and unprejudiced observation of facts, 
progresses by inductive inference to the formulation of universal laws about those facts, 
and finally arrive by further induction at statements of still wider generality known as 
theories 97 These laws and theories are supposed to be checked for their truth content by 
comparing their empirical consequences with all the observed facts, including those 
with which they began. Associated with this view of science was a conception of 
scientific explanation derived from the deterministic paradigm of classical mechanics. 
Scientific progress was seen as the inclusion of more and more kinds of phenomena 
under laws of greater and greater generality. It was a view of science that did not 
mention the history of science and which can not be reconciled with the history of 
science. But this view of science began to break down under the influence of Mach, 
Poincare and Duhem, and has been largely destroyed by Popper, Polanyi, Hanson, 
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Toulmin, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend.98 No generally accepted alternative has 
emerged, however. 
Popper rejected attempts to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless and 
divided all human knowledge into two mutually exclusive classes, labelled science and 
non -science 99 For Popper, science is distinguished by its method of formulating and 
testing propositions, not its subject matter, or a claim to certainty of knowledge. But 
Popper draws no absolute line between science and non -science as falsibility and 
testibility are matters of degrees. All `true' theories are merely provisionally true, 
having so far defied falsification. Importantly, no individual scientific hypothesis is 
ever conclusively falsified. As any particular hypothesis is tested in conjunction with 
auxiliary statements, there can never be any certainty that the hypothesis, itself, has 
been refuted. For this reason, Popper suggested methodological limits on the methods 
that may be used to safeguard theories against falsification. Consequently, for Popper 
there is no certain empirical knowledge, whether grounded in our own personal 
experience or in that of mankind in general. Because it prescribes sound practice in 
science, Popper's methodology is plainly normative. 
Consistent with the account given in the preceding section, Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, in looking at the history of scientific practice, concluded that all 
science is based on a professional agreed framework of unprovable assumptions about 
the nature of the physical universe, not simply on empirical facts.'°° These assumptions 
are subject to radical change. This framework or paradigm is the constellation of 
beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by a given scientific community. Radically 
new theories arise not as a result of verification or of falsification but by the 
replacement of a hitherto explanatory model, or paradigm, by a new one. `Normal 
science', the day -to -day problem -solving within an orthodox theoretical framework, is 
the rule, while revolutionary science, or the overthrow of a paradigm as a result of 
repeated refutations and anomalies, is the exception in the history of science. This 
`normal science' uses the same commonplace methods that the rest of us use in day -to- 
day life. For example, examples are checked against criteria, data is fudged to avoid the 
need for new models , and guesses, formulated within the current jargon, are tried out in 
the search for something which covers the cases that cannot be fudged.'°' 
Consequently, for Rorty, the moral that seventeenth- century philosophers should have 
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drawn from Galileo's success was that scientific breakthroughs were not so much a 
matter of deciding which of various alternative hypotheses are true but of finding the 
right jargon in which to frame hypotheses in the first place.1 °2 
Normal science is a thoroughly social process in which the problems to be examined, 
and the general form of the solution should take, is the result of agreement among a 
scientific community. Consequently, normal science is a self -sustaining, cumulative 
process of problem solving within the context of a common analytic framework. The 
breakdown of normal science is marked by a proliferation of theories and by 
methodological controversy. In this climate, a new framework appears that offers a 
decisive solution to hitherto neglected problems. Conversion to the new approach takes 
on the nature of a religious experience. As the new framework achieves dominance it 
becomes the normal science of the next generation. Kuhn subsequently acknowledged 
that his earlier description of scientific revolutions involved some rhetorical 
exaggeration. Paradigm changes during scientific revolutions do not imply total 
discontinuities in scientific debate. In this later account, scientific development is 
characterised by overlapping and interpenetrating paradigms, some of which may be 
incommensurable. Paradigms do not replace each other suddenly rather they achieve 
dominance in a long process of intellectual competition. Nevertheless, his stress on the 
role of normative judgements in scientific controversies, and sociological factors like 
authority, hierarchy, and reference groups, remains, along with a mistrust of the role of 
cognitive factors as determinants of scientific behaviour.1 °3 
There appears to be agreement on some essential points among the dissident accounts in 
the philosophy of science.104 Strict justification simply cannot be achieved. The 
demand for ultimate justification relies on the belief in absolute distinctions between 
logic and language, language and reality, and theory and practice. These beliefs are 
untenable. In particular, we cannot stand outside our current language and structure of 
thought. Thus, ultimate justification is not achievable, as is inquiry free of 
presuppositions. Consequently, the belief that scientific knowledge is an accurate 
representation of reality has to be abandoned. As Rorty put it: 
"We understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of 
belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation. "105 
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The attempt to isolate science from non -science through the use of words like 
`objectivity', `rigour', and 'meth9d' assumes that scientific success can be explained in 
terms of discovering the language of nature. Galileo, in claiming that the book of nature 
was written in the language of mathematics, meant that mathematics worked because 
that was the way things really were.106 For Rorty, this was simply a bad metaphor. 
Rather, Galileo's reductionistic, mathematical vocabulary just happened to work, 
something which lacks a metaphysical, epistemological, or transcendental 
explanation.107 This is a fairly strong claim. It is not necessary to go all the way with 
Rorty in order to accept that the only useable notion of objectivity is agreement, not 
`mirroring'. What is clear is that the extent to our mathematical vocabulary matches 
that of nature, or indeed, whether nature can reasonably be described as having a 
vocabulary, will always remain problematic. 
It follows that empirical sciences cannot claim an essential grasp of reality and thus a 
privileged status. It also follows, that sociology, political science, or even philosophy 
cannot claim to be objective and rational in a way that moral philosophy, aesthetics and 
poetry are not.108 In both cases, justification is a search for persuasive arguments, a 
fully social phenomenon, not a transaction between the inquirer and reality. In this 
connection, Pierce109 referred to the "indefinite Community of Investigators" while 
Mead11° spoke of the "Community of Universal Discourse ". When it comes to matters 
of the basic structures of society and major issues of public policy, this community is to 
be found in the ordinary citizens of the society, not in some idealised version of 
inquirers, some intellectual elite, who would be the equivalent of Plato's guardians. 
Summing up the above, it can be concluded that the claim that science has a privileged 
epistemological status in virtue of its empirical basis can not be sustained. Rather, 
scientific inquiry and normative theorising use much the same approach. 
THE EXCESSIVE FAITH IN RATIONALISM 
What we have arrived at is not some minor quibble about the philosophy of science but 
a fundamental attack on the whole Enlightenment project. One of the leading critics of 
Modernity, Stephen Toulminm provides an account in which the origins of Modernity 
are linked to the rise of the nation state. The philosophers of the seventeenth century, 
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particularly Galileo in physics, Descartes in epistemology and Hobbes in political 
theory, committed western society to new and scientific ways and the use of more 
rational ways of dealing with the problems of life and of society. It was assumed that 
uniquely rational procedures existed for handling the intellectual and practical problems 
of any field of study, procedures which involved setting aside superstition, mythology 
and tradition and attacking problems free of local prejudice and transient fashion. But, 
as will be shown, such philosophical theories overreach the limits of human 
comprehension. 
Prior to 1600, theoretical inquiries were balanced against discussions of concrete 
practical issues.112 Indeed, sincerely religious Renaissance humanists like Montaigne 
and Erasmus criticised claims to theological certainty as being presumptuous and 
dogmatic. The rediscovery of classical learning had increased their understanding of 
the wide diversity and contextual dependence of human life. Consequently, they 
showed a new open- minded, sceptical tolerance along with practical doubt about the 
value of theory in such fields as theology, natural philosophy, metaphysics or ethics. 
Additionally, their awareness of the limits of our practical and intellectual powers, in 
particular of our ability to reach unquestioned Truth or unqualified Certainty, 
discouraged dogmatism. Thus it was best to concentrate on accumulating a rich 
perspective of the natural world and human affairs, suspending judgment about general 
theory. 
The humanists saw philosophical questions as reaching beyond the scope of experience 
in indefensible ways, that we can claim certainty about nothing.113 The similarity 
between this humanist position and that of Rorty's is obvious. For the humanists, this 
uncertainty reflected the attitude of Aristotle for whom the good had no universal form. 
Consequently for him, sound moral judgement always respected the detailed 
circumstances of specific kinds of cases.114 Because human life did not lend itself to 
abstractions, Aristotle took a broader view of political philosophy than Plato and 
subsequent Enlightenment philosophers. Indeed for Aristotle, ethics was not a field for 
theoretical analysis but for practical wisdom, phronesis. This modesty was part of the 
price of our being human and not gods. Indeed, throughout the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, it had been understood that problems in social ethics were not to be 
resolved by appeal to any single and universal `tradition'. Multiple considerations and 
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coexisting traditions need to be weighed against one another using all the available 
resources of moral thought and social tradition. 
In contrast, the dream of seventeenth century philosophy and science was Plato's 
demand for epistolic, or theoretical grasp. Toulmin115 explains that seventeenth 
century Europe was in a state of general crisis. The theological pressures of the 
Reformation and seventeenth century science narrowed the scope for reasonable debate, 
limiting rationality to theoretical arguments that achieve a quasi -geometrical certainty 
or necessity. In their hope to bring all subjects into formal theory, they altered the 
language of Reason, words like `reason', `rational', and `rationality' ,in subtle but 
influential ways.116 Philosophers became increasingly committed to abstract universal, 
timeless theories, setting aside serious interest in the different kinds of practical 
knowledge, the oral, the particular, the local and the timely (and the present author 
would add, the personal). Rather, they concentrated on the formal analysis of chains of 
written statements, not the circumstantial merits and defects of persuasive statements. 
In the process, ethics was turned into a branch of theoretical philosophy. With the 
invention of ethical theory, dogma acquired an imperative sense, with moral questions 
having unique, simple, and authoritative answers. This belief remained typical of the 
rationalist claims of modern philosophy up until the 1950s. 
Toulmin, rejecting contextual free inquiry, examines the circumstances in which this 
narrowing occurred. The assassination of the tolerant King Henri IV of France in 1610 
undermined tolerance as a way of defusing denominational rivalry. It marked the shift 
from humanism to more rigorous dogmatic modes of thought. Increasingly, those with 
political and theological authority no longer saw tolerance and pluralism as a viable 
intellectual option, and finally in 1618 general war broke out across central Europe 
lasting 30 years. The unacceptability of uncertainty had led to an active distrust of 
unbelievers and to a belief in belief itself. Thus it became urgent to discover some 
rational method of demonstrating the truth of philosophical, scientific or theological 
doctrines, particularly the theological doctrines that had been the prime occasion for the 
religious wars. Interestingly, Toulmin speculates that the assassination of 1610 may 
have had a direct influence on the young Descartes. 
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In classical Greece, philosophy had recognised two distinct kinds of order, an order of 
nature or cosmos and an order of society or poli, but stoic philosophers fused theses 
orders into a single order, a cosmopolis. For them, everything in the world manifests an 
order that expresses the Reason that binds all things together. In the intellectual crisis 
of the seventeenth century, this view gained dominance. The search for certainty 
involved a shift away from practical issues to an exclusive concern with the theoretical. 
Thus, Descartes set out to place the central areas of human knowledge on foundations 
that were clear, distinct and certain, scrapping our inherited concepts, and starting again, 
using rationally validated methods having the necessity of geometrical proofs. 
Newton's account of the solar system followed the methodological example set by 
Descartes. This Cartesian program swept aside the uncertainties and hesitations of the 
sixteenth century in favour of new mathematical kinds of rational certainty and proof. 
Logical analysis was separated from, and elevated far above, the study of rhetoric, 
discourse and argumentation. Inspired by Descartes, moral philosophy followed the 
theoretical road of natural philosophy, relegating practical ethics to a second place. It 
set about clarifying and distinguishing the concepts of ethics and formulating the 
universal, timeless axioms that, they assumed must lie at the base of any rational system 
of ethics. Similarly, academic jurisprudence developed formal and theoretical goals. In 
political theory too, a new style of political theory emerged, of which Hobbes'theory is 
paradigmatic. This flight from the particular, concrete, transitory, and practical aspects 
of human experience became a feature of cultural life in general, and of philosophy in 
particular. From this perspective, the essence of humanity was seen as the capacity for 
rational thought and action while the emotions were seen as frustrating or distorting 
reason. This distrust of emotions is still current and reinforces the Cartesian, or 
calculative, idea of `rationality'. 
Of course, the very idea of humanity having an `essence' is being undermined, while 
recent research on the cognitive abilities of primates is undermining the claim that it is 
rationality that radically distinguishes humans from other animals. The questioning of 
these ideas of rationality and reason are at the heart of the contemporary critique of 
Modernity. This critique calls into question the claim that moral and legal reasoning 
could imitate geometrical forms of argument. The claims for such deductive reasoning 
disguises the moral or political choices that are inevitable between possible inferences 
in long chains of reasoning. Likewise, deductive reasoning, by using contradictory 
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assumptions, can produce radically different ethical systems and geometrical forms of 
argumentation give us no means of choosing between those assumptions. Indeed, such 
forms of reasoning have, themselves, come under sustained attack. With the realisation 
that alternative, useful geometries were possible, mathematicians and geometers have 
recognised that geometries are formal logical systems, based on arbitrary assumptions, 
whose only necessary characteristics were self- consistency with no necessary 
connection to reality. Thus, it was possible to conceive of different logics like the 
several non -Euclidean geometries. Consequently, for Lewis: 
"There are no `laws of logic' which can be attributed to the universe or to human 
reason in the traditional fashion... Rather all logical systems and `laws' were 
human conventions honoured only for their utility... Logical truth could not 
possibly serve as an ultimate criterion since the nature and form of that truth 
necessarily depended upon the prior choice of a particular logical system. "117 
To make matters worse for the logicians, Godel demonstrated that it was theoretically 
impossible to produce any final solution to the problem of the foundations of 
mathematical logic. It was not possible for an axiomatic system to be self- contained.118 
Mathematics was also simply a tool created by the human mind with no connection to 
any metaphysical or theological absolutes.119 All logical and mathematical reasoning 
was thus shown to be purely tautological, the elaboration of implications contained in 
the definition used according to problematic, socially- created, formal systems of 
thought. This critique of logic and mathematics undercuts all pretensions to a priori and 
absolute knowledge."0 For Purcell, summarising Dewey, James and Peirce, truth : 
"was not to be found in the abstract logic of ideas, but in their practical 
consequences. There were no absolute or a priori truths, only workable and 
unworkable hypotheses."121 
The very idea that human reason could discover immutable metaphysical principles that 
could explain the true nature of reality was an illusion. 
For his part, Richard Rorty denies the existence of an `Archimedean point' in human 
understanding that would provide a foundation to all knowledge. We must give up our 
desire for a uniform and normalised sense of truth. Every culture is entitled to judge 
matters of rationality by its own lights. Maclntyre requires us to look behind questions 
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of abstract rationality and ask whose conception of rationality is being used in any 
situation.122 
Rorty points out that we are the heirs of three hundred years of rhetoric about the 
importance of distinguishing sharply between science and religion, science and politics, 
science and art, science and philosophy, and so on. This rhetoric has formed the culture 
of Europe. In every sufficiently reflective culture, there are those who single out one 
area of practice as the paradigm human activity.123 In the Western philosophical 
tradition, this paradigm has been knowing - possessing justified true belief, or beliefs so 
intrinsically persuasive as to make justification unnecessary. However, on the periphery 
there have been figures who distrust the idea that humankind's essence is to be a 
knower of essences. Even when we have justified true belief we may have no more 
than conformity to the norms of the day. Consequently, they have maintained an 
historicist sense of the transience of ideas along with the realisation that the latest 
vocabulary may just be one of the potentially limitless vocabularies in which the world 
can be described. Words take their meanings from other words, not their representative 
character, and vocabularies acquire their privilege from the people who use them not 
because they are transparent to the real. 
For Rorty, the problems of Western philosophy have been set by visual imagery. The 
notion of a human being whose mind is an unclouded mirror, and who knows, is the 
image of God. Thus the human aspiration towards objective truth is an attempt to 
escape from humanity, to become god -like. Indeed, the institutionalised structures of 
command in the West are always legitimised by invoking abstract transcendental 
justifications, like God, or natural law, or a generalised will of the people.124 Western 
art, literature and philosophy shares the idea that, beyond the empirical, mundane realm 
lies a greater reality - immovable, permanent, and absolute. Christianity and other 
forms of transcendentalism have shaped the reality in which Westerners live. At the 
beginning the transcendental absolute was an anthromorphised God, but, through the 
Enlightenment, God was replaced by Nature and natural laws which continued to 
occupy the transcendental plane of absolute truth. This provides our fundamental 
understanding of the ordering of the world, and our vocabulary of legitimation. This 
patterning is so taken for granted that it is difficult to imagine a world -view put together 
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in any another way. As indicated above it is this world -view that is under serious 
challenge. 
In contrast, the Confucian civilisation of South East Asia was not formed by 
monotheism, and does not conceptualise a meaningful level of human action and 
causation beyond the world of human experience. Chinese cosmology not only lacked 
monotheism, but also lacked a transcendental leve1.125 There was, instead, a 
cosmological ordering of this world, represented by the harmonious hierarchical 
interrelations of heavens, earth, and mankind, a notion of order that excludes the 
Western notion of law. In the Chinese world -view, the harmonious cooperation of all 
beings arose from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes, forming a 
cosmic pattern. What they obeyed were the internal dictates of their own natures, and 
not the orders of a superior authority external to themselves. In China, there is no God 
or God -given laws, and no transcendental level that leaders could use to justify their 
claims to power. Consequently, a different vocabulary of legitimation was developed, a 
vocabulary in which justifications for power were based on the requirements for natural 
harmonies in this world. Power over another was justified in terms of one's obedience 
to one's position in a universal relational order. There is, thus, a close connection 
between the postmodemist challenge to Western rationalism and Eastern challenge to 
Western economic hegemony, the two parts of the paradigm shift noted earlier. 
Criticism of this Western transcendentalism is central to Rorty's critique of rationalism. 
Western philosophy sees itself as the attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to 
knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion, on the basis of its special 
understanding of the nature of knowledge and of mind.126 In this tradition, to know is to 
represent accurately what is outside the mind. Consequently, the central concern of 
Western philosophy has been to construct a general theory of representation. But the 
very idea of an autonomous philosophical discipline separate from and sitting in 
judgement on religion and science is quite recent. It originates with Descartes' 
invention of `mind' as a separate entity in which processes occur. Locke made 
Descartes's newly contrived mind into the subject matter of a `science of Man' - moral 
philosophy as opposed to natural philosophy.127 Kant contributed the idea of 
philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason upholding or denying the claims of the rest of 
culture. But this search for the foundation of knowledge originates in an assumed 
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compulsion to believe when staring at an object. The way to have accurate 
representations is to find, within the Mirror of the mind, a special privileged class of 
representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. Thus, this modern 
Cartesian -Kantian pattern is an attempt to find ahistorical conditions for any possible 
historical development. Consequently, for intellectuals philosophy became a substitute 
for religion. The author insulates his beliefs from Rorty's attack by claiming that God's 
transcendence precludes us from the sort of absolute knowledge derived from the 
rational discourse associated with that Western transcendentalism. Such knowledge is a 
matter of revelation, not dialectic. Interestingly, Rorty's attack on the methods of 
rationalism, is itself, an unavoidable echo of the system that he attacks. 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey and Rorty see the possibility of a post -Kantian 
discourse in which there is no all -encompassing discipline which legitimises the 
others.128 Rather, justification is a social phenomenon, a conversation, and not a 
transaction between a knowing subject and reality. Consequently, words like `rational', 
`objective' and `cognitive' are simply marks of distinction applied to matters about 
which there is agreement. This conversational justification is naturally holistic, in 
contrast to the reductive and atomistic habits of the epistemological tradition. It is 
associated with the dissolution of the philosophical dualisms that have characterised 
theoretical debate since the Enlightenment. The attempt to devise mutually exclusive 
categories has come to seem less and less convincing 129 Rorty concludes that the 
attempt since the Greeks to explain `rationality' and `objectivity' in terms of the 
conditions of representation is a self- deceptive effort to eternalise the normal discourse 
of the day. It follows from the Greek belief that what differentiates humans from other 
animals is our ability to know universal truths, numbers, essences, the eternal. Thus, to 
suggest that there are no universals is to endanger our claimed uniqueness. 
This conversational view of truth and knowledge does not devalue human knowledge. 
It simply recognises that nothing can count as justification except by reference to what 
is already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and language to find 
an alternative test to coherence. 
Hermeneutics involves the notion of culture as a conversation rather than a structure 
erected upon foundations. It abandons the belief that all contributions to a discourse are 
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commensurable; that is, can be brought under a set of rules that tell us how to reach 
rational agreement. Within this approach to knowledge, Rorty suggests a distinction 
between normal discourse and abnormal discourse, generalising Kuhn's normal and 
revolutionary science. Normal discourse is that which is conducted within agreed 
conventions while abnormal discourse involves ignorance of, or the setting aside of, 
these conventions. No discipline can explain such abnormal discourse. 
Western transcendentalism has also been closely associated with personalised, 
charismatic authority.13o Greek philosophy, Christianity, and by the Enlightenment, all 
defined the right to teach by the teacher's special knowledge of a universal message.131 
Since the Enlightenment, the guardian of truth and justice was no longer the priest, but 
the intellectual, claiming a special right to speak for humanity, a magisterium. This is a 
claim to authority. Indeed, one of the main reasons that truth and power have been 
posed as separate is to guarantee the authority of those who proclaim this separation.'32 
This abandonment of the quest for commensurability is a particular threat to their role 
as cultural overseers, the Platonic philosopher- kings, who know about the ultimate 
context of knowledge. 
From this postmodernist perspective the sciences are a confederation of enterprises, 
with methods and patterns of explanation to meet their own distinct problems, not the 
varied parts of a single, comprehensive, `unified science'.133 The Platonic image of a 
single, formal type of knowledge is replaced by a picture of enterprises that are always 
in flux, and whose methods of inquiry are adapted to the nature of the case. 
Importantly, the belief that we can start again by cutting ourselves off from inherited 
ideas is as illusory as the hope for a comprehensive system of theory. The hope for 
certainty and clarity in theory has to be balanced with the impossibility of avoiding 
uncertainty and ambiguity in practice. But we need to reappropriate the reasonable, 
tolerant, but neglected legacy of humanism more than we need to preserve the 
systematic, perfectionist legacy of the exact sciences. In particular, formal calculative 
rationality can no longer be the only measure of intellectual adequacy: one must also 
evaluate all practical matters by their human 'reasonableness'. Consequently, for 
Toulmin: 
"the charms of logical rigour must now be unlearned. The task is not to build 
new, more comprehensive systems of theory with universal and timeless 
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relevance, but to limit the scope of even the best- framed theories, and fight the 
intellectual reductionism that became entrenched during the ascendency of 
rationalism. It calls for more subdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and 
multidisciplinary reasoning. "134 
Toulmin believes, in particular, that biology provides less constricting analogies for 
thinking about social relations than physics does. In the organic world, diversity and 
differentiation are the rule and not the exception. The universality of physical theories 
is rare. 
Such positivist social science has suppressed political and moral discourse by 
appropriating the prestige associated with the natural sciences and conferred a 
privileged position on the status quo and on the professional expert with a capacity for 
judgement based on an unstainable claim to technical expertise, neutrality and 
impartiality. All of this should lead us to be critical of abstract and impersonal values, 
of universal solutions and of logical imperatives within economics, the law, and social 
life more generally.135 Thus we should be wary of grand theory, sacred rules, and 
mystical absolutes which have little connection to reality. For, as Horowitz confirms, 
the belief in the explanatory possibility of general laws capable of making predictive 
statements in the social sciences has plummeted: 
"The result has been a dramatic turn towards highly specific `thick description' 
in which narrative and stories purport to substitute for traditional general 
theories... a complex, multi- factored interdependent world has lost confidence 
in single- factor `chains of causation' that were embedded in most nineteenth- 
century explanatory theories. "136 
The above account involves a rejection of the arrogance and dogmatism of past 
intellectual optimism and pretension, the lack of intellectual humility that seems to have 
infested the entire Western intellectual tradition, particularly since the Enlightenment. 
As with the Reformation, this lack of a convincing theoretical base, and the radical 
disagreement it engenders, undermines the magisterium of the theorist. We need to take 
seriously the possibility that the total social environment is too complex, and the human 
mind too limited, for us to understand,137 a view with echoes in Hayek,138 Nielbuhr,139 
and more recently in Arthur.14° 
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This critique also has the effect of undermining the credibility of much recent economic 
theorising, particularly its general use at a very high level of abstraction to support 
arguments for a minimalist government. Thus in the next section, we will turn to a 
discussion of the status of economics and its usefulness in public policy formulation. 
THE QUESTIONABLE STATUS OF ECONOMICS WITHIN THE HUMAN 
CONVERSATION 
This thesis has already rejected the proposition that there can be such a thing as positive 
economics. Economics, particularly its application to public policy choices, is 
inherently normative. But the systematic investigation of social phenomena, including 
economic phenomena, cannot be decried simply because it is normative. But it is a lot 
more difficult that it appeared to Enlightenment philosophers. At best economics is a 
normative science, but given the false connotations of the word `science' in English, it 
might be better to rename it a normative discipline. The dominant school of economics, 
neo- classical economics, has involved the application of a particular metaphor to social 
affairs. This, in itself, is not illegitimate. Indeed, there is no other way of proceeding 
except through such metaphors. But the Newtonian metaphor is only one, among a 
possibly countless number of such metaphors, and might simply be an inappropriate 
metaphor to choose. After all it has been replaced in the physical sciences. It also 
follows from the earlier argument that there are no final criteria for determining its 
worth. The criteria that are used in practice include its simplicity, its usefulness and its 
elegance, but our understanding of these cannot be tied down. They also are matters of 
human invention. It is, consequently, up to the advocates of the use of the Newtonian 
metaphor in economics to convince the rest of us of the worth of their project, 
independent of the `truth' claims, that were simply assumed by the Enlightenment. 
There is a danger that a hermeneutical approach to economic analysis could be used to 
encouraging the uncritical acceptance of modern economics.141 But the hermeneutical 
approach would not oppose the call for much greater empirical testing of economic 
theories. The falsification criteria is central to the coherence test applauded earlier. 
While still much a minority view within the economics profession, there are those that 
are taking the hermeneutical approach seriously. Thus, Klamer and McCloskey142 claim 
120 
that economists have begun to see that their talk is rhetorical, an honest argument 
directed at an audience. But this does not warrant a casual indifference to truth as 
newly understood. Consequently, they question what constitutes economic knowledge. 
In so doing, they point to specific influential papers as examples; one in the rhetoric of 
the hypothetico- deductive model of science, but which looks more like a charming 
metaphor; and another, in the rhetoric of empirical finding, but which looks like a 
reading of history. Indeed, prior convictions appear to have a large effect on the 
econometric results of normal economics. They question the point of publishing one's 
prior convictions dressed up as findings. They go on to argue that "all conversations are 
rhetorical." and to recommend "a rhetorically sophisticated culture for economists, 
following Richard Rorty `in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets 
nor the Party were thought of as more `rational' or more `scientific' or `deeper' than one 
another. "143 They suggest, however, that being a good conversationalist asks for more 
than does following some method, it asks for goodness. Presumably this means serious 
adherence to the norms of the scientific sub -culture, including the subjection of claims 
to serious and honest examination. 
Heilbroner144 reminds us that for Adam Smith rhetoric, the art of speaking effectively 
was the rock on which economics stands. Hilbroner is also sympathetic with 
McCloskey's attack on the pretentious scientism in which economists couch their 
mutual persuasions. He sees such scientism as dangerous in that it conceals, or 
minimises, the elements of judgement and moral valuation that are an intrinsic part of 
economics. For Heilbroner, economics is ideological, by which he means an earnest 
and sincere effort to explain society as its ideologists perceive it, an effort to speak the 
truth at all costs: 
'What is `ideological' about such an effort is not its hypocrisy but its absence of 
historical perspective, its failure to perceive that its pronouncements are a belief 
system, conditioned like all belief systems by the political and social premises of 
the social order." 145 
From this perspective economics is intrinsically normative and directive in that it 
embodies the constitutive beliefs of its parent society. These beliefs are intrinsically 
political, in part of the result of the self - justifying intentions of their spokespersons. But 
it is also because all societies presuppose structures of subordination and 
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superordination, of cooperation and conflict- resolution, and of the justification and use 
of power. Consequently, all systems of social thought must contain that political 
character, knowingly and explicitly, or unknowingly and in disguise. 
Of course, many economists dismiss methodological questions on the grounds that all 
the effort to determine whether economics is a science or not, has never advanced 
economics in any practical sense.146 But this is not a tenable position in this inquiry: in 
practice economists do pronounce with apparent authority on policy issues. What is the 
source of that authority? 
CAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY ASSIST ECONOMISTS IN PROVIDING 
POLICY ADVICE? 
In the face of these philosophical and methodological conclusions, the extent to which 
economists can have anything to say on public policy development as a result of their 
`economic expertise' is deeply problematic. It is at this point that we encounter the 
superficially helpful suggestion that economists should turn to the study of moral 
philosophy if the are to offer relevant policy advice. The suggestion assumes that moral 
philosophy can produce rational answers to the moral questions raised by public policy 
questions. But it is that very concept of rationality that is under question. In any event 
this search for basic principles of ethical action has run into the sand. The 
Enlightenment project, which began as the rejection of religion as the guarantor of 
legitimacy and meaning, dismantled the metaphysical and teleological superstructures 
that held the medieval and classical worlds together. But that project's search for a 
replacement has collapsed and left a vacuum. As Maclntyre concludes: 
"in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of 
sociology, [we] lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal 
individualist point of view. "147 
It has privatised all sources of meaning and belief ensuring that no other tradition can 
assert itself as the sole claimant of a shared and public conception of the good.148 
Indeed, why should we attach more weight to the pronouncements of philosophers on 
moral issues than those of other people ?149 There is little reason to believe that the 
academic practice of moral philosophy has the authority to determine the style and 
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method of thinking on moral matters, what the serious problems are, and how they 
should be characterised 150 The normative assumption underlying this form of 
justification is never, itself, justified. Apparently we are somehow required by reason 
to accept certain basic moral injunctions. But where reason acquires this power to 
compel is never explained, simply assumed. 
In any event, moral philosophers do not start from zero when they begin their system - 
building. They start from an impression of the everyday social reality embodied in 
culture, language and tradition. At the end of the day, Rawls seeks to justify the norms 
that he thinks are the critical ones in his society. So do Plato and Aristotle. For his part 
Habermas' searches for ideal speech conditions, but since we do not live in such a 
world, we cannot know what would command agreement, and thus what to 
recommend .151 
This turn to moral philosophy is no turn at all. It is where economists have been all 
along. Indeed, neo- classical economics is inherently utilitarian. An appeal from 
economics to utilitarianism is therefore no more than an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. 
It is just that most economists have failed to recognise the fact. Indeed, it is simply a 
further appeal to the failed Enlightenment project noted earlier. In any event, in moral 
philosophy, there are different and incompatible schools and little is uncontroversial.152 
Moral justifications take many different forms and people give many different 
justifications for the moral judgements that they make. Indeed, moral disagreements are 
the essence of political debate. These conflicting moral traditions are embedded in our 
moral vocabulary, culture and tradition: 
"we live with the inheritance of not only one, but a number of well integrated 
moralities. Aristotelianism, primitive Christian simplicity, the puritan ethic, the 
aristocratic ethic of consumption and the traditions of democracy and socialism 
have all left a mark on our moral vocabulary. "153 
These incompatible traditions, when taken with the Enlightenment's privatisation of 
morality, means that moral values can be a matter for individual choice. Arguments 
alone can give no definitive answer to moral questions, and all such philosophers do is 
disguise the answers they want to give, as the verdict of philosophical inquiry. Thus, 
policy advisers are in a position to pick their school of moral thought to suit their 
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rhetorical and ideological purposes, hiding their choice behind a cloud of impressive 
rhetoric. Hausman and McPherson also warn us of the many dimensions of moral 
appraisal and against reducing these many dimensions to one or two.'54 
This appeal to moral theory leads to a reliance on theoretical reasoning to explain moral 
values rather than actual reflection on experience. At the heart of such theoretical 
accounts remains the idea that social life is logically secondary to an unconstrained non- 
social life in which what people do is a matter of their individual `natural' drives. But 
this psychological vocabulary presupposes an established web of social and moral 
relationships.r55 Indeed, moral justifications are always justifications to somebody who 
accepts the relevant standard.'56 
Indeed, Maclntyre157 points out that contemporary moral philosophy is characterised by 
radical disagreement, interminable arguments and incommensurable premises. There is 
no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture. Thus, we have competing 
theories, for example deontological ones like those of Rawls, Nozick and Gerwith 
which focus on the individual and usually take duty or rights as the basis of morality. 
And we also have teleological theories which judge actions on the basis of their 
consequences alone. From this teleological perspective we can only know whether 
something is right if one knows the fundamental aims or ends that our activities are to 
promote. 
Each of the arguments Maclntyre cites is logically valid, but the premises are such that 
there is no way of weighing their respective claims.158 These premises employ quite 
different normative concept so that their claims are of different kinds. But there is no 
established way of deciding between these claims in our society. The invocation of one 
premise against another is pure assertion and counter assertion. The different 
conceptually incommensurable premises of rival arguments can easily be traced to a 
wide variety of historical origins, but we should not underestimate the complexity of the 
history and ancestry of such arguments. Indeed, we need to recognise that the various 
concepts which inform our moral discourse were originally at home in larger totalities 
of theory and practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by a context 
of which they have now been deprived. 
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Maclntyre complains that moral philosophy is often written as though the history of the 
subject were only of secondary and incidental importance. Some philosophers have 
even written as if moral concepts were timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate 
species of concept, necessarily having the same features throughout their history. The 
history of ethics is instructive because moral concepts change as social life. For 
example, the list of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics reflects what Aristotle takes to be 
the code of a gentleman in contemporary Greek society 159 To understand a concept is 
always to learn the grammar that controls the use of such words and so to grasp the role 
of the concept in language and social life. But there are continuities as well as breaks in 
the history of moral concepts. The complexity is increased because philosophical 
inquiry, itself, plays a part in changing moral concepts. 
Consequently, it is not clear that an investigation of how a concept is used will yield one 
clear and consistent account. Indeed, if part of our ethical knowledge is tacit, as was 
argued in Chapter 2, it may not even be possible to articulate the concepts successfully. 
Moreover, the current state of moral philosophy involves a whole range of 
interconnected differences of views. The parties to these different views will not agree 
that they could be settled by empirical inquiry into the way in which evaluative 
concepts are actually used. The ordinary use of moral concepts may on occasions be 
confused, or even perverted through the influence of misleading philosophical theory. 
Indeed, Rorty questions whether we already possess the moral vocabulary necessary to 
determine whether we are doing justice to others.16° He argues that since Kant and 
Bentham moral philosophy has identified moral perfection with doing justice to others 
taking for granted that we already possess the necessary vocabulary. From this 
perspective the only remaining problem is to split the difference between Kant and 
Bentham - between the categorical imperative and the utilitarian principle as 
formulations of `the moral law'. This reduction of morality to `the moral law' has twin 
roots in the Christian and the scientific traditions. On the one side, it is an attempt to 
update and make respectable the Judeo- Christian idea that all the laws and the prophets 
can be summed up in respect for one's fellow humans. On the other hand, it is an 
attempt to secularise ethics by imitating Galileo's secularisation of cosmology, finding 
nice, elegant little formulae with which to predict what will happen. Consequently, 
when Aristotelians, Kierkegaardian Christians, Marxists, or Nietzscheans argue that 
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there is more to moral philosophy than that - that we may not yet know the words 
which would permit us to deal justly with our fellows - they are said to confuse 
morality with something else, something `religious' or `aesthetic' or `ideological'. 
When philosophers protest that what is needed is not rules that synthesise the utilitarian 
principles and the categorical imperative but rather a morally sensitive vocabulary, they 
are seen as doing something rather odd and `literary', not to be confused with moral 
theory. 
For Rorty, the difficult moral cases are ones where we grope for the correct words to 
describe the situation, not ones where we are tom between the demands of two 
principles. The fiction of real moral and political questions being resolved by finding 
the morally relevant features of the situation, those that can be described in the 
vocabulary in which classical moral principles are stated, should not be taken seriously. 
We should not think of our distinctive moral status as being `grounded' in our 
possession of mind, language, culture, feeling, intentionality, textuality, or anything 
else. These numinous ideas are simply declarations of our awareness that we are 
members of a moral community, phrased in pseudo -explanatory jargon. This awareness 
is something which cannot be further `grounded', it is simply taking a certain point of 
view on our fellow humans. It is the ability to wield complex and sensitive moral 
vocabularies that counts as moral sophistication. What makes the modem West morally 
advanced is not a clear vision of objective moral truths but its sense that we are creating 
morality, a moral text, rather than discovering nature's own moral vocabulary. What 
needs to be emphasised is that the moral vocabulary does not stand alone, but, in any 
culture, is supplemented greatly by endless narratives which aim to explain the way in 
which the vocabulary should be used. 
This emphasis on the existing moral vocabularies stands as a healthy correction to the 
Platonic system building tendencies of Western rationalism. In this spirit, Haan looks to 
the construction of an empirically based, consensual theory of everyday morality.161 
This morality of everyday life in not a capacity that resides exclusively in individuals; it 
is social exchange in itself. For Haan, several Platonic ideas have obscured the simpler 
features of everyday morality. For example, it is assumed that for a moral theory to be 
adequate, it should provide clear and absolute guidance for all important problems of 
living. Consequently, formulations of everyday morality have usually been depreciated 
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as being relativistic and inferior. Similar to Toulmin, Haan argues that such absolute 
claims attract human beings because they seem to deliver the security of moral clarity. 
Associated with this is an assumption that a complete morality can only be known to us 
when it is presented by a higher authority or by morally elite figures. The consequence 
of this way of thinking is that leaders can then employ morality and manipulate guilt as 
an instrument of political control. People's deep commitments to their collectivities 
make them highly vulnerable and responsive to this form of manipulation. Leaders' 
public judgements of moral merit quell the efforts of the disadvantaged to promote their 
own good: those of lower status are guilty - intrinsically unworthy - and have not 
earned the right to expect more. But for Haan, everyday morality has no other source 
than the experience and agreements of people themselves. Thus, she questions that 
moralities must be in the form of complete, formalised systems, rather than the more 
proximate forms that emerge from the details of human interchange. In such a morality 
of everyday life, specialists are not needed. Under the influence of Piaget's work, Haan 
believes that the mind is active, rational, and constructivist, and that therefore morality 
must be inductive and creative rather than compliant and rule deductive. Thus, `moral 
character' as a fixed faculty now seems less likely than moral responsiveness as a 
sensitivity and skill in social interaction. This would seem to require an ability to 
access the appropriate social text.162 In this connection, psychology is moving towards 
the explicit recognition that humans are thoroughgoing social beings from birth and that 
infants are far less egocentric than previously thought. 
When social interaction is taken as the pivotal feature of morality, a different view of 
moral processes, decisions, guidelines, and individual capacities emerges. Moral 
dialogues occur continuously as major or minor events throughout the day and life of 
every person. People have a clear and strong expectation of engaging in moral dialogue 
as organising the patterns of social thought and interchange. Consequently, moral 
dialogue can be regarded as the prime moral structure. The question of why people are 
willing to consider others' moral claims has some empirical answers. Haan163 considers 
that people are willing to consider the moral claims of others for the following 
interrelated, empirical reasons: 
1. the need to conserve our view of ourselves as moral; 
2. the mismatch between the moral person one thinks one is and the immoral 
person one is afraid one has been; 
127 
3. enlightened self- interest; and 
4. integrity among people, a matter of good faith. 
This interactive view puts citizens and society in the difficult role of constantly working 
to achieve moral agreements. In order to be moral, people must actually and 
authentically participate in building the morality they endorse and use. In particular, for 
Haan, a just society cannot exist without an interactive morality requiring equitable 
participation. The more remote justice is from the actual experience of people, the less 
sensible it is for them to accept society as morally legitimated. This is a position very 
close to that advanced by Habermas, shorn of its Platonic tendencies. It also has much 
in common with the evolutionary account of the development of moral order advanced 
in Chapter 2. But, it is not a position that rejects critical analysis, but it gives far greater 
weight to other forms of prophetic proclamation. 
CONCLUSION 
Earlier we argued that self- interest is not the fundamental ordering principle operating 
in society. This was in response to the argument from many economists that social 
norms and social groups can be explained as a result of a voluntary contract between 
self- interested individuals who have made a rational calculation that cooperation was in 
their long -term interest. Rather it was claimed that human beings have always been 
social animals drawing their identity from their social relations and from their culture. 
Consequently, neither the self or society had explanatory priority. As a result, the 
methodological individualism inherent in the social contract idea could not be sustained. 
It as also argued that our moral and legal infrastructures was essential to the social and 
economic system, the economic system being seen as a sub -system in the social system. 
An evolutionary account was given of the development of that social system. The 
neglect of the social underpinnings of economic activity by contemporary economists is 
surprising given the weight of earlier discussion and account was provided in the last 
Chapter of the various ways in which that relationship has been described. 
Chapter 4 has developed a critique of the foundations of economic rationalism, 
examining a number of closely interrelated themes. The Chapter has firstly examined 
128 
the historical emergence of the intellectual basis of modernity and economic rationalism 
recounting the waning of the medieval idea, inherited from Aristotle through Aquinas, 
that human beings were social and political beings necessarily involved in a network of 
social relations. This view was replaced by what was termed the Natural Law Outlook 
in which the Divine underpinnings of the inherited idea of Natural Law was gradually 
secularised. This was a trend associated with the developments of science and a desire 
to find a scientific and increasingly more natural explanation of the social order. Thus, 
appeals to reason and nature, both increasingly divinised, provided a source of meaning 
and justification as comprehensive as the religion that it had replaced. Social contract 
theory emerged to provide a Newtonian and individulistic account of the social and 
political system. Gradually, the concept of contract replaced law and custom as the 
source of law and social obligations. Locke's account with its emphasis on pre -social 
property rights was particularly agreeable to the property classes. While the various 
theories recounted did not add to a coherent whole they reflected the Enlightenment's 
ambition to produce a secular, naturalist and rational justification for our moral 
allegiances and social arrangements. 
Economics is the inheritor of this tradition of scientific discourse. This leads directly to 
the question of what kind of discourse is economics. Is economics a positive science or 
is it a moral discourse? Notwithstanding the ambitions of Hobbes and Locke and their 
successors to found our moral institutions on science, over the last century economists 
have generally made a distinction between positive and normative economics, a 
distinction traced to Hume's distinction between facts and values. Normative 
economics involved the application of the positive science of economics to policy 
problems in which the choice of ends was seen as normative with positive economics 
addressing the best way of achieving those ends. It has been argued that it was a 
mistake to think that explanatory theories occupy a privileged epistemological position 
compared to normative theories. Indeed, there is no value free vocabulary. Thus it was 
concluded that the distinction between positive and normative economics cannot be 
sustained, and that economics is a moral science. 
If economics is a moral science then what can be said about the status of science? It is 
clear that the positivist pretensions of science, in which scientific progress was viewed 
as the inclusion of more and more phenomena under natural laws of greater and greater 
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generality, have themselves been undermined. While there is not complete agreement 
among the critics of the positivist view of science, there is broad agreement on essential 
points. The belief that scientific knowledge is an accurate representation of `reality' 
needs to be abandoned. Accuracy of representation is not achievable. Rather science is 
a social practice in which knowledge is socially constructed to produce coherence, a 
social practice which in the physical sciences happened to work. Consequently, the 
empirical sciences cannot claim an essential grasp of reality and thus a privileged status. 
This is no minor quibble but a fundamental attack on the whole Enlightenment project. 
What is involved is a decisive break in our world -view. In particular, the Newtonian 
mechanistic world -view has been undermined along with any sense of objective 
certainty in the physical sciences or the political -cultural sphere. As a consequence, we 
have to live a profound sense of historical relativism and the belief that there can be no 
over -arching absolute principle which can reconcile all the relativities of human thought 
and experience. In particular, the possibility of demonstrating the truth of ethical 
propositions has been undermined. This critique has also undermined the credibility of 
much economic theorising, particularly its use, at a high level of abstraction, to support 
arguments for a minimalist government, arguments which have their origins in Locke. 
Within the economics profession there are those who are taking this hermeneutical view 
of science and of economics seriously. Others have sought refuge in moral philosophy 
as a means of supporting their policy recommendations. But, as might be expected 
from the critique of rationalism, moral philosophy is, itself, in disarray. In any event, it 
is where economists have been all along. Indeed, the idea that we already possess the 
moral vocabulary necessary for determining whether we are doing justice for others is 
disputed. It is the ability to wield a sophisticated moral vocabulary that counts, along 
with the awareness that we are creating, rather than discovering, morality. 
It is against this setting that in the next chapter the thesis will turn to the historical 
background to the development of the doctrine of Freedom of Contract. It will be found 
that the development of that doctrine parallels the development of social contract ideas 
discussed in this chapter and relies on the same Natural Law Outlook. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles 
upon which, from time to time, laissez -faire has been founded. It is 
not true that individuals possess a prescriptive `natural liberty' in 
their economic activities. There is no `compact' conferring perpetual 
rights on those who Have or those who Acquire. The world is not so 
governed from above that private and social interests always coincide. 
It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is 
not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that 
enlightened self -interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is 
it true that self -interest generally is enlightened; more often 
individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too 
ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show 
that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less 
clear- sighted than when they act separately. J M Keynes' 
INTRODUCTION 
The account now turns to an examination of the emergence of classical contract law 
towards the end of the nineteenth century and of its central doctrine, freedom of 
contract. That development of that doctrine was closely associated with the rise of the 
positivist views that have been so strongly criticised in the previous chapter. The 
doctrine is central to the Australian Fair Trading debate that will be discussed in the 
next chapter. It will be shown that the doctrine has its origins in the breakdown of 
medieval ideas regulating social and economic life and the emergence of social contract 
ideas as a basis for explaining social order and justifying the property rights of the elite. 
Natural Law, the Natural Lawyers, and the gradual secularising of that tradition also 
heavily influenced the growth of the doctrine. It is in the context of that doctrine, and 
its gradual erosion throughout this century, that the Australian Fair Trading debate 
occurred. 
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Contract, broadly defined, is one of the central techniques of the market system. And, 
as has been shown in Chapter 4, many philosophers and economists have used contract 
as their fundamental explanatory device in explaining or justifying social order. The 
doctrine of freedom of contract is therefore central to the conceptual framework within 
which economists, and, in particular, economic rationalists, operate. 
Since the Australian common law tradition derives from England, it is necessary to look 
to the development of the law in England, particularly the law of contract, to develop an 
understanding of the Australian Fair Trading debate. As will be seen in the following 
section, that law was heavily influenced by the Enlightenment and by its natural law 
outlook. Indeed the rise of the doctrine of freedom of contract, one of the great 
intellectual movements of modem times, parallels the rise of capitalist society and its 
adherence to social contract theory? As will be shown shortly, classical contract law 
reached its pinnacle in the late nineteenth century.' There are, of course close links 
between the development of the common law and the law of contracts in England and in 
the United States where English judgements and theorists continuing to exercise 
considerable influence.' Indeed, in the period between 1776 and 1784, eleven of the 
original States in the United States adopted some provisions for the reception of the 
common law as well as of a limited class of British statutes. 
Chapter 4, in discussing the development of social contract theory, pointed to the 
gradual breakdown in the medieval idea that people owed a wide range of social and 
religious duties. In that world, relationships were largely customary, but law backed 
that custom. Indeed, law, custom, and morality were not clearly distinguished. While 
there were some elements of bargaining and free choice in economic life, that freedom 
was severely constrained by ethical ideas. These ideas ensured that economic 
relationships occurred in ways that were thought to be fair and just. Thus the notion of 
a just price and a just wage were central to medieval economic thought.' Custom and 
law imposed a duty on those exercising authority to enforce those just prices and wages. 
Any bargain in which one party obviously gained more advantage than the other and 
used his power to the full was regarded as usurious. No one doubted that everybody 
was entitled to subsistence. Thus there were repeated attempts to impose price controls 
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on staple items as well as to regulate wages. Indeed, until the end of the fifteenth 
century all lending at interest was, in theory, totally prohibited. Aquinas (1224 -1274) 
had made a distinction between a wrongful trade that was carried on for profit and a 
rightful trade, which served public necessity.' A sale in which there was a defect in 
either quantity or quality was sinful and was void. Similarly, a seller was obliged to 
reveal a secret flaw in the product being sold. Consequently, the doctrine of caveat 
emptor, the companion doctrine to the doctrine of freedom of contracts, as understood in 
the mid -nineteenth century, was not part of the reputable ideas of the middle ages.' 
In this medieval world, the possession of property involved temporary custodianship 
and carried duties as well as rights. Nor was government regarded as unnatural or a 
necessary evil. On the contrary, for Aquinas, leadership and rule would have been 
necessary in an earthly paradise as it was among angels.' The inclusion of avarice 
among the seven deadly sins brought the whole sphere of trade into ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. But the same sense of control extended to the secular realm. The system 
of justice included the King's tribunals and local and special courts in which 
administrative and judicial functions were blended in ways that now seem curious. 
These functions included a wide range of regulations controlling trade and ensuring an 
open market, a fair price and good quality. These arrangements became even more 
formalised as market towns_ succeeded fairs. And as ecclesiastical authority broke 
down, the secular realm, particularly the crown, took a larger and larger role in the 
maintenance of these fair- trading regulations. The resulting litigation cannot be reduced 
to modern legal terms, but they were more in the nature of criminal rather than private 
actions. It was the community and the craft that were seen as being injured by breaches 
of these regulations more than the buyer.' Hamilton says of the regulation of trade in 
sixteenth century Southampton: 
"The picture which these mercantile entities as a whole impress upon the mind of 
the student is that of a semi -socialistic community in which every craftsman and 
every trader is to some extent a public official, working under license, enjoying 
monopoly, subject to supervision, regulated by authority, in matters of quality, 
quantity, and price of goods, hours of labour, number of apprentices and 
journeymen, and almost every other particular of his occupation. "10 
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By the end of the sixteenth century, the common law shared the domain of justice with 
courts of custom, the liberties of the towns, and special tribunals. Thus the common law 
was not yet the common law. These attitudes were associated with view of the law as a 
body of essentially fixed doctrine derived from Divine and natural law and to be applied 
in order to achieve a fair result in particular cases between private litigants." As a 
consequence, judges in England, and later in the American States, conceived of their 
role as merely discovering and applying pre- existing legal rules. This brought with it a 
strict conception of precedent in which judicial innovation was regarded as 
impermissible. At the same time, statute was largely conceived of as an expression of 
custom. 
With the gradual breakdown of these ideas, the lords and freeholders came to question 
to some extent the Iegitimacy and privileges of the crown and of government more 
generally. They also began to see themselves as the owners of the land they occupied 
while at the same time ideas about the ownership of property become more `absolute'. 
Similarly ideas about `freedom' also became more absolute. The breakdown of central 
government during the Civil Wars (1642 -51) also disorganised the system of market 
control, which had come to depend upon national authority. 12 The damaged authority of 
the central government never made a complete recovery even though the supervision of 
an expanding trade and commerce was maintained with decreasing effectiveness until 
well past the Restoration (1660). 
As indicated in Chapter 4, these changes made it easier for the propertied elite to see 
civil society as based on a social contract, not on socially defined moral obligations 
backed by Divine Law.13 Unlike the traditional natural law, natural rights theories were 
based on conflict between the individual and the state. As the basis of legal obligation 
was redefined in terms of popular sovereignty and contract, the natural law foundations 
of common law rules began to disintegrate.' By the eighteenth century, men thought of 
their relationships with each other, and the state, in contractual terms in which a key role 
was assigned to individual choice. 
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With this came a growing perception that judges did not merely discover law, but that 
they made it. Thus, they gradually began to feel free to disregard earlier precedent and 
to make law consistent with this prevailing contractual ideology. Regard for individual 
choice and contract played a central role in supporting a limited view of the role of the 
state and the erosion of the system of monopolies and of the legal regulation of trade. 
As we saw earlier, for both Hobbes and Locke the primary function of the state was the 
maintenance and enforcement of rights of property and of contract. Together with 
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and the associated idea of a harmony of interests, 
these theorists provided a moral justification for the property and contract based society 
of the eighteenth century 
Roman law had a concept of promissory liability and this concept was reconstructed 
through the influence of Natural Lawyers such as Grotius (1583 -1645) and Pufendorf 
(1632 -94). Both argued for the `naturally' binding nature of promises against the 
consideration -based theory of promissory obligation, which was still to be found in the 
common law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, Pufendorf was himself 
a major social contract theorist whose theories had a powerful influence especially in 
Germany.15 The basic concepts and assumptions of Pufendorf's arguments are similar 
to those of Hobbes, but Pufendorf considered that in a state of nature there were natural 
laws including the obligation to keep promises. These natural law ideas, and 
Pufendorf's adjustments of Hobbes's assumptions, played an important part in Locke's 
social contract theory and in his defence of property. 
There was a close connection between economic liberal ideas and the rule of law as it 
came to be understood after 1688. The idea that the law should be regular, certain, and 
subject to interpretation by independent judges has a powerful value content, the value 
of individual freedom and free choice. The rule of law is, itself, a politically biased 
ideology because by promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the calculating 
and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their advantage.16 Sir Edward Coke (1552- 
1634) was one of the precursors of legal liberalism in the common law tradition: 
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"Coke's legal decisions in the field of economic regulation do constitute a radical 
break with the past and do lay some legal foundation for what later amounts to 
modern rational capitalism.i17 
English common law gained its supremacy over the prerogatives of the crown largely 
through Coke's efforts.'8 Cork was opposed to what he saw as the usurping of power by 
the King, and appealed to the common law as a traditional barrier to the interference by 
government with the economic and other freedoms of the individual.19 In the process 
Coke distorted and misinterpreted the past common -law tradition to make it seem more 
strongly favourable to economic liberalism than it was in fact. Thus while the doctrine 
of caveat emptor had no ancient lineage, it was Coke who helped establish it by setting 
it down in his treatises on law.2° Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's bench 
from 1756 to 1788, was another major figure, who was also an economic liberal, who 
did much to consolidate and develop commercial law. It was during Mansfield's tenure 
that the overthrowing of the traditional role of the courts in regulating the equity of 
agreements began in earnest in England. A casual aside by Lord Mansfield, that the 
only basis for an action for a breach of warranty was an express contract, laid the basis 
for the adoption by the courts of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the rapid overthrow 
of an important element of the equitable conception of contract.21 
Mansfield's conception of a general jurisdiction of commercial law, emphasising its 
universal character and its correspondence with natural reason, had an overwhelming 
influence in the United States. This involved a new stress on the functionality and 
rationality of the legal rules free from every local peculiarity, and brought with it a 
growing distinction between morality and the law. Horwitz" in particular notes the 
influence of a new utilitarianism in nineteenth century US law in general and in the 
erosion of concern for the fairness of contracts in that country. What was involved was 
a change in the moral conception underlying contract in which the express contract 
became paramount. But Horwitz also notes the influence of a new alliance between the 
mercantile classes and the legal profession, firstly in trying to subvert the influence of 
Equity and juries on commercial cases, and ultimately in moulding legal doctrine to 
accommodate commercial interests. 
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This growth in commercial law also reflected the increasing complexity of economic 
transactions. Indeed, the common law had managed very well for some centuries before 
anybody realised that there was a law of contracts.23 But once its existence had been 
realised it was impossible for lawyers to do without it. Thus the title theory of exchange 
ceased to be an adequate description of economic transactions. The wholly executory 
contract, in which the contract is made prior to its performance, came to be seen as the 
paradigm case, a case in which contract is understood as creating an expected return not 
as a transfer of a title. Consequently, the focus of contract law altered from the 
performance of the obligations to the making of the contract. This change helped break 
the link between contractual obligations and the justice of the consideration. This is the 
paradigm case to which economists refer in describing contracts as a risk allocation 
mechanism. 
As the law moved increasingly to a recognition of the generality of the binding nature of 
contracts, they began to be seen as being about promises, wills and intentions and not 
about particular relationships and particular transactions. While there had never been an 
overt principle of fairness in the common law of contracts, lawyers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were not indifferent to such concerns. For example, Lord 
Hardwicke said in 1748 that every contract with a sailor must be fair.' While generally 
the inadequacy of a consideration may not have provided adequate grounds for setting 
aside a contract, gross inadequacy did. And inadequacy supplemented by a very wide 
range of other matters also sufficed. Indeed, there were signs of a broad principle of 
good faith emerging in the common law of contracts in the late eighteenth century, a 
development that ultimately came to naught. Jury control over damages may have 
rendered it unnecessary to strive for substantive fairness of exchange. For Atiyah, it 
was the jury that bridged the gap between morality and the law 25 In any event grossly 
unfair contracts were liable to be upset in Chancery, and it was in Chancery that the 
greater part of contract litigation took place. 
Chancery was the second of two different traditions in English legal practice. Equity 
consisted originally in a body of rules and procedures that grew up separately from the 
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Common Law and which were administered in different Courts. From the time of 
Edward II, or earlier, the Chancellor and his officials, later the Court of Chancery, as 
keeper of the King's conscience' could give equitable relief where the common law 
courts might provide no remedy. They exercised a jurisdiction that did not override the 
Common Law but remedied its imperfections. With the rationalisation of legal practice, 
the Common Law and Equity are now merged and administered by a single set of 
Courts almost everywhere. Indeed, while the merger of Law and Equity is usually 
portrayed as a rationalisation of civil procedure, for Horwitz it represents the final and 
complete emasculation of Equity as an independent source of legal standards.26 
While the moral ideas of economic liberalism were gaining adherence in the common 
law tradition, and society more generally, the Chancery tradition (Equity) maintained 
the older tradition of regulation, protection and paternalism. It was a tradition that was 
only gradually eclipsed as the doctrine of freedom of contract gained hold; but it was a 
tradition that was never completely abandoned. Thus, as late as 1829, Best CJ ruled that 
"It is the duty of the Court, in administering the law, to lay down rules 
calculated to prevent fraud; to protect persons who are necessarily ignorant 
of the qualities of a commodity they purchase; and make it the interest of 
manufacturers and those who sell, to furnish the best article than can be 
supplied."'-' 
Similarly in the United States in 1817, Chancellor Desaussure of South Carolina had 
this to say: 
"[I]t would be a great mischief to the community, and a reproach to the 
justice of the country, if contracts of very great inequality, obtained by 
fraud, or surprise, or the skilful management of intelligent men, from 
weakness, or inexperience, or necessity could not be examined into, and 
set aside. "'S 
Indeed, in the United States, the role of the jury ensured that the community's sense of 
fairness was often the dominant standard in contract cases.29 With the eclipsing of this 
equity tradition in both England and the United States, the discretionary application of 
equity as a form of mercy also declined. And with this decline in concern for fairness 
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came a parallel decline in concern in the law of contract with duress and with mistake. 
At the same time, the role of juries in determining the law and contractual damages was 
gradually whittled away first in England and later in the United States?' 
It is clear that this emerging eighteenth and nineteenth century notion of contract, and 
the role it plays in society, was far broader than is held generally today. The 
rationalisation of the common law was particularly influenced by a new legal literature 
looking for legal principles based on rational first principles, and influenced by French 
legal ideas. For example, Powell's Essay Upon the Law of Contracts and Agreements, 
the first English thesis on contract published in 1790, saw the equitable conception of 
substantive justice as undermining the rule of law: 
"[I]t is absolutely necessary for the advantage of the public at large that the rights 
of the subject should ... depend upon certain and fixed principles of law, and not 
upon rules and constructions of equity, which when applied ... must be arbitrary 
and uncertain, depending, in the extent of their application, upon the will and 
caprice of the judge." 31 
Interestingly, Horwitz' documents the influence of Powell's essay on the erosion of 
concern with the substantive justice of contracts in the United States. Similarly for 
Addison in 1847: 
"The law of contracts may justly indeed be said to be a universal law adapted to 
all times and races, and all places and circumstances, being founded upon those 
great and fundamental principles of right and wrong deducted from natural reason 
which are immutable and eternal.i33 
It is also clear from Powell that that the emergence of a market economy and its 
associated economic ideas played an important role in this view; 
"[I]t is the consent of parties alone, that fixes the just price of any thing, without 
reference to the nature of things themselves, or to their intrinsic value ...i34 
Where there is no intrinsic measure of value of a good or service, but only their 
subjective value to the particular parties, there can be no substantive measure of 
exploitation. Indeed, there was a particularly close relationship between law, economics 
and the social sciences in the first forty years of the nineteenth century. 
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The economic ideas, which influenced lawyers and judges and the development of the 
common law, were the ideas of the classical economists between 1776 and 1870. While 
they assumed that the law must provide for the enforcement of contract, they gave no 
real thought to why the enforcement of contracts was not, itself, a form of government 
intervention." Nevertheless, the concept of freedom of contract was at the very heart of 
classical economics and was taken over by the common lawyers of the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, The Wealth of Nations published in 1776 had a major 
impact on political thought about economic matters. Politicians relied upon Smith's 
ideas and he was consulted by leading Ministers. For example, Pitt the Younger was 
heavily influenced by The Wealth of Nations, paying tribute to Smith in Parliament on 
several occasions 36 As a result of this influence, in 1795 Pitt withdrew proposals for 
regulating wages and giving family allowances. Similarly, it was Bentham's Defence of 
Usury of 1796 that provided the intellectual foundations for later efforts to repeal usury 
laws in both England and the United States." By the end of the century the classical 
economic literature was well known to the educated public and was influential in policy 
making generally. In turn, Malthus and Ricardo exercised considerable influence. Not 
only did Ricardo believe that all contracts should be left to the freedom of the market 
but that the law needed to facilitate exchange: 
"Like all other contracts, wages should be left to the fair and free competition of 
the market, and should never be controlled by the interference of the legislature.i3s 
Ricardo also opposed the Usury Laws in 1818 and the renewal of the Truck Act in 1822. 
In turn, Nassau Senior was an adviser to Whig politicians in the 1830s and 
1840s.39 Influenced by these advisers Lord Melbourne, Prime Minister for seven years 
in the 1830, believed that 
"the whole duty of government is to prevent crime and to preserve contract. "40 
Similarly, in the United States, usury laws were attacked on the grounds that they were a 
violation of the best principles of both politics and political economy 41 
Associated with this rise of freedom of contract was the idea of caveat emptor, whereby 
responsibility for determining the quality of goods being purchased rested firmly on the 
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purchaser. In his Principles of Political Economy, published in 1864, J R McCulloch 
expressed this principle as follows: 
"It is perhaps hardly necessary to advert to the regulations intended to secure the 
quality of manufactured goods that were formerly so general. These are now 
almost everywhere abolished; and it appears to be universally conceded that in 
this, as in most other things, the free competition of the producers is the only 
principle on which reliance can ordinarily be placed for securing superiority of 
fabric as well as cheapness. Wherever industry is emancipated from all sorts of 
restraints, those who carry it on endeavour, by lessening the cost, or improving the 
fabric of their goods, or both, to extend their business; and the intercourse that 
subsists among the different classes of society is so very intimate that an 
individual who should attempt to undersell his neighbours by substituting a showy 
and flimsy for a substantial article, would be very soon exposed, and be obliged to 
reduce its price to its proper level.s4'- 
In addition to the direct influence of major classical economists, in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century popularisers, like James Wilson, the editor of The Economist, and 
Harriet Martineau, began to propagate very simplistic versions of political economy, 
fixing in the popular mind that laissez 
-faire was the practical conclusion of orthodox 
political economy.°; Indeed, the doctrine even got hold of the educational system» 
While laissez -faire was not a coherent political philosophy, it is a convenient way of 
summing up the orientation towards public affairs that was typical of the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, for Keynes, the survival of the fittest could be regarded as a vast 
generalisation of Ricardian economics as One of the strongest advocates of laissez 
-faire 
and freedom of contract was Herbert Spencer (1829 -1903) who saw the very close 
similarity between laissez 
-faire and Darwinism. In his Social Statics, Spencer idealised 
freedom of contract as the supreme mechanism for maintaining the social order with the 
minimum of coercion. Of course, Spencer's views were quite extreme, objecting, inter 
alia, to State -aided education, sanitary and public health laws and the licensing of 
doctors. 
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Laissez -faire principles may well have had more influence on judges, and judge -made 
law, than on the other organs of the English state. Judges and lawyers tended to be very 
conservative, considering the common law as the repository of principle, and Statute 
law as exceptions lacking any coherent social philosophy. Atiyah makes much of this 
emphasis on principle in Victorian life and on its tendency to become more absolute.46 
The rise of formalism in the law, particularly in the United States, played a role in this 
attitude. This formalism, the attempt to place the law under the rubric of `science', was 
a belief that all law is based on abstract legal doctrines and principles, which can be 
deduced from precedents and that that there is only one correct way of deciding a case. 
The aspiration was to create formal general theories that would provide uniformity, 
certainty and predicability in legal arrangements and which would distinguish sharply 
between law and morals." 
This new formalism served to reinforce the recently developed law of contract by giving 
the impression that the principles of that law of contracts were inexorable deductions 
drawn from neutral principles. Within this framework, it was the market that supplied 
the so- called neutral principles, free from all political influence. This attempt to 
separate law from politics has been a central aspiration of the American legal 
profession.48 It served the interests of the legal profession to represent the law as an 
objective, neutral, apolitical and scientific system. This encouraged a search for fixed 
principles that would govern a large number of cases without too close an inquiry into 
the facts. As a consequence, everything not fitting the pattern of the free market was 
simply defined as being outside the law of contract, as some other exceptional body of 
rules - company law, factory legislation, building laws, sanitary laws etc. Such statutes 
were excluded from the emerging conceptual scheme of a general law of contract based 
on free market principles, the classical theory of contract. Nevertheless, Atiyah cautions 
that legal writers in commenting on the influence of caveat emptor and laissez -faire 
attributed a much greater significance to particular legal cases than was warranted by the 
practice of the courts more generally. Indeed, Gilmore ridicules the conclusions drawn 
by judges and treatise writers from some of the particularly significant cases 49 
Nevertheless, the effect of these changes in values was to reshape the legal system to the 
benefit of business and to the detriment of other less powerful groups. The selection of 
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`leading cases' and the dismissal of the `anomalous' was clearly influenced by the 
ideological commitments of the systems -builders. 
The nineteenth century, the very heyday of sanctity of contract and of laissez- faire, was, 
nevertheless, the period in which a whole machinery of Government was created in 
Britain virtually out of nothing. Thus, while there was widespread support for free 
market principles, in practice the role of government and of government regulation 
expanded greatly. Atiyah comments that one of the main reasons that had inhibited 
such government regulation was ignorance of the social evils associated with rapid 
population growth, industrialisation and urbanisation, and of how to deal with them 5° 
The growth of a professional bureaucracy, and the activities of Royal Commissioners 
and Parliamentary Select Committees, corrected this ignorance and led to much 
legislative and regulatory activity. Overwhelming majorities in both Houses of 
Parliament passed much of this social legislation. Many of the participants who started 
as disciples of Adam Smith and Ricardo, and firm believers in individualism and self - 
reliance, were converted by their inquiries into zealous public servants demanding more 
legislation, better enforcement and more administrative staff. 
This enormous change in the character and quantity of legislation had a profound impact 
on the very idea of a contract -based society. With the growth in increasingly 
sophisticated legislative activity, the courts abandoned the overt exercise of law making 
activity and the role of the superior courts as the principle organs of law- enforcement 
began to decline. Thus, for Atiyah, by 1870 individualism as a social mechanism had 
very largely broken down and had been replaced by a different order of society in which 
control, regulation, Iicensing, and institutional arrangements had become the dominant 
mode of social organisation. Nevertheless, 1870 can be regarded as the high point of 
the doctrine of freedom of contract within the English courts: 
"If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that 
men of full and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall 
be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this 
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paramount public policy to consider in that you are not lightly to interfere with 
this freedom of contract.i51 
The language chosen provides a clear example of the worship of technique to which 
Ellul" refers. 
Atiyah qualifies his account of the dominance of the doctrine of freedom of contract by 
suggesting that English judges have always been stronger in doing justice in a pragmatic 
fashion than in providing theoretical justifications for their decisions. In addition, the 
weight of earlier tradition was influential in particular cases. Laissez -faire views, and 
the doctrine of freedom of contract, had a much greater influence on contract law in the 
United States than in England. Gilmore attributes this to the influence of what he calls 
`the great systems -builders' seeking to develop self- contained and logically consistent 
systems of rules and doctrines, but it was a systems -building that drew on Bentham's 
examples' Gilmore also speculates that the Puritan ethic was somehow involved, 
noting the moral fervour with which judges insisted on the performance of contractual 
obligations. For Horwitz,' nineteenth century US judges professed a contractarian 
ideology that was instrumental in promoting economic development and laissez 
- faire in 
being hostile to legislative or administrative regulation. Moreover, the idea of property 
as a pre -political Lockean natural right, not created by law, remained at the centre of 
American legal thought 55 Murphy confirms this influence56 in the following terms: 
"Spencer's influence on American thought in the second half of the nineteenth 
century was particularly strong. He formulated his laissez -faire philosophy in 
such a way that it appealed `at once to the traditional individualism and the 
acquisitive instincts of Americans, who were able without too great inconsistency 
to regard whatever they did, individually, as in harmony with evolution and 
whatever government or society did, collectively, as contrary to natural law. "' 
Thus the US Supreme Court in 190557 elevated the principle of freedom of contract to 
the level of a sacred constitutional principle. But in common law in England the tide 
was about to turn. Even in the United States, the dominance of the doctrine of freedom 
of contract was short -lived. The US Supreme Court decision of 1905 provoked a 
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Progressive reaction and fundamental attacks on this form of legal thought. And with 
these attacks came a breakdown in these absolute concepts of property and of contract. 
In England, the idea of caveat emptor did not long survive the growth in consumption of 
manufactured goods and the reality that people did rely on their suppliers when it came 
to the quality of the goods they supplied. For example, in Piggott v Stratton in 1859 
Lord Cambell and the Lords Justice of Appeal ruled that: 
"the business of life could not be conducted if it were required that men should 
anticipate and expressly guard against the wily devices to which the deceitful may 
resort."" 
Thus, from the 1860s onwards, the English courts started to limit the application of the 
principle of caveat emptor. Decisions in British Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship 
(1868) and Horne v Midland Rly Co (1873) were major departures from the assumption 
that the parties must have contracted on the basis of the information available to them, 
the first since the rise of the doctrine of freedom of contract. Consequently, some 
inquiry by the Courts into the facts was needed from this date onwards. In 1884, in 
Foakes v Beer, the House of Lords started to move back towards the idea of fairness in 
an exchange and away from the idea that a bare agreement was always binding. 
At the same time, the ideal of freedom of contract was itself subject to increasing 
political challenge, particularly with the expansion in the franchise. This involved a 
significant shift in political thinking, a shift that occurred in both England and the 
United States. For example, in the 1880s George Bernard Shaw opposed the appeal to 
free contract, free competition, free trade and laissez -faire against the regulatory 
activities of the state. "19 
Similarly, the philosopher T H Green set out to challenge the primacy of freedom of 
contract in his Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract: 
"To uphold the sanctity of contracts is doubtless a prime business of government, 
but it is no less its business to provide against contracts being made, which from 
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the helplessness of one of the parties to them, instead of being a security for 
freedom becomes an instrument of disguised oppression.s60 
Joseph Chamberlain in 1885 also criticised the faith that been place in freedom of 
contract had for the best part of the nineteenth century: 
"The great problem of our civilisation is still unresolved. We have to account for 
and to grapple with the mass of misery and destitution in our midst, co- existent as 
it is with the evidence of abundant wealth and teeming prosperity. It is a problem 
which some men would set aside by reference to the eternal laws of supply and 
demand, to the necessity of freedom of contract, and to the sanctity of every 
private right of property. But gentlemen, these phrases are the convenient cant of 
selfish wealth. "G1 
And increasingly the common law and legislation interfered with that freedom of 
contract and with the principle of caveat emptor. The effect was to narrow significantly 
the field of activity over which freedom of contract and contract law held sway. This 
change is perhaps most clearly marked by the passage in 1893 of the Sale of Goods Act, 
dealing with such matters as title, quiet possession, freedom from encumbrances, 
correspondence with description, merchantable quality, fitness for purpose and sales by 
sample. This legislation was adopted virtually unchanged by every Australian State and 
Territory 62 
Thus it is clear that the idea of freedom of contract as an absolute ideal gained 
credibility and influence in the nineteenth century but was eclipsed by the end of the 
century as the practical consequences of reliance on this principle began to be realised 
and to offend the sense of justice of the bulk of the population. 
Surely it is now clear that property and contract are not natural `rights' but social and 
legal artefacts or, even, `techniques'. Atiyah argues that there is much about the modern 
world that suggests an affinity with some of the older traditions and suggests that, at 
least in England, the law is returning to those traditions. This is a theme that arose in 
Chapter 4 with Toulmin's suggestion that there is a need to return to the humanism 
characterised of Erasmas away from the dogmatism of the Enlightenment.' 
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THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
As indicated above, the doctrine of freedom of contract was the central doctrine of the 
classical contract law that came to full development in the last half of the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, the very idea of a general law of contract is part and parcel of the same 
positivist era. This law was the creation of judges and thesis writers influenced by 
social contract ideas dating back to Locke, by classical economic thought, and the 
associated ideology of voluntariness. Among legal theorists of the late nineteenth 
century the law of contract was the archetypical branch of what was conceived of as 
legal `science'. This involved an attempt to systematise the various doctrines and 
decisions of the courts to do with contract issues into a consistent and logical theory in 
which the legal rules were to be deduced from general concepts like property. 
The classical view of contract involved a process of abstraction, generalisation and 
systemisation in an attempt to create a unitary theory that was thought to be free of 
moral valuations and thus could appropriately be described as a science. This 
development formed part of the more general attempt to substitute scientific discourse 
for moral discourse at a time when the traditional religious underpinning of moral 
values were coming under increasing attack with the decline in formal traditional 
religious belief. Thus there was an attempt to distinguish between what was conceived 
of as public law and contract or private law, law which individuals legislated for 
themselves. Indeed, the distinction between public and private law was part of the 
Enlightenment's attempt to separate the public from the private realm attempt in 
political and legal theory. Central to this conception of contract was the idea that 
contract obligations arose from the wills of the individuals concerned, and not as a result 
of a socially and historically constructed legal institution. Thus it has much in common 
with the Lockean idea of property as a pre -social natural right. Indeed, the obligation to 
fulfil promises, central to classical contract law, was at its heart a Lockean Natural Law, 
but a natural law increasingly bereft of its metaphysical foundations. 
In retrospect, this development can be seen as a process of reification, a manifestation of 
an excessively legalistic mentality in which legal rules and universal abstractions 
acquired sanctified status and became absolutes. What was also involved was an 
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attempt to claim that the rule of law provided norms independently of politics. There is 
a close connection between this ideal of a rule of law and not of men and laissez -faire 
ideas. Thus it was assumed that rules fixed and known beforehand would make it 
possible for economic actors to foresee how the courts would use their coercive powers 
and thus would allow those economic actors to plan their activities effectively. Hayek 
made much of these ideas in his defence of the market system 64 They involve an 
underlying assumption that predicability is associated with generality. It is also a view 
that conceives of courts as enforcers of rules rather than as settlers of disputes. This is 
also a view that conceives of judges as rulers on the truth, a view that encourages the 
adversarial approach of common law courts. From this rule -based point of view, any 
movement away from the strict enforcement of rules towards multi -dimensional 
standards like fairness is to be deplored. Herein lies the source of the conflict between 
equity as it had been developed in earlier times and classical contract law. The 
nineteenth century desire for uniformity, certainty and predicability could not be 
reconciled with the discretionary element implicit in equity. Herein also lies the source 
of the reluctance to inquire too closely into the particularities of the subject matter of an 
agreement, the circumstances of its making, the actual expectations of the parties and 
especially of the outcomes realised. In practice what came to be important in contracts 
was the written document as interpreted by the courts in a highly literalist manner, 
independent of any substantive inquiry of the parties (the parole evidence rule precluded 
such inquiry into the circumstances surrounding written contracts). All of this involved 
a commitment to a rigid and mechanical decision rule, to be implemented in a 
mechanical manner, a replica of the determinism of Newtonian physics. 
This view of contract law has increasingly founded on the evidence of experience. Too 
rigid an enforcement of contracts on the basis of freedom of contract led to what were 
clearly recognised as unjust outcomes. These were not tolerated by legislatures and, 
over time, by the courts themselves. As a matter of practical politics, legislatures 
everywhere moved to legislate and to regulate to remove the grosser abuses of the 
contract system. These measures have not been confined to simply addressing issues 
associated with contract formation but have increasingly been concerned with the 
substantive outcomes of contractual arrangements. Thus, contract law came to be 
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systematically robbed by legislatures of much of its subject matter. As a consequence, 
pure contract law has ceased to occupy so central a position in the economic system. 
Among legal theorists it was increasingly recognised that the refusal to inquire into the 
circumstances surrounding a contract was obviously inconsistent with the will theory on 
which classical contract theory rested 65 This in turn lead to the replacement of the will 
theory with the development of the objective theory of contract, a theory which openly 
acknowledged that contracts were enforced for reasons of public policy. Thus it come 
to be recognised, particularly in the work of the theorists of the American Realist 
school, that classical contract theory was neither neutral or natural but was instead a 
historically contingent social and legal construct 66 
Indeed the very idea of contract law as a neutral system has had to be abandoned. 
Rather, all valuations at law are moral choices. Contract law, and decisions in particular 
cases, involves a balancing of conflicting social values, not a deduction from consistent 
scientific principles. This realisation has posed an overwhelming challenge to deductive 
legal reasoning, as it is impossible to reason down from very general principles to 
particular decision. Indeed, this viewpoint leads directly to a good deal of scepticism 
about the applicability of general rules of the kind that Hayek advocated 6' It also 
became clear that classical contract law conferred a privileged position on the status 
quo, the intelligent and the powerful. 
Even the ideology of voluntariness has come under attack. The first point to be made in 
this regard is that methodological individualism in economic and moral theorising does 
not necessarily lead to any justification for a policy of self -reliance, however much the 
two are confused in practice. Secondly, it is transparently obvious that individuals are 
frequently not the best judges of their own interests. In any event, individual interests 
are often subordinated to social and political goals including in the law of contracts. It 
has also been pointed out that markets are to some extent coercive. Consequently, the 
problem is to decide what forms of coercion are to be regarded as legitimate. 
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The ideology of voluntariness has been seen to provide the more powerful party to a 
contract, a freedom of manipulation and motivation, a freedom from any onus of 
articulation, and a freedom from any other legal duties that cannot be fitted under the 
rubric of contract as promise.68 Consequently, there has been a growing reluctance to 
concede to big business the right to dictate contract terms to less powerful parties, 
particularly consumers, through standard form contracts. Equally, there is a problem of 
deciding to what extent deception and concealment of information in contractual 
negotiations is also to be regarded as legitimate. 
More generally, having acknowledged that contracts are enforced for reasons of public 
policy, and that they involve a balancing of conflicting value choices, the primacy of a 
policy that contracts should always be enforced is open to question. And, indeed, that is 
what has happened both as a result of legislative action and also as a consequence of 
judicial enlargement of various equitable doctrines. Adding to the confusion has been 
the realisation that the grounds for equitable intervention in the enforcement of contracts 
cannot be fitted under a unified doctrine or theory. 
All of these influences have lead to a period of confusion in contract theory. Here in 
Australia there has been a growing acceptance of the objective theory of contract at the 
very time that theorists in the United States detect a process of doctrinal disintegration 
as it is increasingly perceived that contract law, as modified by the various equitable 
doctrines, involves a complex of diffused principles 69 Even the idea of, and a need for, 
a general law of contracts as a uniform body of rules has been questioned.7° 
Some theorists like Gilmore predict the death of contract and its collapse into the law of 
torts.71 While it might be going too far to suggest that a uniform law of civil obligations 
might emerge, there is certainly an increasing recognition of an obligation of good faith 
and a development in the direction of a duty of care in contractual arrangements. The 
former is not as radical as some of its opponents might like to suggest as the German 
civil code has had such an obligation for a century and a doctrine of good faith is now 
firmly entrenched in the US Uniform Commercial Code and in their Restatement of 
Contract. More generally, contract theorists like Atiyah72 and Macnei173 have 
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questioned whether contracts should be seen as a legal mechanism for establishing long- 
term business relationships, rather than the risk allocation mechanisms that economists 
have conceived them to be. This point of view emphasises the relational element 
involved in any commercial arrangement that is not a simple one -off exchange 
transaction. Atiyah,74 for example, sees contractual obligations arising primarily from 
the reliance one party places in another, while Macneil stresses the fact that all longer - 
term contracts are incomplete as it is simply not possible, in practice, to anticipate all 
the possible eventualities and risks involved in an on going commercial relationship. 
Macneil sees the solution to this incompleteness as involving the development of 
intermediate contract norms to govern the ongoing relationship. This is consistent with 
empirical evidence of actual commercial behaviour particularly between large 
companies where the existence of a valued long -term relationship induces companies to 
resolve difficulties that occur in the relationship without reference to the written 
agreements between them, and without reference to the courts. 
This chapter has surveyed the growth of the doctrine of freedom of contract and of 
classical contract law which reached full development in the late nineteenth century. 
That doctrine, and that law, is closely related to the tradition of political and moral 
thought that followed from Locke, and the Natural Law Outlook, described in 
Chapter 4. It was a view that was based on individualistic premises and natural law, 
both of which are open to damaging attack. It is a doctrine that has been in decline 
throughout this century, though some of that decline has been masked by the tendency 
to define statutory dilutions of the doctrine as erecting special rules outside of contract. 
However, the Australian Fair Trading debate to which the account now turns openly 
challenged the doctrine as it involved proposals to directly legislate a prohibition of 
unfair conduct in contractual arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FAIR TRADING DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA 
Few who consider dispassionately the facts of social history will be 
disposed to deny that the exploitation of the weak by the powerful, 
organised for purposes of economic gain, buttressed by imposing 
systems of law, and screened by decorous draperies of virtuous 
sentiment and resounding rhetoric, has been a permanent feature in 
the life of most communities that the world has yet seen. 
R H Tawney' 
Will you be any friend to the court of wickedness: that contrives evil 
by means of law? Psalm 94 v 20 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines the Australian Fair Trading debate in the light of the conceptual 
discussions of the previous chapters, particularly on the doctrine of freedom of contract 
discussed in Chapter 5. It is not necessary for that purpose to continue with an 
exploration of decline of the doctrine of freedom of contract in England and in the 
United States and the gradual re- emergence of a concern with the fairness of contracts. 
The Australian Fair Trading debate, as discussed here, occurred in the period 1974 to 
1997. It revolved around proposals aimed at broadening, by statute, the Equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability, the doctrine that carried the remnant of the medieval 
concern for fairness in trade and contracts, and which permitted courts to decline to 
enforce contractual arrangements. As it had emerged, in effect, as part of classical 
contract law, that equitable doctrine was restricted to tightly defined procedural issues. 
Consequently, the proposal at the heart of the Fair Trading debate directly challenged 
classical contract law and the doctrine of freedom of contract. 
Lack of time and space forbids dealing with the movement away from the doctrine of 
freedom of contract in the Australian States through detailed legislation covering such 
matters as weights and measures, sale of goods, safety and labelling requirements, or of 
hire- purchase legislation. In particular, attention will not be directed at the NSW 
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Contract Review Act 1980, which authorised NSW's courts to rewrite unfair contracts 
or to refuse to enforce them. Rather, attention will be directed to Commonwealth 
legislation intended to apply broadly to all trade and commerce. Nor will a detailed 
account be given of the constitutional limitations that confine the application of that 
legislation. Briefly, however, the constitution limits the Commonwealth's powers to 
make laws to specific heads of powers. The current Commonwealth Trade Practices 
Act 1974 relies primarily on the power of the Commonwealth to make laws with respect 
to foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of 
the Commonwealth, though it also relies upon the trade and commerce, and the postal 
and telecommunications powers. This means that the Act applies to individuals where 
the transaction involves inter -state or overseas trade or commerce or postal or 
telecommunications services. The States and Territories have all enacted 
complementary legislation. 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 deals with a wide range of business misconduct coming 
under the heading of `unfair' besides unconscionable conduct in commercial 
transactions. These include the misuse of market power, unconscionable conduct in 
consumer transactions, and misleading or deceptive conduct. Consequently, proposals 
for legislative action by the Commonwealth to deal with unfair business conduct have 
usually involved proposed amendments to that Act. It is appropriate, therefore, to start 
this aspect of this inquiry by looking at the background to that legislation. 
The first Commonwealth trade practices legislation was the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act 1906. As the Constitution does not give the Commonwealth an 
express head of power relating to restrictive trade practices, this Act relied for the most 
part upon the trade and commerce power (section 51(I)) and the corporations power 
(section 51(XX)). The Act was intended to repress agreements in restraint of trade and 
to prevent the injuring of Australian industry through unfair competition, mainly what 
we now call dumping' This legislation had a significant protectionist flavour. The 
responsible Minister was particularly concerned that predatory conduct by overseas 
cartels should not undermine manufacturing industry in Australia and lead to monopoly 
rents on imported manufactures. The protectionist flavour was not unchallenged in the 
parliamentary debate.3 
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The Act was partly inspired the American antitrust laws. Indeed, Clause 4, and Clause 
7 derive from sections 1 and 2 of the US Sherman Act 1890, as do the penal and 
injunction clauses. The Minister's second reading speech, by convention the major 
speech detailing the purposes of the legislation, also referred to the US Inter -State 
Commerce Act of 1887 which dealt with rights, liabilities, and duties of common 
carriers engaged in Inter -State traffic and whose principle purpose was to: 
secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; 
prohibit unjust discrimination in the rendition of like services under similar 
circumstances and conditions; 
prevent undue or unreasonable preference to persons, corporations or localities; 
and 
abolish combinations for pooling freights. 
That Act also created the US Inter -State Commerce Commission. The Minister went 
on to refer to the Wilson Bill of 1894, the Exhibitions Act of 1903, the Commerce and 
Labour Act of 1903, and the Elkin Act of 1903. The Minister also referred to Canadian 
and New Zealand legislation dealing with dumping. 
This Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 was amended in 1906, 1907, 1909, 
1910, and 1930. It was repealed in 1965 after a relatively ineffectual life. There was a 
successful constitutional challenge in Huddard Packer v Moorhead in 1910 when the 
High Court held that sections of the Act that sought to regulate the conduct of 
corporations were beyond the Commonwealth's legislative powers. Again in 1912, the 
Commonwealth failed in the Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd v Attorney- General in alleging 
restraint of trade and monopolisation. In this case, the British Privy Council, at the time 
the highest appeal court for Australia, found that the Commonwealth had failed to 
establish that a collective agreement providing for exclusive dealings and price 
maintenance was to the detriment of the public interest. The Court regarded the parties 
as acting only in the protection of their own legitimate business interests. 
Consequently, this decision reflected English precedents allowing such restrictive 
agreements in restraint of trade on the basis of freedom of contract. Similar State 
legislation was also rendered ineffective. 
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The second major attempt at legislating against restrictive trade practices generally at 
the Commonwealth level was the Trade Practices Act 1965 -71. This followed an 
announcement in March 1960 by the Commonwealth government of an intention to 
consider the introduction of legislation against monopolies and restrictive trade 
practices .5 Following an examination of trade practices legislation in the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom, the government presented proposals for legislation in 
December 1962. These proposals, developed by Sir Garfield Barwick and his advisers, 
were strongly influenced by the limited approach of the UK Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act of 1956, compared to the broad prohibitions of the US law. It proposed a process of 
registration and adjudication of the lawfulness of a practice by an administrative 
tribunal. This particular proposal was not proceeded with, and a modified proposal was 
introduced in March 1965. The restrictive approach was justified on the basis that there 
might be some restrictive practices that were in the public interest .6 Interestingly, this 
Bill contained no provisions for controlling mergers or takeovers. According to the 
Minister, there were difficulties relating to the mechanics of such controls and the 
Government was conscious of the need to take advantage of economies of scale. This 
legislation reflected a concern with the extent of restrictive trading arrangements being 
implemented through trade associations? For example, a Western Australian Royal 
Commission on Restrictive Trade Practices reported in 1958 that such practices as 
channelling distribution, price fixing and control, and collective tendering were 
widespread. A similar Tasmanian Commission in 1965 reported that the majority of the 
600 business associations in Australia had agreements to eliminate or reduce 
competition. This Act and related successors were criticised as being inefficient, slow 
and costly and also because examinable agreements or practices remained operative 
until restrained by the Tribunal .8 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 was the third major attempt to introduce effective general 
trade practices legislation in Australia. It shifted the emphasis from a case -by -case 
examination of particular agreements or practices, which had characterised the 1965 -71 
Act, to a series of proscriptions based on US antitrust legislation. In introducing the Bill 
in the Senate in 1973 the then Attorney -General and Minister for Customs and Excise, 
Senator Murphy, said that the purpose of the Bill was to control restrictive trade 
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practices and monopolisation and to protect consumers from unfair commercial 
practices. The Minister went on to say: 
"Restrictive trade practices have long been rife in Australia. Most of them are 
undesirable and have served the interests of the parties engaged in them, 
irrespective of whether those interests coincide with the interests of Australians 
generally. These practices cause prices to be maintained at artificially high levels. 
They enable particular enterprises or groups of enterprises to attain positions of 
economic dominance which are then susceptible to abuse; they interfere with the 
interplay of competitive forces which are the foundation of any market economy; 
they allow discriminatory action against small businesses, exploitation of 
consumers and feather bedding of industries. 
"In consumer transactions unfair practices are widespread. The existing law is 
still largely founded on the principle known as caveat emptor - meaning let the 
buyer beware. That principle was far more appropriate for transactions conducted 
in village markets than for modem consumer -oriented transactions today. It has 
ceased to be appropriate as a general rule. Now the marketing of goods and 
services is conducted on an organised basis and by trained business executives. 
The untrained consumer is often no match for the businessman who attempts to 
persuade the consumer to buy goods or services on terms and conditions suitable 
only to the vendor. The consumer needs protection by the law and this Bill will 
provide such protection.i9 
The Minister concluded that the Bill was intended to promote efficiency and 
competition in business, to reduce prices, and to protect all Australians against unfair 
practices. As indicated above, much of the Act was intended to protect the process of 
competition from abuse of market power. However, Part V dealt with a wide range of 
practices that were considered to be unfair and was primarily intended to protect 
consumers. Nevertheless, Section 52 forbidding false or misleading conduct in trade or 
commerce had general application. 
Thus the Trade Practices Act 1974 in its initial form involved a substantial statutory 
interference in freedom of contract. Not only was it intended to promote economic 
efficiency, it was also intended to promote fairness both in competition, and in dealings 
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between businesses, and between businesses and consumers, and to promote honesty in 
the provision of information. Thus it legislated directly on the question of what 
constituted just behaviour in trade and commerce. The inference to be drawn was that 
in enacting this legislation, the Government and Parliament had accepted that market 
forces left to themselves would not produce just outcomes. Nor would they produce 
economically satisfactory outcomes. 
Since the enactment of that legislation in 1974, there have been at least eighteen major 
reports, or legislative proposals dealing with proposals to amend the Act to strengthen 
the regulation of unfair business practices, that is to amend what was considered just in 
economic relationships. These were: 
Trade Practices Act Review Committee (Swanson Committee), August 1976; 
Trade Practices Consultative Committee: Small Business and the Trade 
Practices Act (Blunt Committee), December 1979; 
The Trade Practices Act Proposals for Change, February 1984; 
Trade Practices Revision Act 1986; 
Two Exposure Drafts of a Franchise Agreement Bill, 1986; 
Ministerial Council Statement abandoning draft franchise legislation, 1987; 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs (Griffiths Committee), Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies: Profiting 
from Competition? 1989; 
Trade Practices Commission Discussion Paper, 1989; 
Small Business in Australia - Challenges, Problems and Opportunities, Report of 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science, and 
Technology (Beddall Committee), January 1990; 
Government Response to the Report of the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, November 1990; 
Unconscionable Conduct and the Trade Practices Act, Possible extension to 
cover commercial transactions, Report of the Trade Practices Commission to the 
Attorney- General and the Minister for Small Business and Customs, July 1991; 
Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Mergers, Monopolies and Acquisitions: Adequacy of Existing Legislative 
Controls (Cooney Committee), December 1991; 
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Report by the Franchising Task Force to the Minister for Small Business and 
Customs, the Hon David Beddall MP, December 1991; 
Review of the Franchising Code of Practice, by Robert Gardini, October 1994; 
Report by Working Party to the Minister for Small Business, Senator Schacht on 
the Need to Amend Section 51AA, February 1995; 
Better Business Conduct, Discussion Paper, Department of Industry, Science 
and Technology, 25 October 1995; 
Trade Practices (Better Business Conduct) Bill 1995; and 
Fair Trading Inquiry 1996 -7 by the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (Reid Committee). 
From the weight of consideration given, it is apparent that this was a policy debate of 
considerable political significance, in which mainly big business interest groups 
opposed proposals for stronger legislation coming mainly from small business interest 
groups, though there were parallel proposals from consumer groups. 
Trade Practices Act Review Committee (Swanson Committee), August 197610 
The new Fraser Liberal Government, appointed in controversial circumstances in 
November 1975, decided to review the operations of the former government's Trade 
Practices legislation. The terms of reference, announced by the then Minister for 
Business and Consumer Affairs, the Hon John Howard MP, on 1 April 1976, covered 
whether the Act was achieving its purposes and benefiting consumers and whether it 
was causing unintended difficulties or costs. 
In its report, the Swanson Committee was concerned with the concept of `competition' 
underlying Part IV of the Act and with the abuse of undue market power. The 
Committee described competition in standard economic terms, seeing it as a process 
rather than a situation, involving the degree of market concentration, barriers to entry, 
the extent of extreme product differentiation and sales promotion, the character of 
vertical relationships, and the restrictive nature of any agreements between firms. 
The Committee went on to examine a number of specific issues raised throughout the 
Fair Trading debate. Firstly, the Committee was concerned about rights on the 
termination of Termination of Franchise Agreements. The terms of contracts relating to 
termination or non -renewal of franchise agreements often reflect a balance of power 
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weighed heavily in favour of the franchisor. Drawing attention to overseas regulatory 
action, particularly in the USA, the Swanson Committee considered that franchisees 
should be able to secure fair compensation for their investment, including goodwill, 
upon termination of their franchises and that such a provision should be read into every 
relevant contract. Thus the committee considered that contract terms in franchise 
agreements could not be left simply to the parties to determine, but needed to include 
legislated standards of conduct. The Committee, referring to the Fourth Report of the 
Royal Commission on Petroleum, recommended that that any franchise legislation 
should be enacted at the Commonwealth level and should be quite general in incidence, 
rather than designed for a particular industry. 
The Swanson Committee pointed out that in consumer transactions the balance of 
bargaining power had shifted in favour of the seller as a result of the substantial increase 
in the range of products available, the confusing number of available options, and the 
development of sophisticated and persuasive mass -marketing techniques. 
Consequently, the Committee recommended that Part V of the Act be strengthened and 
extended. Again, the Committee was attempting deal with the asymmetries of power 
and information that were involved particularly in transactions between large corporate 
organisations and individual consumers. It also recognised at a practical level that 
individual preferences were open to influence and manipulation and could not be treated 
simply as `sovereign'. Importantly, in this context, the Committee recommended 
strongly that the definition of a `consumer' should be sufficiently broad to provide 
protection to a range of business transactions, particularly purchases by small 
businesses. This was a tacit recognition of the existence of asymmetries of power and 
information in the relationships between big business and small business. 
A number of submissions to the Committee had sought the introduction of prohibition 
of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices along the 
lines of Section 5(a) (1) of the US Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade 
Commission's definition of `unfair' is very broad: 
1 Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered 
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the 
common law, or otherwise -- whether in other words, it is within the penumbra 
of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; 
168 
2 Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 
3 Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other 
businessmen)." 
It is important to an understanding of this definition to realise that US courts adopt a far 
less strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutory language than do 
Australian courts. Thus this definition gives US courts a very wide discretion to 
overturn business arrangements for reasons which are openly acknowledged to be moral 
reasons. A number of submissions also recommended that the Trade Practices Act be 
amended to allow relief to be given against harsh or unconscionable contracts. 
These submissions set the agenda for the subsequent debate. The Committee concluded 
that a general prohibition of `unfair' conduct could, under Australian conditions, result 
in a considerable degree of uncertainty in commercial transactions, but gave no 
substantial reason why Australian conditions were different from those of the United 
States. Given the narrow interpretation of statutory language in Australian courts, this 
claim is open to strong dispute. Nevertheless, the Committee did see advantages in 
prohibiting unconscionable conduct or practices, but as a civil matter only. The 
Committee preferred a prohibition of `unconscionable conduct or practices', rather than 
`harsh or unconscionable contracts', believing that `harsh' was an uncertain concept. Of 
course, the word `unconscionable' had its origins in Equity. The Committee also 
recommended that fairly detailed legislative guidance be given on the kinds of conduct 
considered unconscionable; such factors as the commercial nature and setting of the 
practice, the complexity of any contemplated or executed transaction, and the relative 
ability of the parties to understand the transaction and protect their interests. The effect 
of this proposal would have been to broaden significantly the existing equitable doctrine 
of unconscionability allowing courts the discretion to decline to enforce contracts. 
These recommendations mark the central issue throughout the Fair Trading debate - the 
extent to which the Commonwealth should legislate to prohibit unfair conduct in trade 
or commerce thus undermining the restrictions placed on Equity throughout the 
nineteenth century under the positivist influences already discussed. 
In total, the Swanson Committee made 139 recommendations, many involving 
significant amendment of the Act. A large number of these were subsequently enacted 
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as the Trade Practices Amendment Act of 1977. Included was a strengthening of 
Section 52 dealing with false or misleading conduct, but not a general prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct. There is no information on the public record of the reasons for 
the Government's rejection of this aspect of the Committee's recommendations. 
Trade Practices Consultative Committee: Small Business and the Trade Practices 
Act (Blunt Committee), December 197912 
This Committee was asked in December 1978 to examine the relationship between the 
restrictive trade practices provisions of the Trade Practices Act and small business 
having regard to the Government's high priority for the development of small business. 
Subsequently, the Committee was asked whether there was a need for specific 
legislation regulating franchise agreements. 
Among other matters, the Blunt Committee focused on the abuse of market power by 
large businesses in their relations with small businesses, in particular, price 
discrimination involving franchised dealers in the motor trades. These are situations in 
which there are large asymmetries in power and information between the manufacturers 
who are large transnational companies, and local franchised dealers. 
The Blunt Committee Report discussed at some length the various objectives of 
competition rules such as are found in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the 
US Anti -Trust laws, for example to limit the accumulation and use of power, including 
`social' power, by individual large firms. The Committee suggested that this might be 
justified on the basis that fragmenting economic power through many independent 
proprietors is desirable in itself. In doing so, it cut across the understanding of the 
operation of competitive markets that had been current in the time of the classical 
economists, and which is incorporated in the idea of perfect competition. The 
Committee rejected this justification as principally structural, as ignoring the efficiency 
and growth potential of big business or its actual conduct. They considered it was 
inappropriate to have laws directed primarily at industry structure, a position that seems 
to reflect the confusion in contemporary economic ideas of competition. 
In relation to fair trading, the Blunt Committee acknowledged that the ideas that 
`businessmen' should receive equal treatment in similar situations and should deal 
`fairly' with consumers was intuitively attractive. However, the Blunt Committee 
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objected that the concept of fairness was elusive and not susceptible to `objective 
assessment', believing that fairness resided only in the eye of the beholder and 
depended on the circumstances of individual cases. Thus there was a failure to 
understand that standards of fairness are socially constructed and are not purely 
individual, and that consumer behaviour is influenced by such standards.13 These 
concerns, of course, reflect the nineteenth century assumptions underpinning classical 
contract law. The appeal to `objectivity' embodies the rationalist aspirations of the 
Enlightenment with its attempt to privilege a particular form of dialectic, and the 
attempt to privilege individual exchange and private arrangements over other values. 
The Committee was also concerned that insisting on a standard of fairness would 
require the replacement of competition by detailed regulation of individual transactions 
by either the courts or officials. Again this concern to avoid detailed inquiry into 
particular circumstances was part of both the Enlightenment program and of classical 
contract law. 
Nevertheless, the Blunt Committee acknowledged that some of the competitive 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act reflected a number of aims including the 
protection of small business and the promotion of fairness. The Blunt Committee 
considered that Part IV of the Act was directed primarily against anti -competitive 
conduct working against the attainment of economic efficiency, a claim running counter 
to the intentions of the legislation as described in the second reading speech cited above. 
The Committee noted with interest a submission from the Law Council of Australia 
seeking a general prohibition of harsh, unconscionable or unfair conduct irrespective of 
whether or not the conduct involved injury to competition or abuse of market power. 
The Law Council submission argued that fairness in competition was a concept separate 
from, and distinct from, freedom of competition, that both were vital, and that the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 already prohibited some practices as unfair, even though 
competition was not affected. This distinction nicely sums up what the debate was 
about. Consequently, the Law Council argued for a general prohibition of harsh, 
unconscionable or unfair conduct, disagreeing with the Swanson Committee view that 
such a provision would result in a considerable degree of uncertainty in commercial 
transactions. Their preference was for the formula `harsh or unconscionable' and 
considered that detailed legislative guidance on what sort of conduct came under those 
headings was unnecessary. Rather they drew attention to the definition of `unfair' used 
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by the US Federal Trade Commission and endorsed by the US courts. The Law Council 
also saw such an amendment as dealing adequately with unfair conduct in franchising 
relationships. 
However, the Blunt Committee reported that it saw the aim of Part IV of the Act as 
being to promote economic efficiency through the maintenance of the competitive 
process. Thus they saw a law prohibiting `unfair' business conduct as going further, 
and not being compatible with, the provisions of Part IV because the provisions regulate 
conduct according to the competitive effect of the conduct and not, as a law based on 
`fairness' would, on its morality. The Committee saw it as having a very wide impact 
beyond the then boundaries of Parts IV and V. Nevertheless, the Committee said that 
there was great merit in debate on the proposal and suggested that the Government keep 
it under active examination. The confusion in the Committee's analysis, including its 
narrow interpretation of the intentions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, will be taken up 
in the next Chapter. 
The Blunt Committee went on to considered franchising in some detail, supporting the 
Swanson Report recommendations regarding the termination of franchise agreements, 
and drawing attention to continuing concerns regarding petroleum retailing and the 
termination of service station franchises. The Government had already announced an 
intention to enact a specific franchise law for the retail petroleum industry, but the Blunt 
Committee, like Swanson, supported a more general law. The Committee pointed to a 
general trend in the United States at both federal and state level for special statutory 
regulation of franchise relationship to maintain a `fair' position for franchisees. The 
Committee was particularly concerned to impose a positive obligation to disclosure of 
full information about franchisors and the commercial viability of franchises being sold. 
In this regard, the Committee could see very little difference between the objectives of 
company law and its proposal. The Committee recommended that any legislation to 
deal with these franchising concerns should be included within the Trade Practices Act, 
setting out in detail the clauses it wished to see enacted. The Committee did not 
perceive the inconsistency between its position on specific legislation to promote 
fairness in franchising, and its position on fair trading more generally. 
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The Trade Practices Act Proposals for Change, February 198414 
In February 1984, the Attorney -General, the Minister for Home Affairs and 
Environment and the Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations in the new 
Labor Government released a Green Paper containing proposals for changes to the 
Trade Practices Act 1974. 
In addition to raising the monetary limit in the definition of a consumer, the 
Government proposed to amend the Act along the lines recommended by the Swanson 
Committee, inserting a new Section 52A prohibiting corporations, in trade or 
commerce, from engaging in unconscionable conduct in relation to contracts. Included 
in the draft Bill were a long list of issues which the courts could take into account in 
assessing the unconscionability of contracts: 
The relative bargaining strengths of the parties; 
Whether any provisions would be unreasonably difficult to comply with or would 
not be reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interest of any party; 
Whether its provisions were the subject of negotiation and, if so, whether any party 
could have negotiated successfully for the addition, omission or variation of any 
provision; 
The consequences reasonably foreseeable at the relevant time of compliance or non- 
compliance with, or contravention of, any or all of the provisions of the contract; 
Whether, any party to the contract, prior to the relevant time, failed to disclose 
information of a material kind to any other party; 
Whether any provisions would limit the liability of any party for any breach and the 
remedies available; 
Whether any party or representative was not reasonably able to protect his interests 
because of his age or the state of his physical or mental capacity; 
The relative economic circumstances, educational background and literacy of each 
party or representative; 
The form and intelligibility of the contract; 
The extent to which the provisions and their legal and practical effect were 
accurately explained; 
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Whether any undue influence or unfair pressure was exerted on, or unfair tactics 
were used against, any party or representative; 
In the case the acquisition of goods or services, the difference between the price of 
the identical or equivalent goods or services from an alternative supplier; 
Whether, and the extent to which, the contract as a whole favours any party; 
The commercial or other setting, and the purpose and effect, of the contract or 
proposed contract; and 
The conduct of the parties in relation to any similar or related contracts. 
It is interesting that the proposed Bill used the term `unconscionable' to describe the 
conduct being prohibited. This would have significantly extended the equitable doctrine 
of unconscionability well beyond consideration of procedural matters, to which late 
nineteenth century and twentieth century judge -made law had limited it, to the 
substantive consequences of a contract. This exposure draft provoked a wide range of 
submissions to the Attorney -General, leading to a significant watering down of the 
government's intentions. There is no substantive information on the public record as to 
the contents of those submissions or of the reasons for the Government's decision. 
Trade Practices Revision Act 198615 
In introducing this legislation on 19 March 1986, the then Attorney -General, Mr Lionel 
Bowen, said that the legislation was the result of a major review of the competition and 
consumer protection provisions of the Act, and of more than 120 submissions received 
following the exposure draft.16 The Attorney- General said that the Government 
attached great importance to ensuring that the Act achieved its dual aims of promoting 
efficiency through competition, and providing consumers and business people with an 
appropriate measure of protection against unscrupulous traders. This statement is 
significant in that it contradicts the claim made by the Blunt Committee above, that the 
Act was primarily to do with economic efficiency. 
The Government also said that it was committed to ensuring that unnecessary regulation 
was wound back, and adequate justification put forward for new regulation. This was at 
a time when economic rationalist ideas began to gain ascendancy within the 
Commonwealth Government.17 As part of that growing ascendancy, there was a new 
174 
emphasis on the cost of Government regulatory activity, reflected in the establishment 
of the Business Regulation Review Unit within the Department of Industry and 
Commerce in about 1986, a unit with very extreme views as to what constituted 
regulatory activity and the undesirability of such regulatory activity.18 
The Government indicated that following consultation with business, industry and 
consumer groups, the scope of the amendments had been `refined' and the proposed 
section 52A was limited to a prohibition of unconscionable conduct by corporations in 
relation to consumer -type transactions. What the Minister did not acknowledge clearly 
was that the `refinement' of the legislation represented a major weakening and 
narrowing of the original legislative intention. Thus, while the Minister used the words 
`clearly unfair or unreasonable' to describe the intention of the legislation, he made no 
reference to the very limited interpretation of the doctrine of `unconscionability' current 
in the courts and which did not encompass the meanings usually attached to those 
words. The Minister failed clearly to acknowledge that the legislation did not result in 
any general widening in the equitable doctrine of unconscionability, or that it denied 
promised protection from exploitive conduct to the small business sector, a result 
radically different from that proposed in the exposure draft. Of course, such obsecration 
is typical of ministerial announcements where promised actions are not implemented. 
Two Exposure Drafts of a Franchise Agreement Bill, 198619 and the Ministerial 
Council Statement abandoning draft franchise legislation, 1987 
In 1986, the Government also published two separate exposure drafts of a proposed 
Franchise Agreement Bill. Both exposure drafts were also discussed at length in the 
Beddall Report outlined below. In May 1987, the Commonwealth /State Ministerial 
Council decided not to proceed with the proposed franchise legislation and announced 
that it would do no more than exempt franchise agreements from the `prescribed 
interests' provisions of companies and securities legislation. In making that decision, 
the Council claimed that adequate legal remedies already existed to protect the parties to 
a franchise agreement, referring to s52 of the Trade Practices Act. 
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House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(Griffiths Committee), Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies: Profiting from 
Competition? 198920 
The Griffiths Committee, in a short comment on the issue of fair trading, pointed to the 
extensive opposition to proposals to extend the unconscionable conduct provisions in 
Section 52A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the section enacted in 1986 discussed 
above) to commercial transactions. The Committee considered that if the Trade 
Practices Commission wished to pursue the proposal, it needed to develop persuasive 
arguments to counter the concerns of the business community and legal profession in 
this regard. Clearly, the 1986 amendments had failed to satisfy a substantial body of 
opinion, including the Trade Practices Commission, the body charged with 
administering the Act, and, at that time, the Commission thought that a problem that 
should be addressed. 
Trade Practices Commission Discussion Paper, 198921 
This failure led the Trade Practices Commission in 1989 to ask Baker & McKenzie, a 
prominent Australian legal firm, to assist the Commission to develop a proposal to 
expand section 52A of the Trade Practices Act to cover `small business dealings ". In 
the process, Baker & McKenzie prepared a discussion paper identifying problems in the 
areas of retail tenancy, loan guarantees, franchising, the abuse of buying power, 
government conduct and petroleum franchising. 
In order to test the extent of existing remedies, Baker & McKenzie prepared and settled 
with the Trade Practices Commission a list of examples of questionable conduct. Baker 
& McKenzie concluded that the existing legislation provided only limited relief. 
Small Business in Australia - Challenges, Problems and Opportunities, Report of 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science, and 
Technology (Beddall Committee), January 199022 
On 24 March 1988, the Minister for Science, Customs and Small Business requested the 
House Of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology to 
investigate the unique problems of small business as a result of extensive, yet 
176 
fragmented regulations, and ways in which the administration of regulations could be 
improved. 
These terms of reference clearly exhibit a concern with, and focus on, the cost of 
regulatory activity to the small business sector. In relation to unconscionable conduct, 
the Committee noted that Section 52A of the Trade Practices Act, adopted in 1986, 
covered unconscionable conduct towards consumers only. The Committee 
recommended that Section 52A be extended to include small business transactions 
including retail /commercial tenancy agreements, where a small business is 
disadvantaged in the same way as a consumer, in its dealings with other parties. Again, 
this is a reference to the asymmetries of power and information that are inherent in these 
economic relationships. 
The Beddall Committee also received considerable evidence concerning unfair 
commercial lease agreements resulting from the disparity of bargaining power between 
small businesses and landlords, particularly in shopping centre complexes and in 
motels. The terms and conditions of retail leases, high rents and `outgoings' (the 
shopping centre management costs shared by tenants) were the principle causes of 
complaints. It was claimed that smaller retailers were paying disproportionately high 
rents and subsidising large retailers attracted to centres as anchor tenants. Additionally, 
costs, which should be borne by shopping centre management, were being passed on to 
tenants. High rent increases during the term of a lease also had a severe impact on small 
retailers. In summary, the lease agreements gave the landlords wide discretions about 
future rent increases and about outgoings, providing tenants with little certainty about 
the costs that they would be facing. The Shopping Centre Tenants Association argued 
that such a centres were an autonomous market for retail space, and consequently, the 
landlord could set the terms and conditions for leases without the threat of competition. 
While not fully accepting this assertion, the Committee considered that these centres 
offered prime retail space relative to traditional `strip' retail shopping environs, and that 
the competition for space in such centres was more intense, while the single ownership 
of such centres placed shopping centre landlords in a more powerful position over their 
tenants than landlords of `strip' retail space. To limit the opportunities for abuse of this 
superior bargaining power, the Committee recommended that Commonwealth, State 
and Territories formulate a standardised rental lease for commercial properties, and 
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introduce shop lease tribunals to arbitrate in disputes between landlords and commercial 
tenants. The broader question, of whether the growth of regional shopping centres 
were, themselves, the result of the growth of excessive market power and political 
influence on the part of major supermarket chains, department stores, and centre 
developers, combined with the access of the developers to tax privileged superannuation 
savings, was not addressed. This points to a potential breakdown in the relevant 
planning controls combined with a possible regulatory distortion in the capital market 
induced by other policy goals. 
The Beddall Committee also gave detailed consideration to franchise agreements, 
pointing to three areas where franchise agreements acted against the interests of 
franchisees. These were the absence of any requirement for prior disclosure of 
information clearly outlining the rights and responsibilities of the two parties, the 
unilateral alteration of agreement by franchisors without prior notification, and the lack 
of clear cut statements on the basis for renewal, or the grounds for termination, of 
agreements. Again, there was a lack of certainty about the environment that franchisees 
would be facing and asymmetaries of power and information. 
The Committee pointed to the two previous reviews of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in 
the 1970s and their conclusion that the Trade Practices Act should be amended to 
overcome these franchising problems. The Beddall Committee supported separate 
legislation and went on to discuss at length the two exposure drafts of such legislation 
released by the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities in 1986. The first 
draft Bill sought to ensure that franchisors dealt fairly with franchisees throughout their 
agreement by requiring the prior disclosure of relevant financial and management 
information, and of the terms under which they were to carry on their dealings. The 
majority of submissions on the first draft Bill opposed the Bill and it was redrafted. The 
Attorney- General's Department reported to the Committee that the first draft had been 
revised because it was considered to be too onerous on franchisors and was an 
unwarranted interference with the parties' `freedom to contract'. The second draft Bill 
reduced the requirements for prior disclosure of financial and managerial information 
and for fair dealing with franchisees. Provisions concerning the protection of the 
interests of franchisees, such as the cooling off period, equitable supply of goods and 
services, termination of franchise agreements and related agreements, were also deleted. 
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This second draft was also severely criticised this time by franchisees who saw the 
second Bill as protecting the interests of franchisors as a result of pressure from 
franchisors, potential franchisors and larger business interests. In view of the criticism, 
the Ministerial Council decided in May 1987 not to proceed with the legislation. The 
Attorney -General's Department advised that the Ministerial Council had taken the view 
that section 52 of the Trade Practices Act already provided for adequate disclosure and 
the States were bringing their fair trading legislation into line with the Trade Practices 
Act 1974. There were also concerns about finding a satisfactory definition of 
franchising. 
The Beddall Committee did not accept that a satisfactory definition of franchising could 
not be developed, pointing to the substantial body of franchising legislation in the 
United States and to the Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act. Nor did the 
Committee agree that adequate remedies were already available to protect parties in 
franchise agreements. The Beddall Committee commented that this attempt to draft 
franchise legislation resulted had in an outcome which pleased neither franchisee nor 
franchisor, and that the attempt was abandoned for reasons having little to do with the 
adequacy of existing remedies at law. The Beddall Committee went on to recommend 
specific franchise agreement legislation requiring prior disclosure documentation, a 
cooling -off period, provisions for alteration to the agreement, and for 
termination /renewal or transfer of franchises. 
Government Response to the Report of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, November 
199023 
It is normal practice for the Government to make a response to such Reports through a 
formal statement to the Parliament. The Government responded on this occasion that it 
would await the conclusion of an examination of the issue by the Trade Practices 
Commission before acting on the recommendations. 
Unconscionable Conduct and the Trade Practices Act, Possible extension to cover 
commercial transactions, Report of the Trade Practices Commission to the 
Attorney -General and the Minister for Small Business and Customs, July 1991 
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This was the report foreshadowed in the Government's response to the Beddall Report. 
In developing this report, the Trade Practices Commission released a discussion paper 
in October 1990 indicating that a substantial problem existed with approximately one 
third of complaints it received being about unfair conduct in commercial transactions. 
The report acknowledged that persistent small business problem arose from a disparity 
of bargaining power between the parties in relation to commercial tenancy agreements, 
loan agreements, small manufacturers and their suppliers, government conduct, and in 
the petroleum and building industries. 
Most complaints remain unresolved, as they tended to fall outside the Trade Practices 
Act 1974. The Trade Practices Commission concluded that, on balance, there were 
economic benefits to be gained from the regulation of unconscionable conduct in 
commercial transactions in circumstances where the weaker party to a transaction 
suffers from an inability to protect its interests and advantage is taken of the 
circumstances. Although the equitable jurisdiction was capable of developing 
economically justifiable doctrines in relation to unconscionable conduct, the jurisdiction 
was still growing in a somewhat piecemeal and unpredictable way. The most 
appropriate way of regulating such conduct was to create a new part to the Act. The 
rationalisation and codification of the relevant principles developed in the 
Commission's report would do much to increase the predicability and certainty of their 
application by providing a guide to the courts. The involvement of the Trade Practices 
Commission would increase the business sector's awareness of unconscionable conduct 
through its high profile, its compliance programs and litigation where appropriate. The 
Commission emphasised that any potential benefits to be gained from regulating 
unconscionable conduct in commercial transactions could be neutralised unless there 
were meaningful access for small business to the legal remedies involved. 
This report confirms the point made earlier that the Trade Practices Commission 
believed that a problem existed because of asymmetries of power and information in 
business transactions, particularly between big and small business, and that legislation 
addressing that problem was justified on economic grounds. 
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Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Mergers, Monopolies and Acquisitions: Adequacy of Existing Legislative Controls 
(Cooney Committee), December 1991 
On 16 May 1991, the Senate referred the adequacy of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Amongst other 
things the Committee was asked to consider the extension of section 52A 
(unconscionable conduct) to all commercial dealings. 
In its Report, the Cooney Committee noted the objections which had been raised against 
any extension of section 52A to commercial dealings: 
That replicating or `codifying' existing equitable principles is unnecessary and 
undesirable - the Australian courts have shown a capacity to intervene in 
appropriate commercial circumstances, and a willingness to expand existing 
doctrines and develop new doctrines when necessary. 
Uncertainty would arise within commercial dealings. 
The principles governing the regulation of business in its relations with consumers 
should be quite separate from those governing relations between businesses, as 
even small firms necessarily possess a level of commercial sophistication not 
possessed by consumers. 
Simple extension of section 52A would have detrimental effect on its use by 
consumers. 
In the absence of any economic analysis, it was difficult to determine the financial 
impact that an extended provision would have on business. In this regard, the 
Law Council had submitted that an extended provision would increase the risk 
and the legal cost of doing business, and compound economic inefficiencies in 
carrying on business (for example, through being forced to compromise rights to 
avoid legal costs and delay). 
It was likely that an extended statutory provision would be used extensively in 
commercial disputes, with the potential to increase costs and delay and frustrate 
the enforcement of legal rights. An extended section 52A would be pleaded and 
could not be easily dealt with summarily as unconscionability was essentially a 
question of fact. If pleaded as a defence in enforcement proceedings, it would 
probably necessitate either a full trial or perhaps more likely a settlement. 
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Extension of statutory unconscionability would provide an ineffective remedy, 
particularly for small business. 
The existing equitable principles dealing with unconscionable conduct, together 
with the traditional remedies for fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence 
and mistake, estoppel, and section 52 of the Act, in combination, would provide 
an avenue for relief in most, if not all serious, cases where unconscionability 
arises. 
Implicit in these objections was a view that extension of the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability was inappropriate and that such matters were best left to the courts. 
The Cooney Committee noted, on the other hand, that extending the statutory 
prohibition against unconscionable conduct to commercial dealings was supported by a 
number of submissions: 
The existing provisions were arbitrary and illogical. Although they did not cover 
commercial dealings, they could nevertheless be used by businesses when they 
acquire `consumer' goods and services. An individual could probably rely on 
they when guaranteeing a loan for the purchase of a house, but not in connection 
with a business. 
Were section 52A to have general application, then it would become as ubiquitous 
a remedy as section 52 had become, and uncertainty in the law would be reduced. 
The Trade Practices Commission considered that there were net economic 
benefits in regulating unconscionable conduct in commercial transactions. 
The Attorney- Genera's Department saw no argument of principle against a 
prohibition on `unconscionable conduct' in commercial as well as consumer 
transactions, and favoured a prohibition on such conduct in trade and commerce 
generally. It considered any attempt to limit the extension to small business as 
artificial and arbitrary. 
In conclusion, the Cooney Committee acknowledged that it would be consistent with 
the position at common law to introduce a statutory prohibition on `unconscionable 
conduct' in commercial as well as consumer transactions. The Committee also noted 
the claims that there could be benefits in introducing such a prohibition such as 
increased business awareness of unconscionable conduct, both through the public 
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profile, education and compliance programs of the Trade Practices Commission and 
through their representative actions. 
The Cooney Committee also accepted that any attempt to confine a statutory prohibition 
against unconscionable commercial conduct to small business would be arbitrary, 
artificial and productive of uncertainty. There was also the difficulty of defining what 
was small business, and there was no competition policy principle supporting the 
preferential treatment of small business over large business. 
The Cooney Committee claimed that the relatively new Section 52A (the consumer 
provision discussed above) had rarely been used and that it did not enhance the 
protection afforded by the common law. The Committee was also concerned that a 
statutory provision like section 52A might not have the ability to develop in the way the 
common law could. Thus the Committee recommended relying on the common law 
alone, particularly as the courts had shown a willingness to expand the existing 
doctrines and to develop new equitable doctrines where justified. Accordingly, the 
Committee recommended that section 52A of the Trade Practices Act be repealed. Of 
course, this begged the questions of whether the courts had been tardy in expanding the 
doctrine of unconscionability and whether such an expansion was justified. It also 
recommended that Act be amended to permit the Trade Practices Commission to bring 
proceedings on behalf of persons who have an action at common law arising from the 
unconscionable conduct. The Committee further recommended that appropriate funds 
be made available to enable this to be done. 
Report by the Franchising Task Force to the Minister for Small 
Business and Customs, the Hon David Beddall MP, December 199124 
This Task Force believed that concerns regarding inappropriate, fraudulent or 
misrepresented franchising systems should not be ignored. The Task Force pointed to 
franchisors who had failed to provide appropriate disclosure, were not members of the 
Franchisor's Association of Australia, and had not committed to any code of ethics or 
practices, and for whom there was no monitoring mechanism. The creation of a 
Franchising Code of Practice, supported by some government funding, arose out the 
report of this taskforce. It should be noted that the responsible Minister, Mr Beddall, 
had previously been Chairman of the House of Representatives Inquiry that had 
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produced the Beddall Report discussed above. There is no information on the public 
record as to whether the Minister had sought the introduction of franchising legislation. 
Trade Practices Amendment Act 1992 
This Act introduced a new section, 51AÁ, into the Trade Practices Act 1974 in response 
to the political pressure reflected in the above inquiries. The section prohibited a 
corporation in trade or commerce from engaging in conduct that was unconscionable 
within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of the states and territories. 
The provision dealing with unconscionability in consumer transactions, the former 
section 52A, was renumbered 51AB. The amendments were not intended to create new 
legal rights but to provide a statutory endorsement of the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability as determined by the courts. This opened unconscionability in 
commercial transactions to scrutiny by the Trade Practices Commission, and provided 
for representative actions by the Commission. It also allowed the remedies contained in 
sections 80 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to apply. This picked up one aspect 
of the Cooney Report recommendations outlined above. 
Review of the Franchising Code of Practice, by Robert Gardini, 
October 199425 
This code of practice was reviewed at the request of the Minister for Small Business and 
Customs. Mr Gardini received more than 70 written submissions, and interviewed the 
directors of the Franchising Code Administration Council, franchisors, franchisees, 
banks, legal advisers and publishers. A one day workshop was also held to discuss the 
operation and effectiveness of the Franchising Code of Practice. Matters complained 
about included: 
charging excessive prices for goods supplied to franchisees; 
secret rebates and commissions from suppliers; 
discrimination in the terms of trade between company owned outlets and 
franchised outlets; 
encroachment on the franchisee's geographic trading area; 
failing to address lack of viability of franchised outlets; 
making substantial increases to renewal fees; 
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failing to provide adequate service and support to franchisees; 
unwilling to discuss and negotiate problems; 
using advertising levies for other purposes; 
intimidation and victimisation of franchisees; and 
unfair terminations. 
Mr Gardini reported that the main weakness of the Code had been its failure to provide 
sufficient coverage across the franchising sector with 40 to 50 per cent of franchisors 
not registered under the Code. Importantly, the motor vehicle industry had decided not 
to participate, as had significant areas of the real estate sector. He thought it unlikely 
that the Code would ever achieve more than 70 per cent coverage of franchisors. A 
significant number of non -registered franchisors failed to provide adequate disclosure, 
to offer a cooling -off period for new franchise agreements, and to observe the standards 
of conduct contained in the Code. Mr Gardini also found that the conduct provisions of 
the Code had not been effective in addressing serious franchise disputes. The 
unconscionable conduct provisions were too limited and the general standards of 
conduct provisions offered little practical assistance to franchisees who were in serious 
dispute with franchisors. Any attempt to strengthen the provisions of a voluntary code 
would result in a loss of registrations under that Code. 
Mr Gardini made 15 recommendations, including a proposal that only those franchisors 
who register with the Franchising Code of Practice should qualify for the exemption for 
franchising contained in the Corporations Regulations. This was the exemption 
provided to franchisors by the Ministerial Council in 1987 from the prospectus 
requirements of the Companies Code. 
Report by Working Party to the Minister for Small Business, Senator Schacht on 
the Need to Amend Section 51AA, February 199526 
This Working Party reported that Section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, which 
was enacted in 1992, was extremely limited in its application and was not addressing 
the problems with which it was intended to deal. The Working party recommended that 
section 51AA should be amended to prohibit unconscionable, harsh or oppressive 
conduct, broadening the restrictive equitable meaning of unconscionability contained in 
the existing provision. The Working Party believed that such a provision would not 
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lead to commercial uncertainty, pointing out that almost all jurisdictions in the United 
States had adopted a broad, general provision prohibiting unconscionability conduct 
(Section 2.302 of the US Uniform Commercial Code, a provision given broad 
application by United States courts). The Working Party recommended that Section 
51AA be amended to prohibit unconscionable, harsh or oppressive conduct in trade or 
commerce. Further, the Working Party recommended that the Government appoint a 
Commissioner to the Trade Practices Commission with knowledge and experience of 
small business problems, that it give a specific direction to the Trade Practices 
Commission to fully enforce the provisions, and provide the Commission with adequate 
resources to do so. 
This Working Party made a supplementary Report to the Minister for Small Business, 
in May 1995 to address issues not included in their earlier report. These included a 
response to arguments opposed to a widening of section 5 1AA, the review of the 
Franchising Code of Practice, and an analysis of the economic impact of widening 
section 51AA. The Working Party pointed out that the severe limits on the operation 
of the equitable remedy of unconscionability were well known to the Trade Practices 
Commission before Section 51AA was enacted, and that the administration and 
judicial interpretation of Section 51AA had confirmed those shortcomings. In 
commenting on the contrary views of the Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (VECCI), the Working Party believed that there was little or no 
relationship between market structures and unconscionable conduct. Further, the 
Working Party believed that VECCI's suggestion that the Trade Practices Act focused 
on market structure rather than conduct, was to grossly misunderstand the nature and 
scope of the Trade Practices Act. It is interesting to note, in passing, that this reference 
to market structure by VECCI is the very reverse of the argument used by the Blunt 
Committee in its opposition to legislation to prohibit unfair business practices. 
The Working Party criticised the claim made by VECCI that a change to legislation 
would have no impact on the incidence of unconscionable conduct and that the words 
`unconscionable, harsh and oppressive' lacked precision. The Working Party claimed 
that such words had a long history of judicial interpretation pointing to NSW Industrial 
Relations Act 1991 and the NSW Contracts Review Act 1980. The Working Party did 
not recommend the use of the word `unfair', notwithstanding the judicial interpretation 
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given that word `unfair', to avoid substantial criticism from big business as to the 
meaning of unfairness. In any event, any business uncertainty had to be balanced by 
the need to do justice. 
The Working party went on to draw attention to advice sought from Access Economics, 
a Canberra consultancy firm, on the economic consequences of extending the 
unconscionability provisions. Access Economics argued that similar protection should 
be provided to producers of goods and services as to consumers, as the damage done is 
economically indistinguishable, and similar remedies should be available. Provided that 
economic efficiency was not adversely effected, measures that improve fairness should 
be regarded as worthwhile. In particular, horizontal equity was a well established 
distributional objective to which public policy should have regard. Those who argue 
that, from an economy -wide perspective, unconscionability in commercial transactions 
is not a major issue are assuming that unconscionability in commercial transactions is a 
zero -sum issue with little or no change in welfare for the economy as a whole. Those 
holding that view can only object to measures that promote horizontal equity if it is at 
the expense of significant additional regulatory or other costs that impair efficient 
business operations. In that case, there is a need to balance efficiency costs against 
equity improvements. The argument that such a provision would increase business 
uncertainty also needed close scrutiny. The result could be less uncertainty overall, or a 
more even distribution of uncertainty as between the parties to a commercial contract. 
Better Business Conduct, Discussion Paper, Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology, 25 October 1995.27 
This paper, which released for public comment proposed new amendments to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, pointed to the reluctance of the courts to interfere in commercial 
bargains, for fear of allowing parties to unfairly avoid situations of their own making. It 
suggested that this was to avoid commercial activities being subject to excessive levels 
of uncertainty. This view had been affirmed by the High Court as recently as 1992: 
"The law in general leaves every man at liberty to make such bargains 
as he pleases and to dispose of his property as he chooses. However 
improvident, unreasonable or unjust such dispositions may be, they 
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are binding on every party to them unless he can prove affirmatively 
the existence of one of the recognised invalidating circumstances. "28 
Thus, under the existing law, a court would invalidate commercial bargains only in 
limited circumstances such as provided for in Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 
prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct. This confirmed the limited view of the 
impact of the Equitable doctrine of unconscionability reflected in the advice from Baker 
& McKenzie in 1989. 
The Discussion Paper claimed significant policy issues arose where a firm is denied 
practical choice, so that it is unable to adequately protect its own interests. The 
Discussion Paper examined the impact of such `economic ransom' on the franchising, 
petroleum and retail tenancy sectors. It advanced an economic argument for legislation 
using the concept of contestability - the ease with which firms can enter or leave an 
industry. In a perfectly contestable market, firms would not be able to impose harsh or 
oppressive terms on one another, and parties would be able to leave an industry without 
significant economic penalty where the economic returns were less than the party's 
expectations. Of course, the conditions for perfect contestability cannot be met, and 
Government actions, under the rubric of competition policy, are sometimes necessary to 
improve contestability and restore choice in commercial relationships. The discussion 
paper particularly pointed to the barrier to exit created by the existence of sunk costs 
financed by borrowings against the family home. These sunk costs leave small 
businesses open to exploitation. 
Disparity of bargaining power arising from the existence of sunk costs 
could therefore result in abuse, allowing a stronger party to exploit another 
in a manner that was harsh or oppressive and out of kilter with prevailing 
market conditions. The Discussion Paper concluded that the policy of 
encouraging free and fair competition therefore justified legislation to 
proscribe such conduct. These are the same issue of an asymmetry of 
power in commercial relationships that has been noted throughout the 
debate. There is no information on the public record as to the content of 
any submissions made to the Government in response to this discussion 
paper. 
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Trade Practices (Better Business Conduct) Bill 1995 
This Bill, based, in part, around the proposal in the Better Business Discussion paper, 
was introduced into the Senate in November 1995. The opposition indicated that it 
would refer the Bill to a Senate Committee for further consideration. In the event the 
Bill lapsed with the calling of a Federal election in February 1996. The clauses of that 
Bill are discussed at length in the Reid Report (account following), and will not be 
discussed here. 
The Coalition's 1996 Small Business Policy,A New Deal for Small Business, 
committed a Liberal/National Coalition government to ensuring that the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 responded to the needs of the small business sector. It went on to claim, 
however, that complex `black letter' law of the sort that was proposed in the Better 
Business Conduct Bill would stifle the dynamics of the small business sector and lead to 
greater uncertainty and cost. Thus, this policy picks up the economic rationalist concern 
about the economic cost of government regulation noted earlier, as well as the positivist 
emphasis on certainty that was a feature of classical contract law. The Coalition placed 
emphasis on flexible, industry specific Codes of Practice and undertook to review 
existing self -regulatory codes. Nevertheless, the policy committed a Coalition 
government to considering amendment to the Trade Practices Act 1974 to complement 
the effectiveness of Codes of Practice, and the establishment of education programs. 
In response, the Motor Trades Association of Australia (MTAA) wrote to the then 
Leader of the Opposition, the Hon John Howard MP, expressing concern at the 
Coalition's small business policy and its deriding of what it called `complex black letter 
law'. The MTAA pointed out that it had met with Mr Andrew Robb of the Liberal 
Party Campaign Headquarters on 16 November 1995, when they were given to 
understand that the Coalition would support the Better Business Conduct Bill. MTAA 
also drew attention to an assurance from the Federal Director of the National Party that 
the National Party supported strengthening the `harsh and oppressive conduct 
provisions' of the Trade Practices Act 1974 . The MTAA said that their experience 
with the operation of Codes of Practice demonstrated that they could only be effective if 
underpinned by that Act. Mr Robb replied to the MTAA on 29 February 1996, 
expressed reservations about the Better Business Conduct Bill and undertook to refer 
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the issue to a Senate or other Parliamentary Committee in the event of a Coalition 
victory.' 
Fair Trading Inquiry 1996 -97 by the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (Reid Committee)30 
Following the Coalition's election victory, the Minister for Small Business and 
Consumer Affairs, the Hon Geoff Prosser MP asked the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology in June 1996 to conduct an 
inquiry into `Fair Trading'. Because it represented the culmination of the debate the 
Terms of Reference are reproduced in full: 
"1. The Committee is asked to investigate and report on: 
the major business conduct issues arising out of commercial dealings between 
firms including, but not limited to, franchising and retail tenancy; [and] 
the economic and social implications of the major business conduct issues 
particularly whether certain commercial practices might lead to sub -optimal 
outcomes. 
2. The Committee is asked to examine whether the impact of the business 
conduct issues it identifies is sufficient to justify Government action taking into 
account, but not limited to: 
existing State and Commonwealth legislative protections; 
existing common law protections; 
overseas developments in the regulation of business conduct. 
3. The Committee is asked to examine options and make recommendations on 
strategies to address business conduct issues arising out of dealings between firms 
in commercial relationships, taking into account, but not limited to: 
the potential application of voluntary codes of conduct, industry self - 
regulation and dispute resolution mechanisms, including alternatives to 




4. In developing options, the Committee will seek to ensure certainty in the 
market place, contract dealings and other commercial transactions, minimising the 
regulatory burden on business, and keep litigation and costs to a minimum.' 31 
Attention in particular is directed to the reference in (1) to sub optimal outcomes and in 
(4) to certainty and to minimum regulation, themes that have already been met 
throughout the debate. 
For its part, the new opposition reintroduced its Better Business Conduct Bill into the 
Parliament, but, of course, no debate occurred on that Bill. 
The Reid Inquiry tabled a bipartisan report, Finding a Balance towards Fair Trading in 
Australia, in the House of Representatives in May 1997. That Report concluded that 
concerns about unfair conduct towards small business were justified and should be 
addressed urgently. To this end, the Report made wide- ranging recommendations to 
induce behavioural change on the part of big business towards small business and to 
provide adequate means of redress. The report was unanimous with a specific 
additional recommendation from one member regarding franchising. In summary the 
recommendations covered: 
the inadequate role taken by the Trade Practices Commission to date; 
Commonwealth facilitation of uniform State and Territory retail tenancy 
legislation and a retail tenancy code backed by the Trade Practices Act 1974; 
generic franchising legislation; 
representative actions by the Trade Practices Commission in respect of Part IV 
of the Trade Practices Act; 
a range of measures regarding the finance sector's treatment of small business; 
major amendments of the Trade Practices Act 1974 prohibiting unfair conduct 
in trade or commerce; 
mandatory pre -trial mediation of unfair conduct disputes; and 
an educational campaign for small business entrants. 
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The Committee reported that they had taken evidence on a wide range of business 
conduct damaging to small business. These included: 
disputes between retail tenants and their landlords; 
disputes between franchisors and franchisees; 
the misuse of market power by large firms competing with small businesses; 
and 
harsh conduct by banks and other financial institutions towards small business 
clients. 
The Committee saw a common theme underlying the unfair business conduct raised, 
namely an inequality of power. The result was a bias in business dealings in favour of 
powerful companies with the financial resources to engage in lengthy litigation. The 
consequence has been that small business people were open to arbitrary or opportunistic 
conduct with an associated economic and social cost. The Committee also pointed to a 
lack of adequate research into small business failures in Australia, and to an absence of 
any formal research in evidence tendered to the Committee. Nevertheless, the 
Committee was convinced by the anecdotal evidence provided by the numerous small 
business people that unscrupulous conduct of big business towards small business was a 
serious problem causing significant social damage. The Committee was conscious that 
in a competitive economic environment many businesses will fail. But that awareness 
did not exclude the need to examine the causes of failure, and action to alleviate its 
adverse consequences. The Committee was convinced that the social impact was 
sufficient to justify the actions it proposed. But the Committee was also convinced that 
unfair business conduct was having a serious adverse economic impact. 
While acknowledging the inadequacies of the previous regulatory control regime, the 
Committee was strongly critical of the efforts of ACCC in relation to small business 
disputes. It believed that there was a need to establish a body of precedent under 
proposed new provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 as quickly as practicable. The 
Committee's extensive recommendations included a very strong amendment to the 
Trade Practices Act to prohibit `unfair' conduct, a proposal that would have replaced the 
equitable doctrine of unconscionability with a much wider statutory provision extending 
to the substantive outcomes of agreements. In addition, there were provisions to back 
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industry codes of practice with the Act, effectively making them mandatory, as well as 
proposals for a separate Franchising Act and a national retail tenancy code. 
The strength and breadth of the Committee's Report came as a surprise to many 
observers including small business representatives. It ran directly counter to the 
rhetoric of deregulation that has surrounded much recent public policy debate, including 
the rhetoric contained in its own terms of reference. That rhetoric was reflected in a 
major policy statement in regard to small business by the Prime Minister, The Hon John 
Howard, on 24 March 1997, More Time for Business: 
We must guard against the tendency for business regulation to increase over time 
as issues are considered in isolation or without systematic reference to their 
impact on business costs... The costs and benefits of regulation will be weighed 
up carefully to ensure that the putative benefits are not outweighed by excessive 
economic and financial costs, including the compliance burden on business." 32 
As could be expected, small business representatives warmly welcomed the 
Committee's Report, while big business representatives were much more reserved. For 
example, The Pharmacy Guild of Australia,33 in welcoming the report, called for an 
immediate priority to be given to its implementation, and reminding the government of 
pre -election policy commitments. The Pharmacy Guild was one of a number of small 
business groups that participated in a joint media conference on 27 May 1997. Other 
participants were the Australian Council of Professions, the Australian Petroleum 
Agents and Distributors Association, the Australian Small Business Association, and 
the Motor Trades Association of Australia. A statement issued on behalf of these 
organisations described the Reid Report as one of the most important documents likely 
to be considered by the Government in its first term of office. 
On the other hand, an editorial in the Australian Financial Review on 26 June 1997 
attacked the Committee's Report as naive on the basis that economic competition was 
desirably deliberate and ruthless. The editorial claimed that requiring fair conduct from 
banks or large shopping centre managers in dealing with their clients and tenants would 
be a restriction on their ability to compete and that small business would suffer as a 
result. The Property Council of Australia commissioned Access Economics to produce 
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an `independent' response to the Reid Report. Their document, Tipping The 
Balance ?34 focused on the retail tenancy aspects of the Report. Access Economics 
claimed that the Report was not consistent with its terms of reference in that it would 
promote `sub -optimal economic outcomes' as well as increasing the regulatory burden 
on retail businesses. Additionally, the Report was said to be internally inconsistent, and 
to have paid scant regard for hard data on retail industry performance. In the process, it 
criticised the Report's reliance on anecdotal evidence from small business operators and 
small business groups and from competing expert witnesses. Of course, the Property 
Council of Australia, as the peak body representing shopping centre owners, had made 
submissions to the Inquiry, had appeared as witnesses at public hearings, and had been 
closely questioned by Committee members. The Executive Director of the Australian 
Retailer's Association, Mr Phil Naylor, responded that the Access Economics analysis 
was a scare tactic to water down the inquiry's findings 35 
The particular data on which Access Economics relied had also been provided to the 
Inquiry by the Property Council of Australia, and was cited in the Inquiry Report 36 In 
these circumstances, the claim made by Mr Geoff Carmody, Director of Access 
Economics, in his Foreword, about the independence of their response lacks credibility. 
Rather, it provides an example of the partisan use made of economic analysis in public 
policy debate. It also provides an example of the demands made by economists 
generally that the forms of analysis used in public policy debate be confined to formal 
economic analysis, and that the direct experience of those involved in markets be 
disregarded. In supporting the Access Economics analysis, P P McGuinness claimed 
that the Committee's report relied on emotion, prejudice and a desire to cater for to the 
voters 37 This disparagement of emotion is, of course, a direct result of the 
Enlightenment's negative attitude towards it as part of its elevation of instrumental 
rationality, while the disparagement of politics is also typical of the economic rationalist 
commitment to markets and to positivism. He asserted that the fact that the Property 
Council had paid for the Access Economics study had no impact on the findings. On 
the other hand, McGuiness saw the bipartisan House of Representatives Report as a 
classic case of an attempt to enrol political power and anti -competitive regulation in the 
cause of ripping -off consumers. He suggests that, like farmers, shopkeepers seem to 
compensate for their hard work by inveterate whingeing. This one -sided application of 
capture theory also appears typical of economic rationalism. Only the economic 
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rationalists can be trusted to present views untainted by self- interest, a view peculiarly 
inconsistent with their own theories. 
In addition, business correspondents in the letters columns argued that judges had 
rightly been reluctant to rewrite business contracts imposing standards of fairness 
because of the need for predicability in business dealings, a theme noted already. From 
this perspective, the real winners would be the lawyers helping judges determine what 
was fair or unfair. On the other side, Professor Andrew Terry argued in the Australian 
Financial Review on 27 June 1997 that the Committee's recommendations would not 
damage the economy, but would lead to a much needed extension and clarification of 
the law. Professor Terry had made a submission to the Inquiry advocating tighter 
regulation of the Franchising Industry. The Chief Executive of the Council of Small 
Business Organisations in Australia, Mr Rob Bastian, described big business concerns 
about uncertainty as `crap', pointing to the uncertainty which had previously confronted 
hundreds of thousands of small businesses 38 
Press reports immediately prior to the Government finalising its response to the report 
suggested that the government had been subjected to heavy lobbying by several 
business groups strongly opposed to the Committee's proposals to adopt a new section 
51ÁA banning unfair conduct. These included the Law Council, which was said to 
have claimed that the proposed unfair conduct test would lead to widespread uncertainty 
and litigation. The Treasury was reported to have strongly opposed the Committee's 
recommendations. The Department of Industry, Science and Technology is also 
believed to have opposed the recommendations39 On the other hand, the press 
indicated that there was strong support from Coalition backbenchers.40 Interestingly, a 
significant proportion of the government's backbench had experience with small 
business. This was also the case with the government members of the Reid Committee, 
including Mr Reid and Mr Richard Evans, who had chaired the Committee for part of 
the Inquiry 41 
On 11 July 1997, the Minister for Small Business, Mr Prosser, who was hostile to the 
Committee's recommendations, was forced to resign his portfolio, after weeks of 
political controversy. Mr Prosser had suggested that a voluntary code of conduct would 
be the best way of resolving disputes in the franchising sector 42 Mr Prosser had also 
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ruled out tougher retail tenancy laws to protect retail tenants as recommended by the 
Committee. Mr Prosser's involvement in retail tenancy issues, while he himself was a 
major retail landlord, was widely condemned as a conflict of interest, in breach of the 
Ministerial Code of Conduct. Mr Prosser had also remained actively involved in the 
management of his own shopping centre interests. It was also reported that Mr 
Prosser's resignation headed off new allegations of a conflict of interest regarding 
involvement in petrol retailing while responsible for the Petroleum Retail Marketing 
Sites Act and the Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act.43 Mr Prosser was replaced 
by one of the government's most experienced and effective politicians, Mr Peter Reith, 
whose portfolio, Workplace Relations, acquired responsibility for small business 
matters. This represented a significant upgrading in the importance of the small 
business portfolio. Mr Reith was quoted as saying that; 
"I have no view for or against legislative change. ... I will treat the issues on 
their merits ."44 
Thus, some compromise was foreshadowed. Mr Reith, in a Meet the Press interview on 
the Ten Network, reassured big business that the Government would not undermine 
Australia's system of contract law 45 But he also claimed that the government would go 
a fair bit further than the Committee had proposed. 
As is the normal practice, the Government responded to the Committee's report in a 
statement to the House of Representatives, New Deal: Fair Deal - Giving Small 
Business a Fair Go, by Mr Reith on 30 September 1997. As far as the rhetoric of the 
statement is concerned, the Minister said: 
"Make no mistake about it, this Federal Coalition Government, this Prime 
Minister, and this Minister, is pro -small business, and proud of it... This 
response on fair trading policy ... is the strongest message ever sent from 
Canberra to Australia's small business community that they now have a national 
Government that has listened, has understood and has acted. "46 
The Minister's statement went on to claim that the Government had accepted the 
Committee's conclusions that concerns about unfair business conduct towards small 
business were justified, and should be addressed urgently. The Minister announced that 
the Government would act on the recommendations of each of the seven areas of reform 
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identified by the Committee - unfair conduct, retail tenancy, franchising, misuse of 
market power, small business finance, access to justice and education. Nevertheless, 
while claiming full credit, the Government did not implement the Committee's 
recommendations in full: 
"The Government has accepted the Committee's recommendations either in whole 
or in part, according to the constraints on Commonwealth powers and the 
importance of delivering a policy outcome that maximises the benefits to small 
businesses whilst minimising any counterproductive impacts on the sector.'47 
The Minister said that, in a number of important respects, the Government response had 
gone further than the Committee's recommendations, particularly in the area of 
effective enforcement of fair trading issues by ACCC. In summary, the Government 
action involved: 
A new provision in the Trade Practices Act to give small business genuine access to 
protection against unconscionable conduct; 
A new provision which would allow industry- designed codes of practice, in whole 
or part, to be legally underpinned and made mandatory under the Trade Practices 
Act and enforced as breaches of that Act; 
A new provision which would allow the ACCC to take representative actions on 
behalf of small business for misuse of market power by big business; 
A new provision which would give small business interests equal importance to 
consumer interests when appointments are made to the ACCC; and 
A directive to the ACCC under the Trade Practices Act 1974 requiring the ACCC to 
enforce small business legal rights against unfair business conduct. The 
Government also provided funding to enable test cases to be undertaken. 
In respect to the first of these, the new provision extended the existing common law 
doctrine of unconscionability by mirroring the legal rights available to consumers under 
the existing Section 51AB and incorporating most of the matter included in the 
Committees proposed Clause 51AÁ. Importantly, however, the Government legislation 
persisted with the term `unconscionable conduct' rather than `unfair conduct as 
proposed by the Committee'. The Committee had recommended that the term 
`unconscionable conduct' be replaced by a term without its limiting legal entailments 
and proposed the term `unfair' as covering all the circumstances that would be covered 
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by the terms `unconscionable', `harsh' and `oppressive'. The Government's Bill also 
dropped the terms `harshness of the result' from the matters that the courts could take 
into account. Importantly also, the new provision was Iimited to transactions under 
$1 million and public- listed companies were excluded from instigating action under the 
provision. Perhaps the most important recommendation that survived the Government's 
consideration of the Reid Committee's proposals was the requirement that corporations 
covered by the section were effectively required to act in good faith. 
While the Committee clearly recommended that the law should be extended to cover 
both procedural and substantive circumstances it is unclear as to the extent that the 
Government's legislation achieved that widening. Thus the Government's response, 
which, in other respects, was very much in the spirit of the Committee's 
recommendations, fudged the central issue in the inquiry, and limited the impact of any 
change to small transactions. Consequently, it will be necessary to await the reaction of 
the courts to the new clauses before it will be clear how extensive the change has been. 
It is also unclear how the courts will interpret the $1 million limitation and so the 
breadth of application of the new clauses is also subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Again, big business response to the government's proposals were less than enthusiastic. 
For example, Mr Peter Verwer, Chief Executive of the Property Council of Australia, 
was quoted in the Australian Financial Review of 2 October 1997 suggesting that a 
number of issues regarding the proposed unconscionable conduct provisions required 
clarification. In particular, he suggested that: 
"the sanctity of contract could well be in jeopardy. "48 
In the same vain, the Chief Executive Officer of VECCI, Mr David Edwards, who had 
opposed legislation in his submission to the Inquiry, said that the government's action 
could be disastrous for all businesses 49 Similarly, Professor Baxt, former Chairman of 
the Trade Practices Commission, claimed that the new provision would erode the law of 
contract and cause widespread uncertainty 50 On the other hand, the ACT and Region 
Chamber of Commerce believed the package was a fair and just outcome for small 
traders 51 The Victorian Minister for Small Business and Tourism said that the response 
signalled a major breakthrough for the protection of small business.52 
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Interestingly, Peter Switzer, Small Business Editor for The Australian ,53 in welcoming 
the proposals on 1 October 1997, pointed to the role of Mr Reith, newly responsible for 
small business matters, seeing him as riding to the Prime Minister's rescue at a time 
when the government was under pressure because of ministerial travel rorts. Michelle 
Grattan54 pointed out that the Report had raised high expectation in the small business 
community, expectations that the government could not afford to disappoint. The 
Australian Financial Review in its editorial of 1 October 1997 had also pointed to Mr 
Reith's skill as a politician in crafting a package that got small business off the 
government's back, while avoiding an overly intrusive regulation of commercial 
relations. The Australian Financial Review was thankful that the government's 
response did not go as far as the `often wacky' recommendations of the Report. 
Nevertheless, The Australian Financial Review was concerned that the new legislation 
would interfere in the commercial activities of the business sector and that the 
legislation would set a new attitude to regulation that could easily become heavy - 
handed. 
In a subsequent academic article, Baxt and Mahemoff attacked the Government's 
legislation as eroding basic notions of contract law, though pointing out that it fell far 
short of the recommendations of the Reid Report.55 They cite with approval a 
judgement of Lord Ackner in Wainer v Miles: 
"[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. 
Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so 
long as he avoid making misrepresentations ... A duty to negotiate in good faith 
is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a 
negotiating party.i56 
Further, they believe that competition is, by its nature, harsh and ruthless. Of course, 
the claim as to impracticality of a good faith requirement cannot stand the empirical 
test, as Germany has had a strong formal duty of good faith in its civil code for a 
century, while the requirement is now well entrenched in United States law, including 
the Restatement of Contract. 
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Baxt and Mahemoff see the amendments to the Act as accelerating the widening of the 
remedies of unconscionability triggered by previous amendments and an even more 
adventurous set of courts. Thus, they see these developments as further encroaching on 
the certainty and sanctity of contract law, and creating an atmosphere where anything 
can be challenged. They believe that legislative enactments often provide considerable 
impetus to judicial activism. Indeed, they believe that since 1983 the High Court has 
greatly extended the scope of equitable doctrines in Australia, in what they see as a 
growing wave of `intervention'. In particular, they refer to the 1997 decision of Batt J 
in Olex Focas Pty Ltd y Skodaeexport Co Ltd and of Branson J in Pritchard y Racecage 
Pty Ltd (1997) as opening the door to an expansive interpretation of the common law 
definition of unconscionability applying to commercial transactions in general. They 
believe that, while commercial law should encourage fair dealings, 
"it is a mistake for the law to set its sights too highly when the critical inquiry is 
not whether the conduct is lawful but whether it is morally or socially 
unacceptable .i57 
This again invokes the positivist attempt to distinguish between law and morality. Their 
fear is that the list of considerations contained in section 51AC of the Act will also be 
used in practice in respect of section 51AA, and through this route extend to the 
common law. At the very least, it will be difficult for the courts to ignore the criteria. 
Of course, if that were the case, then the Reid Committee's recommendations for a 
general broadening of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability would have been 
achieved. 
Since the 1997 amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974, the ACCC has actively 
sought to bring actions in respect of unconscionable conduct to establish the body of 
case law sought by Finding a Balance. Discussion with the ACCC has led the author to 
the belief that the broad range of measures has significantly increased the regulatory 
constraint on unfair conduct, and is acting as a significant deterrent to such conduct. 
The ACCC has now commenced the first of such proceedings in respect of alleged 
unconscionable conduct by a company for taking advantage of its superior bargaining 
position when it demanded $70 000 in consideration for granting a new lease. A small 
business tenant had purchased a business occupying lease -hold premises with an option 
for a further term of seven years. While the landlord was aware of the lessee's intention 
to exercise that option, the tenant had failed to formally advise the landlord of that 
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intention until after the required date. Interestingly, the ACCC has joined the solicitor 
advising the company in the proceedings under Section 76 of the Act. Section 76 
provides that when the court is satisfied that a person has aided and abetted 
contravention of the Act that person can be penalised as determined by the court. 
Section 76(1)(e) also permits the court to impose penalties where a person `has been in 
any way directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention by a 
person of such a provision'. This action suggests that the ACCC has also decided to 
take a hard line with legal advisers who are knowingly concerned in their client's unfair 
conduct in breach of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
What has been remarkable about the above debate has been its extraordinarily frequent 
use of the expert public inquiry as a means of deflecting political pressure for change 58 
This has been complemented by regular consultation processes on the outcomes of those 
inquiries. Nevertheless, throughout the debate the issues remained essentially the same, 
whether, and to what extent, the Commonwealth should legislate to regulate unfair 
conduct by big business towards small business. Similarly, the arguments used 
throughout changed in style only, not in content. The debate also exhibits the tendency 
for public policy to follow a path of incremental change, which the early Lindblom 
advocated as the best form of policy development.59 It also exhibits the entrenched 
power of big business groups, that the less optimistic late Lindblom feared would 
forever provide a barrier to more radical change.6° It is also unusual among 
contemporary policy debates in that, for the most part, it found big and small business 
lobby groups on different sides of the debate. Thus Governments had to chart a course 
through two powerful business lobbies, advancing two different conceptions of justice, 
neither of which governments wished to offend. Consequently, throughout the debate, 
Governments of both persuasions conceded as little to the pressure of small business 
groups as they could get away with at the time. 
The debate also provides a good illustration of the entrenched power of economic 
methodologies and values as the dominant evaluative considerations used in 
contemporary policy debates. Thus, big business used the rhetoric of classical contract 
law, along with the contemporary economic rationalist rhetoric of minimum effective 
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regulation, as the means of deflecting the political pressure. For its part, Treasury 
responded with concerns about the impact of regulatory action on transaction costs 
throughout the economy. Small business responded with theoretical arguments to the 
effect that economic efficiency would be enhanced by legislation of the type they had 
proposed. What was disappointing from an economic point of view was a lack of any 
real attempt to evaluate the costs of unfair business conduct. Consequently, the debate 
remained throughout at the speculative level, except to the extent that the small business 
lobby made regular appeals to anecdotal evidence of the impact of such conduct on 
individuals and the ACCC reported frequent complaints. 
What is also evident is that the debate cannot be settled on the basis of current moral 
theories based on individualistic premises that are incommensurable and incompatible. 
The debate can only be mediated by the political process. Indeed, it can be seen as part 
of a broader and basic political controversy that also is incapable of rational resolution 
on the basis of individualistic premises. This is the conflict between incompatible 
accounts of justice arising out of individualist entitlement theories of property rights 
such as advanced by Nozick in the tradition of Locke, and the equally individualistic 
accounts of just distribution advanced by Rawls 6r 
There is a particular irony about the closing phases of this debate as well. At a time 
when small business groups were strongly pressing for justice for small business in its 
dealings with large business, pointing in particular to oppressive terms and conditions of 
contractual arrangements, to the unilateral alterations of terms and conditions and to 
unfair terminations of long -term contractual arrangements, these very same lobby 
groups were also opposing unfair dismissal laws intended to protect employees from 
similar unfair conduct by small business employers. It brings to mind Nietzsche's 
complaint that the morality of European society had been nothing but a series of 
disguises for the will to power.62 Another irony is that we are unable to come to terms 
about the meanings of the words, unconscionable and unfair, while being obliged to 
pretend that all legal words should have an objective and identifiable meaning available 
to all. Of course, most people will not have heard of the word `unconscionable', let 
alone how the courts have used it in recent times. This stands in marked contrast to the 
word `fair' which is used daily by everyone in our society. 
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This chapter has provided an account of the development of the doctrine of freedom of 
contract and charted some of its demise, most recently in the Australian Fair Trading 
debate. The account pointed to contract as a central concept and technique of the 
market system as well as a fundamental explanatory device used, in particular by 
economists, in talking about social order. That form of explanatory device arose 
following the breakdown of the ideas derived from Aristotle and Christianised by 
Acquinas and which justified the medieval social structure. In this world, the 
possession of property involved temporary custodianship and carried duties as well as 
rights, in particular, obligations regulating economic life to achieve fairness. The 
breakdown of these notions and the development of more absolute ideas of ownership 
were closely related. Locke's social contract ideas, with their Natural Law basis and 
their defence of property rights, served the interests of the propertied elite. This brought 
with it the realisation that judges made law rather than discovered it. These changes 
made it easier for the propertied elite to see society as based on a social contract, not on 
moral obligations backed by Divine law. These economic liberal ideas were also 
closely connected with the idea of the rule of law and development of commercial law. 
They also brought with them an erosion of the medieval concern for a just price and for 
just agreements and thus the decline of Equity. Contracts came to be seen as the 
creation of the wills of the parties, as private legislation, which the courts were obliged 
to uphold, however harsh the consequences. 
This development of the doctrine of freedom of contract and the associated doctrine of 
caveat emptor was encouraged by legal thesis writers looking for fixed, certain 
principles on which the law should be based and on the `scientific' accounts of the 
classical economists, and the promotion of laissez faire economic ideas by popular 
commentators and by Herbert Spencer in particular. These ideas were particularly 
influential in the United States, where the development of the doctrine of freedom of 
contract was closely linked with English legal doctrines. The rise of formalism within 
the law, the attempt to place law under the rubric of science and not morality, was 
closely linked with these developments. Taken together these developments gave rise 
to classical contract law, that body of legal doctrine that came to its full development 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. Social and political developments in both 
England and the United States rapidly led to the erosion of the practical significance of 
the doctrine as both countries erected all the machinery of a modern society. Curiously, 
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the vast body of legislation controlling trade and commerce that resulted was not seen as 
eroding the doctrine of contract so much as creating special bodies of law dealing with 
exceptions. Nevertheless, the last century has seen the gradual re- emergence in all 
common law countries of Equity that has eroded the more extreme affects of the rigid 
application of the doctrine of freedom of contract. 
Classical contract law was, of course, applicable to Australia. And here in Australia, 
over the last twenty -five years, there has been an ongoing debate about Commonwealth 
regulatory action to control unfair business conduct towards consumers and small 
business operators. This debate centred around proposals to amend the Trade Practices 
Act 1974, the first effective general legislation at the Commonwealth level to control 
trade practices. Most of the proposals raised in that debate were specifically aimed at 
broadening, by statute, the Equitable doctrine of unconscionability, directly challenging 
classical contract law and the doctrine of freedom of contract. Since the enactment of 
the 1974 Act there have been at least nineteen major reports or legislative proposals 
dealing with proposals to amend the Act for that purpose. These culminated in the 1997 
Reid Report and its major proposals to prohibit unfair business conduct, by significantly 
broadening the equitable doctrine of unconscionability. In response to that report the 
Government introduced Amendments of its own to the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
Though not as broad, these changes further erode classical contract law, authorising the 
courts to examine a broad range of factual issues in contract disputes involving small 
business, involving both procedural and substantive issues, in a way inconsistent with 
the classical law. While the courts are still to react to the new legislation, there is a 
strong possibility that these legislative provisions, and in particular the requirement to 
act in good faith will migrate to the common law. 
The next chapter will tease out some of the issues raised by the above history and the 
conceptual matters that they raise. 
204 
Notes 
Tawney, R H, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Pelican Books, 1926, 1938, pp252 -253 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Volume XXXI, 14 June 1906 p244 
3 Mr Johnson, Member for Lang, 1906 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Volume 
XXXI, pp352 and 356 
4 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Volume XXXI, 14 June 1906, p255 
Richardson, J E , 1967, Introduction to the Australian Trade Practices Act, Hicks Smith, Sydney 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol H of R 46, 19 May 1965, pp1654 -1656 
Richardson, 1967 
'Report of the Trade Practices Act Review Committee (Swanson Committee), August, 1976, AGPS, 
Canberra 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Vol S57, 27 September 1973, pp1013- 
1014 
Swanson Committee, 1976 
1 Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Practices Rule 408, cited Report of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 1997, p180 
'? Trade Practices Consultative Committee: Small business and the Trade Practices Act, December, 1979, 
AGPS, Canberra 
't See for example Etzioni, 1988 
14 Minister for Home Affairs and Environment, and Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, 
1984, The Trade Practices Act Proposals for Change, AGPS, Canberra 
" Act No 17 of 1986 
10 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, H of R, Vol 147, 19 March 1986, p1623 
'' This claim is based on the author's experience of public policy debate within the bureaucracy at that 
time. The author attributes it in part to the growing dominance of Mr Keating as Treasurer within the 
Hawke Labor government, though it also reflects the desire of that government to appear economically 
and financially responsible following the perceived failure of the Whitlam Labor government, and the 
influence of economic rationalist ideas more generally throughout key areas of the Commonwealth public 
service. 
''` Personal knowledge 
19 Business Affairs Division of the Commonwealth Attorney- General's Department, 1986, Co- Operative 
Companies and Securities Scheme, Draft Franchise Agreement Bill and Second Draft Franchise 
Agreement Bill, AGPS, Canberra 
70 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 1989, Mergers, 
Monopolies: Profiting from Competition, Canberra 
71 Trade Practices Commission, 1989,Trade Practices Discussion Paper, TPC, Canberra 
22 Report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science, and Technology, 
1990, Small Business in Australia - Challenges, Problems and Opportunities, (Beddall Committee), 
Canberra 
23 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, H of R, Weekly Hansard No 10, 13 November 
1990, p3837 
74 Report by the Franchising Task Force to the Minister for Small Business and Customs, the Hon David 
Beddall MP, December 1991, DIST, Canberra 
Gardini, Robert, 1994, Review of the Franchising Code of Practice, October, DIST, 
Canberra 
20 Report by Working Party to the Minister for Small Business, Senator Schacht on the Need to Amend 
Section 51AA, 1995, DIST, Canberra 
205 
'' Department of Industry Science and Technology,1995, Better Business Discussion Paper, DIST, 
Canberra 
28 Salmon J in Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NSWLR 1106 at p109 cited with approval by Brennan and 
Toohey JJ in Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1, pp8 -9 
79 This correspondence was made public in a media kit released by MTAA and other small business 
organisations on 29 May 1997. 
31) Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
May 1997, Finding a balance Towards Fair Trading in Australia (Reid Report) 
SI House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Media Release, 1 
July 1996, also cited put Reid Report 
Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard MP, 24 March 1997, More time for Business, 
AGPS, Canberra, piv 
"The Pharmacy Guild of Australia, Media Release of 27 May 1997 
34 Access Economics, Tipping the Balance ?, July 1997, Canberra 
3' Hughes, Anthony, Inquiry into retail tenants misguided, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August 1997 
3' Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
May 1997, p55 
37 McGuinness, P P, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August 1997 
3' Abernethy, Mark, Full weight behind fair trading report, Australian Financial Review, 8 July 1997 
39 Personal knowledge 
4° Burton, Tom and Katharine Murphy, Govt considers compromise on unfair conduct, Australian 
Financial Review, 22 September 1997. 
4! Personal knowledge 
42 Bita, Natasha, A parliamentary inquiry has exposed rampant exploitation of small businesses, The 
Australian, 5 June 1997 
43 McKinnon, Michael, Oil groups cite petrol bias, Herald Sun, 14 July 1997 
44 Stott, Diane, Reith balancing on a legal fence, Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 1997. 
4' Burton and Murphy, 1997 
4' Statement by the Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business, the Hon Peter Reith MP, New 
Deal: Fair Deal- Giving Small Business a fair Go, September1997, pl 
°7 Reith, 1997, p1 
Hartley, Robert, Property Observed, Australian Financial Review, 2 October 1997 
49 Chamberlin, Paul, and Patrick Donovan, Canberra steps in to restrain the business bully -boys, The Age, 
1 October 1997 
° Reith's blueprint for change, The Australian Financial Review, 1 October 1997 
'1 Clack, Peter, Small business to flex its new -found legal muscle, The Australian Financial Review, 
2 October 1997 
Chamberlin and Donovan, 1997 
'3 Switzer, Peter, Levelling the playing field, The Australian, 1 October 1997 
'4 Grattan, Michelle, Small end of town wins, The Australian Financial Review, 1 October 1997 
Baxt, Robert, and Joel Mahemoff, 1998, Unconscionable Conduct Under the Trade Practices Act - An 
Unfair Response By the Government: A Preliminary View, Australian Business Law Review - Vol 26, 
February, pps5-24 
Baxt and Mahemoff, 1998, p5 
Baxt and Mahemoff, 1998, p17 
'" Use of inquiries to this extent in a particular debate is very unusual in the author's experience. 
206 
'9 Lindblom, C E, 1977, Politics and Markets, Basic Books , New York 
Lindblom, C E, 1982, The Market as Prison, The Journal of Politics, vol 44, no 2, 
fil Maclntyre, 1981 
°' Kaufmann, Walter, trans and ed, 1992, The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Random House, London 
207 
CHAPTER 7: THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
AUSTRALIAN FAIR TRADING DEBATE 
Justice ... is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. 
If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human 
society ... must in a moment crumble into atoms. 
Adam Smith.' 
INTRODUCTION 
As we have shown in Chapter 6, over the last twenty -five years there has been a 
vigorous policy debate at the Commonwealth level on the issue of fair trading which has 
been documented by a large number of public inquiries over the period. That debate 
arose out of ongoing complaints from the small business sector regarding the conduct of 
big business towards small business. This Australian Fair Trading debate continues a 
centuries old controversy over the role of the state in regulating transactions and 
particularly in enforcing contracts which are claimed to be unfair. Thus, this debate 
raises fundamental questions about the relationship between the state and the market 
system and between that market system and society more generally. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the successor body to 
the Trade Practices Commission, and which administers the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
says that there are a number of common features in the complaints that they have 
received from small businesses in relation to their dealings with more powerful firms 
These also appear to be typical of the complaints that have arisen over the course of the 
entire debate: 
little or no ability to negotiate terms of the contract (often pro -forma `take 
it or leave it' contracts are used); 
inadequate disclosure of relevant and important commercial information 
which the weaker party should be aware of before entering the transaction; 
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inadequate and unclear disclosure of important terms of the contract, 
particularly those which are weighed against the weaker party. This can 
occur through: 
the technical wording of the document; 
the `theatre' of the negotiations whereby the small business person 
is under -represented, lacks the legal fire power brought to the table 
by the other party, and is discouraged from considering the details 
of the contract, or is not given the opportunity to do so; and 
the fact that the terms which can operate against the interests of the 
weaker party are not brought to the attention of that party, or their 
full import is not spelt out to that party; 
when smaller parties have committed themselves to a long term 
relationship, for example, through a lease or franchise, the dominant 
parties seek to vary the nature of the relationship so that it is more 
favourable to the dominant player and conversely, affects the viability of 
the weaker party; and 
when disputes do arise there is often no quick, cheap and market sensitive 
way of dealing with them and even where they do exist, there is a 
reluctance by small business to access any remedial action through fear of 
reprisal. 
As has been noted in the account in Chapter 6, these common complaints can be 
characterised as resulting from asymmetries of power and information between the 
parties to these transactions. The debate, itself, has involved a number of key elements: 
A dominant evaluative methodology, based on the concept of `economic 
efficiency' seen primarily in terms of Pareto- optimality; 
A reliance on and advocacy of the primacy of contract with its underlying 
unexamined assumption that it is proper for the state to enforce private 
agreements; and 
209 
A reliance on a crude regulatory strategy articulated in terms of minimum 
effective regulation, based on a minimalist view of the role of the state 
derived from Locke. 
These closely interrelated themes in turn rely on two hidden assumptions that have 
intruded into contemporary policy debates under the influence of contemporary 
economic discourse, the autonomy of the economic system and the primacy of the 
economic over the social. Consequently, the first and the last of the key elements, listed 
above, are very familiar themes in contemporary policy debates. The second, as we 
have already seen, is not new but arose out of the `classical view' of contract law that 
developed in Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century under the influence 
of classical economists and positivist attitudes more generally. This classical view of 
contract is a feature of Common Law counties and was not fully shared by countries 
with a Civil Code tradition. Each of these themes will be dealt with in turn. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
There are numerous examples in the public inquiries documented in Chapter 5 referring 
to the concept of economic efficiency as the basis on which such public policy issues 
should be settled. Indeed, the debate has been conducted almost entirely under this 
rubric. For example, during the Blunt Committee Inquiry in 1979, in commenting on a 
proposal from the Law Council of Australia for a general prohibition of harsh, 
unconscionable or unfair conduct expressed the view that that the Trade Practices Act 
1974 was directed primarily at enhancing competition and should not deal with the 
`moral' issues involved in business conduct.' This view was endorsed by the BCA in 
its submission to the recent Reid inquiry.4 
The claim is, of course, unsustainable. It is a view that relies directly on the positivist 
separation of law and morals, a separation that is largely discredited. In the particular 
case, protecting competition, as the Trade Practices Act 1974 does in some of its 
sections, is not an end in itself. It is done because of the belief that competition 
enhances economic outcomes and that in turn enhances human welfare. That is, it is 
done for a moral reason, economic efficiency being one of the intermediate moral values 
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served by that Act. Competition is also seen as producing fairer economic outcomes, as 
enhancing equity. Consequently, the competition provisions of the Act, themselves, are 
intended to enhance welfare and fairness. Conduct that directly reduces welfare or 
fairness can hardly be thought to be consistent with the aims of that Act. Indeed, even 
the Blunt Committee acknowledged that competition laws operate directly on business 
conduct and accepted that the Act's thrust against anti -competitive conduct was 
tempered to some extent to protect small business and to promote fairness' 
This should come as no surprise as this is what the Minister actually said when 
introducing the legislation in the first place. The Act was intended to both enhance 
competition and protect against unscrupulous conduct. More generally, and consistent 
with the account given in Chapter 2, the Law should not enforce anything but moral 
values .6 The question, therefore, is not whether the law should enforce morality, but the 
extent to which it should do so. 
The Blunt Committee went on to specifically define `desirable economic performance', 
the words used in its terms of reference, in terms of `economic efficiency', a concept 
which it took to be the equivalent of 'Pareto- optimality'. The Blunt Committee 
acknowledged, in a footnote only, some limitations of this concept, but its analysis 
remained unaffected by that acknowledgment, a deficiency shared by subsequent 
references to `economic efficiency' throughout this debate, and recent public policy 
debate more generally. 
Another fashionable economic perspective was that employed under the rubric of 
`competition policy' by the Better Business Conduct Discussion Paper of 25 October 
1995 by the Department of Industry, Science and Technology.' That Department relied 
on reasoning related to the `contestability' of markets and `economic ransom' to provide 
a justification for its proposed amendments of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to outlaw 
`harsh or oppressive' conduct within an existing commercial relationship. In this 
analysis, contestability is defined as the degree of ease with which firms can enter or 
leave an industry with a number of elements being necessary to secure 'perfect' 
contestability. These include an absence of sunk costs; all firms being subject to the 
same conditions; and consumers being indifferent between markets. In a 'perfect' 
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contestable market, a firm would not be able to impose harsh or oppressive terms on one 
another and firms would be able to leave an industry without significant economic 
penalty where the economic return is not in keeping with that firm's expectation. In 
reality, the conditions for perfect contestability cannot be met, and the Department 
argued that Government initiatives are sometimes necessary to improve contestability 
and restore choice in commercial relationships. The Department went on to point out 
that gaining an adequate return on sunk costs is important for small businesses, as they 
often use finance borrowed against the family home to enter a market. The sunk costs 
of a business then create a barrier to market exit which restricts their commercial 
flexibility and leaves them open to exploitation. The abuse of relative bargaining 
power, in such a way as to remove choice from a commercial arrangement from one 
party, impacts negatively on contestability. The Department concluded that the theory 
of contestability clearly establishes that situations of `economic ransom' are a problem 
which requires attention. It is not clear that this form of analysis is anything other than a 
particular form of a more general economic efficiency argument based on Pareto- 
optimality, though some may argue that it is an attempt to come to grips with the 
`workable competition' experienced in real markets, while avoiding the conceptual 
difficulties involved in the concept of competition. Of course, this is the same problem 
that the legal doctrine of economic duress was intended to deal with shorn of the 
limitations imposed upon it by classical contract law. 
More recently still, the Reid Inquiry was charged with reporting particularly on whether 
certain commercial practices might lead to sub -optimal outcomes .8 In its submission to 
that Inquiry, the Business Council of Australia (BCA), the premier business lobby group 
operating in Australia and representing Australia's largest companies, cited with 
approval the Blunt Committee's claims that it was inappropriate for the Trade Practices 
Act 7974 to deal with moral issue and that the Act is primarily concerned with 
`economic efficiency' 9 As has already been explained, this flies in the face of explicit 
statements by the responsible ministers to the contrary. 
There is some similarity between this BCA position and Posner's economic theory of 
the law, in which the law is seen as serving wealth maximisation.10 But, of course, the 
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law to which he refers is judge -made law which he considers morally superior to statute 
law which tends to depart from his efficiency norm." Posner's theory is, indeed, an 
extreme manifestation of the economic rationalism of the Chicago school. It is such a 
transparently impoverished account of justice, running in the face of our contemporary 
moral vocabulary, that it warrants little serious consideration. Thus, for Posner, 
suffering is irrelevant to his conception of justice unless it is accompanied by a capacity 
to pay. It equates justice with economic efficiency, but an economic efficiency which is 
defined purely in terms of wealth maximisation. It is clearly intended to be both a 
descriptive and a normative theory. It is a theory which attaches importance to freedom 
of choice, but only to the positive rights and values intrinsic to capitalism, the protection 
of private property rights, promise keeping, and freedom of contact, those rights and 
obligations that were also central to Locke's social contact theory. 
The BCA submission mounts a more standard economic argument based on Pareto- 
optimality: that there should only be `regulatory intervention' when `economic 
efficiency' is lessened by distortions in a market, interventions which hinder the 
movement of resources to their most valuable and efficient use, and where the benefits 
of that intervention outweigh the costs. They go on to suggest that this calculus is one 
that should properly be performed by the Productivity Commission, the successor body 
to the Industry Commission, an organisation popularly believed to be committed to 
economic rationalism. 
More generally, the Trade Practices Commission and its successor, the ACCC, have 
consistently argued that `economic efficiency' would be enhanced by action directed 
against unconscionable conduct in commercial transactions. For example, in 1991 the 
Trade Practices Commission" advised the Attorney -General and the Minister for Small 
Business and Customs that there were net economic benefits to be gained from `the 
regulation of' unconscionable conduct in commercial transactions where: 
there is an inequality of bargaining power; 
the weaker party suffers from an inability to protect its interests because of 
a special disability, a special relationship, or a lack of a practicable 
alternative; and 
213 
the stronger party is sufficiently aware of the inability and uses its superior 
bargaining power to take advantage of the weaker party. 
In its submission to the recent Reid Inquiry, the ACCC expresses a similar view in the 
following terms: 
"From an economic viewpoint, economic efficiency and consumer welfare are 
maximised when resources are allocated to those uses in which the value to the 
consumer is highest. However, the attainment of economic efficiency is affected 
by distortions in the market (such as misuse of market power and misleading 
information) which prevent or hinder the free movement of resources to their 
most valuable and efficient use. In other words, the market may fail in 
important respects. Measures such as those in the Trade Practices Act to lessen 
or remove the underlying market distortions are economically justifiable. "n 
The Treasury submission to the Reid Inquiry points to the important contribution that 
small business makes to the Australian Economy." Thus, for Treasury, the claims that 
small businesses are not adequately protected against `harsh or oppressive' conduct in 
their dealings with larger firms raised important policy issues requiring careful 
assessment. The Treasury goes on to argue that there are two primary reasons for 
government `intervention': market failure; and equity /fairness. This use of the word 
`intervention' is not neutral, however, as it implies an interference in the normal, or 
even the ideal, state of affairs, an interference that has to be justified. The implication is 
that the normal or ideal is an unregulated market. It carries with it the minimalist 
account of the role of the state derived from Locke, which is challenged by the critique 
of the Enlightenment and of rationalism recounted in Chapter 4. Of course, this use of 
the word `intervention' is typical of contemporary policy debates. The belief that 
markets are autonomous lies at the heart of economic rationalism. But it is a view that 
cannot be sustained in this debate, in particular, which is about what laws are necessary 
for the proper operation of markets themselves. It also presupposes that an unregulated 
market could actually operate, that `the Market' is autonomous, a view that has already 
been rejected. Of course, `the Market' or `markets', are, themselves, abstract categories 
with no tangible existence, the reified aggregation of all exchanges, or some, exchanges, 
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and thus subject to all the objections directed by economists at the category `society'. 
Indeed, even the category `economic exchanges', like all categories, is contestable. 
The Treasury agreed that inadequate information, high transaction costs, and substantial 
market power may give rise to a `market failure'. This `failure' can result in efficient 
small businesses being discouraged from entering the market or being forced out of 
business, thereby producing a `sub -optimal' allocation of the community's resources. 
These are the standard economic arguments used by small business and the ACCC to 
justify amendment to the Trade Practices Act 1974 throughout the debate. They rely on 
the concept of Pareto- optimality. Treasury also acknowledged that unfair business 
conduct can also lead to other social costs, such as increased bankruptcies and social 
dislocation. It was concerned, however, that general legislative action to deal with these 
issues, and associated equity considerations, could have adverse consequences on 
business certainty and the competitive process. 
In relation to the economic arguments, neither the relevant departments, nor the big 
business lobby, pay any serious attention to `distributional' or equity issues. Thus, 
while in the Treasury case the existence of equity concerns is briefly acknowledged, 
they are not discussed. More broadly, the word justice is never uttered. The two 
departments with policy responsibility in this area at that time, Treasury and the 
Department of Industry, Science and Tourism mounted theoretical arguments about 
economic efficiency, and possible efficiency costs or benefits associated with any 
changes in the law, but devoted few words to the social implications of unfair conduct. 
If their submissions are any guide, they had done little or no empirical work on this 
aspect of the problem. Throughout this debate, and more generally, it appears that these 
Departments believed that in practice economic discourse only legitimises a concern 
with `efficiency', and /or that their responsibilities for policy advice were restricted to a 
concern with `economic efficiency' only. 
There seems to be no recognition that, in practice, it is impossible to separate efficiency 
from distribution issues, however much economists like the conceptual distinction. In 
any event, that conceptual distinction relies heavily on the concept of consumer 
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sovereignty, and on individual preferences, and the concept of Pareto- optimality. The 
first of these is clearly an ideological commitment arising originally out of Locke's 
political philosophy with its commitment to individualism, `natural' property rights and 
a minimalist state. The second is also tainted with a bias in favour of the existing 
distribution of income and property, a bias which we also see in Locke and the tradition 
he founded. It will be recalled from Chapters 4 and 5 that Locke's political philosophy, 
originally served as an ideological justification for Whig property owners in their 
struggle with the Stuart kings and in their subsequent defence of their property rights. 
An uncharitable observer might see it serving the same purpose in this contemporary 
policy debate. 
In relation to those limitations, it is often argued that the concept of Pareto -optimality is 
of little or no practical use because of its refusal to make interpersonal comparisons, its 
individualistic and static basis, and its bias in favour of the existing distribution of 
wealth. The dependence of Pareto- optimality on the initial distribution of income and 
wealth means that it cannot provide a neutral measure of welfare improvement. At best 
it is a minimum condition for a social optimum, but even that is open to damaging 
challenge. In any event, it relies on assumptions which are not realisable in practice. 
This also is well recognised, but ignored in actual policy debates. The attainment of 
Pareto- optimality requires the simultaneous fulfilment of all the optimum conditions, 
conditions that cannot be satisfied in real circumstances. But if only one of the 
conditions is not satisfied the model provides no guidance for action. Thus it is not 
possible to derive a `second best' system from the perfect competition model. 
As indicated above, underlying the Blunt Committee's concerns, and the Treasury's 
recent reluctance to endorse action to deal with unfair trading, is the fear that such 
action will damage the `competitive process'. But they seem to have little 
understanding of how closely related the two concerns are. Their fear reflects an 
inability to distinguish between hard bargaining over the distribution of the economic 
surplus arising from an ongoing economic relationship, or a transaction, and 
competition. This, in turn, reflects a commitment to a dichotomous form of thinking in 
which it is necessary to classify conduct as either cooperative or competitive, but not 
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both. This choice of vocabulary is not neutral, but reflects underlying preconceptions, 
particularly a faith in competitive market processes. Having decided, without 
discussion, that the category `competition' should be applied to these situations, a 
number of submissions to the Reid Inquiry went on to cite the judgement of Chief 
Justice Mason and Justice Wilson of the High Court in Queensland Wire Industries v 
BHP (1989): 
"Competition is by its very nature deliberate and ruthless. Competitors jockey 
for sales, the more effective injuring the less effective by taking sales away. "'s 
This claim is, itself, open to contention because the damage that arises out of 
competition should be seen as the unavoidable side effect of a striving for excellence in 
the service of customers, not its primary purpose. The implication that big business 
seeks to draw is that, if it is permissible to damage competitors, then it is permissible to 
damage business partners. But, in fact, governments place severe limits on the ability of 
firms and individuals to injure each other in direct economic competition. They do it in 
order to protect firms from forms of competition that are considered unacceptable. The 
do it in order to protect competition, itself, as well as for other reasons. Thus violence, 
theft and fraud in economic competition are illegal, as are most attempts to monopolise 
a market, either individually, or in collusion with others. But, in any event, it does not 
seem reasonable to classify the bargaining between business partners, or even 
transaction partners, simply as competition in the sense in which that word is usually 
used. This vocabulary seems inadequate for the task being set it. 
Briefly, competitive pressure, the attempt to maintain market share and profitability in 
the face of the offerings of rival firms, is seen in the economic literature as allowing 
performance comparisons, increasing incentives for firms to avoid inefficiency. 
However, not all forms of competition are seen as being desirable, nor are all forms of 
monopoly seen as being undesirable. Indeed, all real market situations are both 
competitive and monopolistic to some degree. The problem is to decide what degrees, 
and modes of competition are desirable; and to what extent monopoly is acceptable.16 
Economic theory seems to have some considerable difficulty in sorting out the 
difference. As John Vickers says: 
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"Despite the widespread view, which has considerable empirical support, that 
competition is important for productive efficiency, it is not so obvious why. 
Competition seems very well in practice, but it is not so clear how it works in 
theory."" 
The perfect competition model has little to say about productive and dynamic 
efficiency, though they may be more important than allocative efficiency. These 
different economic views potentially have significantly different policy implications. In 
any event, the very idea of `perfect competition' seems to be incoherent - it presupposes 
the existence of social order, while postulating a perfect state of economic conflict, 
conditions in which no such order could be possible. It is effectively Hobbes's war of 
all on all, where no commerce would be possible. 
Consistent with the account given in Chapter 3, Etzioni'8 emphasises that the 
competition experienced in practice is a sub -system nestled within a more encompassing 
societal context and is not self- sustaining. Rather the existence of competition and the 
scope of transactions organised by it, are dependent on what he calls the societal capsule 
within which it takes place. This is consistent with the earlier argument that self- interest 
alone does not provide an adequate basis for our social order. The pursuit of self - 
interest alone by real economic actors does not, and will not, produce a peaceful society. 
It is our moral codes combined with legal rules and penalties which prevents our 
conflicting interests from escalating to the point of self- destruction. Thus these moral 
and legal constraints are an essential precondition for competition to operate to increase 
welfare. 
In Chapter 3, attention was directed in particular to the role of trust in promoting social 
and economic interaction. But in the language of neo- classical economics, trust and 
similar values, loyalty or truthfulness are called `externalities' 19 The very language 
seems to marginalise their importance even though technically they are only called 
`externalities' because they are external to the price system, those areas in which the 
price system fails to operate. In a climate where the importance of `externalities' is 
discounted, there is a danger that the importance of those moral values will be forgotten. 
This is particularly relevant to contracts in contemporary society which rely on informal 
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constraints to ensure that parties will act honourably when unforseen circumstances 
arise during the course of contracts which, in practice, are necessarily incomplete. 
The dangers associated with a transaction depend not only with the nature of that 
transaction, but also with the trading environment of which it is a part. Consequently, 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of one party to a transaction or a contract can 
increase risks attached to all transactions and thus the costs of doing business generally. 
Consequently, the moral and legal sanctions which reduce opportunistic conduct also 
reduce transaction costs generally. In particular, they can have the effect of infusing 
trading confidence into transactions that are characterised by costly information and 
power asymmetries. Moral standards and a complementary legal framework provide 
infrastructure fundamental to the `efficiency' of the market system - our moral and legal 
institutions are an essential part of the capital of the economic system. Indeed, as Arrow 
has noted, a lack of mutual trust is among the properties of many societies whose 
economic development is backward. This argument runs directly to the Treasury 
argument that unfair trading laws may raise transaction costs generally. 
Such social demands may be expressed through the internalised demands of conscience 
or they may be embodied in formal legal rules. Indeed, the reliance on the more 
informal demands of conscience may well have efficiency benefits in some situations 
because of their adaptability to different circumstances. The calculativeness involved in 
the application of rigid rules could well be dysfunctional if cooperative attitudes, with 
their positive spillover effects, are undermined. It follows that an exploitive business 
culture is likely to be less efficient than one in which there is a greater degree of `give 
and take'. Indeed, a number of specific studies have looked at the role played by social 
convention in helping to sustain collaborative relationships, even where recourse to the 
courts might have been preferred. In particular, Stewart Macauley researched non - 
contractual relations in manufacturing industry in Wisconsin in 1963.20 He found that 
businesspeople often prefer to rely on a person's word in a letter, a handshake, or 
common honesty and decency, even when the transaction involves exposure to serious 
risks, rather than seek professional legal advice and protect themselves with a tightly 
worded contract. Indeed, Macauley discovered that in some cases, business people 
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considered that recourse to legalism in relationship -building indicated a lack of trust 
turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade. Any weakening of the 
social and moral sanctions promoting such give and take may well increase the need for 
the codification of such standards through law. 
The potential exists for significant conflict between the internalised social demands of 
conscience and the social demands expressed through formal legal rules, particularly in 
a litigious culture. Lacking extensive experience of the rigid application of the formal 
rules of the contract law, inexperienced small business operators are likely to expect that 
the standards of conscience will govern, or at least moderate, the business relationships 
they enter into. Further complicating this situation is the likelihood that unscrupulous 
businesses will exploit these expectations in contract negotiations, so as to impose harsh 
contract terms. And, of course, unscrupulous businesses have been known to lie about 
their intentions in order to obtain the agreement of the other party. 
Competition must therefore always remain bounded. The question that then has to be 
decided is to what extent? No decision seems possible on the basis of the theoretical 
economic analysis available. Rather, it appears to be an economic issue that can only be 
answered by experience, by experimentation. But economic categories do not 
adequately cover all the possible issues. Some forms of behaviour are simply 
considered wrong, regardless of the consequences. This view flies in the face of the 
moral claims made for the market by economic rationalists. 
What is clear in all the discussion about competition is that competition is not valued as 
a goal in and of itself, as a form of social Darwinism in which economic might is right. 
Rather, competition is valued as an instrument promoting social welfare?' As the 
Hilmer Report, a report that has been taken as the gospel of competition policy in 
Australia in recent years, says: 
"Competition policy is not about the pursuit of competition per se, rather, it 
seeks to facilitate effective competition to promote efficiency and economic 
growth while accommodating situations where competition does not achieve 
efficiency or conflicts with other social objectives." 
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The problem is that the extent to which, and the way in which, competition promotes 
that welfare remains problematic. The danger is that we will slip all too readily into a 
form of social Darwinism deriving from Spencer where anything goes. It is that 
sentiment which seems, to some extent, to be reflected in the extract from the High 
Court judgement cited above?' Thus it is argued that such `competition' as is permitted 
is the servant of our fundamental social values, not the determinant of our values. In 
particular, it is those fundamental values which define what is meant by social welfare. 
Consequently, such fundamental values as fairness or justice in social relationships are 
not to be conditioned by more instrumental values like competition. 
What has also escaped comment in this somewhat impoverished debate is the fact that 
the effective operation of the market system relies on the coordination of activities every 
bit as much as it does on competition. That coordination necessarily involves 
cooperation, though coordination may also involve some coercion. It is also quite clear 
that the competitive provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 set out to control the 
acquisition, extension and abuse of market power. There appears to be no good reason 
why it should not also seek to control the abuse of power in the coordination of 
activities as well. Indeed, in a liberal state, with its strong tradition opposing the abuse 
of governmental coercion, it would seem to be inconsistent and unreasonable not to be 
equally concerned about the abuse of government coercive power through the vehicle of 
contract law. 
It is curious that in the current deregulatory environment none of the submissions from 
big business groups to the current Fair Trading Inquiry have attempted a positive 
justification of the status quo, that is, the continued application of state coercive power 
in support of the institution of contract. On the contrary it is small business groups who 
are seen as demanding government regulation, as having to justify that demand. In 
reality, of course, it is the small business groups who have been arguing for a selective 
deregulation of contract in arguing that in certain limited circumstances contracts should 
not be enforceable by the state. It is big business groups, some lawyers and the 
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Treasury that have been arguing for the continued use of the coercive powers of the state 
in support of certain business interests. 
PRIMACY OF CONTRACT 
Chapter 5 has already provided an extensive discussion of the doctrine of freedom of 
contract. It was shown that it rose out of the Enlightenment program, and its associated 
political theorising, and came to prominence in the nineteenth century as the central 
doctrine of classical contract law. It has also been shown that the doctrine replaced an 
earlier concern with fairness in contractual arrangements, and transactions more 
generally, with a mechanical decision rule modelled on the same sort of individualistic 
and Newtonian principles that are used in neo- classical economics. It has also been 
recounted that this positivist view of contract law and of its central doctrine cannot be 
sustained. Indeed, the influence of the doctrine has now been in decline for over a 
century. Nevertheless, it remains an important value in contemporary capitalist society. 
Or rather, the values that lay behind the doctrine, remain important. What has changed 
is not that the freedom of individuals to enter into transactions and contracts is less 
important, but that it has been recognised that, in practice, there are many barriers to 
individuals exercising that freedom. In these circumstances, the high sounding principle 
of freedom of contract can all too readily become a cloak for the exploitive conduct of 
the powerful. 
In any event, the common law, equity and the Trade Practices Act 1974, and a very 
wide range of other laws now constrain what can be contracted and by whom. And 
following the amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 enacted in 1997, these 
constraints have been strengthened. In this context, the idea of a `right to contract' 
independent of the social purposes of contract and of the surrounding law seems to be 
incoherent. As Jevons argued in a similar context:2' 
"The first step must be to rid our minds of the ideas that there are such things in 
social matters as abstract rights, absolute principles, indefeasible laws, 
inalterable rules, or anything whatever of an eternal and inflexible nature." 
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Contract is not an institution existing independently of law, and of society and its 
values. In effect what small business groups have been arguing is that collective 
coercion should not be used to enforce conduct, including contractual terms, which 
offends against collective values. And this is a position with which the Reid Committee 
and ultimately the Australian government, albeit with some reluctance, agreed. And in 
so doing they appear to have brought the law of contracts in Australia more into line 
with the community's values. 
Nevertheless, the keeping of promises is one of those community values, but it is not a 
value that has been shown, or could be shown, a priori, to warrant priority. Importantly, 
it has also been argued that far from undermining the institution of contract and 
economic exchange, any law which insisted on standards of fairness in contracts would 
be protecting the fundamental purposes of those institutions. As Angelo and Ellinger24 
say: 
"It is ironic that during the last decades of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth century, the concept of `freedom of contract', which originally was 
used to invalidate contracts made without the parties' freely given consent, 
became the very tool used to establish the sanctity of standard form contracts." 
In this same regard, Professor Terry's has argued that US experience with Section 2 302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the doctrine of unconscionability can strengthen the 
ability to co- determine the terms of a contract that is implied by the concept of `freedom 
of contract'. The courts may examine unbargained terms without disturbing those terms 
that have been co- determined. 
UNCERTAINTY 
As was shown in Chapter 6 the issues of uncertainty in commercial arrangements was 
also raised as a significant objection over the years to proposals for stronger unfair 
trading legislation. This focus on uncertainty is reflected in the terms of reference for 
the Reid Inquiry: 
"4. In developing options, the Committee will seek to ensure certainty in the 
market place, contract dealings and other commercial transactions, minimising 
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the regulatory burden on business, and keep litigation and costs to a 
minimum. "" 
Indeed, the reference to the certainty in the market place, one of the key justifications of 
classical contract law is so plain that a cynic might be tempted to conclude that it was 
included in the terms of reference of that Inquiry to pre -empt the outcome of the inquiry. 
As shown in chapter 5, the issue of uncertainty has been closely associated with the 
doctrine of freedom of contract. As was explained in Chapter 4, this demand for 
certainty is a theme also closely associated with the whole Enlightenment project. In 
the case of the Fair Trading debate, the BCA, for example, in its evidence to the Reid 
Inquiry was concerned that the existence of a harsh and oppressive provision could be 
used to overturn contracts that should otherwise be enforceable and that would produce 
uncertainty about the enforcement of contracts .27 
This concern has been shown in Chapter 5 to confuse certainty with generality. The 
assertion that such generality leads to certainty is simply not true. What it does do in 
our legal system, however, is provide large businesses with a powerful advantage in 
enforcing contractual provisions. The cost and the practical difficulties of providing 
adequate evidence acts strongly against small business in any litigation. While big 
business makes much of the need for certainty in contracts, in practice many contracts in 
franchising, in retail tenancy, and in commerce more generally, provide the weaker 
party with little certainty about the environment they will be facing. Indeed, they 
usually provide the stronger party with wide discretions. For example, franchising 
contracts typically impose very heavy obligations on franchisees while leaving 
franchisor's duties relatively undefined. But the obligations of the franchisor are vital to 
the franchising relationship!' Such contracts and the franchisors' sunk costs necessarily 
involve the danger of opportunistic abuse. Retail tenancy contracts involve similar 
onerous terms and similar risks. 
The widespread existence of such contracts must surely undermine any simplistic 
assertion that inexperienced small business people, entering into such contracts, are 
engaged in a process of rationally allocating the risks associated with the future of those 
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relationships. Indeed, even risk is the wrong word, what is really entailed is uncertainty. 
Big business frequently deals with the uncertainty associated with their economic 
relationships with small business by exploiting their bargaining power to retain freedom 
of action for themselves, while heavily constraining the discretion available to their 
small business partners. It also seems likely that many small businesses do not really 
understand that the resulting harsh contract terms will, in fact, be enforced against them. 
It appears possible that in many instances such businesses rely on oral assurances to the 
contrary. In these circumstances there needs to be a sounder theoretical description of 
contractual relationships than provided by the neo- classical view. 
In this regard, Williamson tells us that transaction cost economics subscribes to the idea 
of the American legal realist Karl Llewellan of contract as a framework. According to 
Llewellan, a contract between two parties: 
"almost never accurately indicates real working relations, but ... affords a rough 
indication around which such relations vary, an occasional guide in case of 
doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to work. "29 
Transaction cost economics seeks to identify, explain, and mitigate contractual hazards. 
All those hazards can be attributed to the twin behavioural assumptions from which 
transaction cost economics works, bounded rationality and opportunism. Williamson 
argues that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete and where bilateral 
dependency exists are fraught with what he calls maladaption hazard. For Williamson, 
an important lesson for the study of economic organisation is that transactions that are 
subject to ex -post opportunism will benefit if appropriate safeguards can be devised in 
anticipation. Incentives may be realigned or superior governance structures within 
which to organise transactions may be devised. This is, of course, a position similar to 
that advocated by MacNeil30 
At a more empirical level, those who favour such changes argue that experience in 
NSW and in the USA support the proposition that undue uncertainty will not be caused. 
For example, Mr Frank Zumbo, an academic lawyer, submitted to the Reid Inquiry that 
a general provision in the Trade Practices Act 1974 prohibiting unconscionable, harsh 
or oppressive conduct would not have the effect of undermining freely and openly 
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negotiated contracts.' He argues that a provision giving the courts a considerable 
degree of discretion should not be feared as the courts are likely to be careful in 
applying such a broad remedial provision, particularly given the legal precedents 
already established. Mr Zumbo refers in particular to experience with the NSW 
Industrial Relations Act 199132 which gives the Industrial Court of NSW the power to 
deal with particular types of unfair or harsh and unconscionable conduct. Professor 
Andrew Terry, Director, Centre for Franchising Studies at the University of NSW, 
similarly argued that there is no reason to believe that the power to address `harsh or 
oppressive' conduct would not be handled responsibly and with less threat to certainty 
in commercial activities than may be feared. Professor Terry also pointed out that 
Australian judges were already applying broad standards to commercial behaviour. In 
particular, section 52 the Trade Practices Act 1974, which prohibits, in broad and 
general terms, `misleading or deceptive conduct', conferred a massive jurisdiction that 
had been applied responsibly. While the term `misleading or deceptive' could not be 
comprehensively defined, a wide body of jurisprudence had developed, which had 
accommodated higher standards of commercial morality without handicapping 
commercial reality. He also suggests that an approach which provides criteria for the 
courts when assessing such matters would also reduce uncertainty. Similarly, 
experience in Germany and the United States had demonstrated that a general doctrine 
of unconscionability does not introduce uncertainty into the law of contracts. Courts in 
both jurisdictions have been cautious in applying these unconscionability doctrines. 
What they have tended to do is to compare the terms of transactions being challenged, 
with the terms of similar transactions 33 The recent amendments to the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 will allow similar comparisons in Australia for small business transactions. 
In any event, the Reid Inquiry, and the subsequent Government legislation, has provided 
mechanisms for businesses in conjunction with the ACCC to codify the types of 
conduct that are appropriate to particular sectors through Industry Codes of Practice. 
These are processes that enable interest groups to negotiate what are in effect standard 
terms and conditions that will be applied in particular areas of business. Thus it 
represents a step away from the individualistic basis of contract formulation, that was 
the nineteenth century ideal, indeed the Lockean ideal, to a more corporatist approach. 
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REGULATORY STRATEGY 
It has been argued' that legislating to require that commercial conduct including 
contracts meet standards of fairness involves the Court in the application of value 
judgements and that involvement is undesirable. Of course, this view cannot survive the 
analysis provided before. There are no value free legal rules. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that a rule has advantages compared to a standard of fairness in that it promotes 
consistency, predictability and uniformity in decision making. Of course, this reflects 
the general orientation in moral philosophy since the Enlightenment, where God was 
conceived of as a rule giver. It also reflects the orientation of classical contract law. 
This opens up a debate about whether such a rule can be defended as just in the face of 
evidence that the only possible rule - that contracts will always be enforced - has already 
been found wanting. People like Rawls are engaged in such a debate. The focus on 
procedural issues within the equitable doctrine of unconscionability is, itself, an attempt 
to maintain such a rule -based approach. Space does not allow the further exploration of 
this issue in detail. However, the value of this type of theorising has been strongly 
attacked in Chapter 5. In any event, the only reason the courts focus on procedural 
issues in practice has been to provide a pretext for them to decline to enforce contracts 
that were seen to be unjust on other grounds35 
This focus on rules that are easily enforced seems to be influenced by the neo- classical 
view of contracts and the search for mechanical decision rules. At the same time, it 
seems to involve a simplistic understanding of regulatory strategy. In particular, it 
seems to assume that such a rule is, in practice, enforceable. Yet one of the major 
themes in the Reid Inquiry was that smaII business cannot afford access to the courts 
(particularly given the long pockets and delaying tactics employed by big business), 
and, in any event, the fact that they are often involved in an ongoing relationship with 
the company with whom they are in dispute precludes them from undertaking litigation 
to enforce contractual rights. The point was made particularly strongly at a public 
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hearing in Canberra on Monday 4 November 1996, by the Deputy Chairman of the 
ACCC: 
"It has been our profound view, ever since we first started consideration of 
business -to- business conduct and small business -big business difficulties, that to 
imagine that simply a clause in the law would fix those problems is just looking 
in the wrong place. So in our submission to this inquiry, in our submission right 
back to the Swanson Committee in the 1970s, the Commission has been of the 
view that what is required is an overall new approach to the resolution of 
disputes between small and large businesses... . 
"But, in my view, it is a cruel hoax to give people a legal provision that is not 
enforceable. By enforceable, I do not just mean that there is a legal right but that 
there is some real capacity to be able to use it. 
"It only takes a moment's thought to see that for any small business, if it has 
some continued dealing with a large business, the idea of litigation is just not 
relevant. That is only after a business relationship has ended and you are trying 
to sweep up the pieces. "" 
In this context, the idea of minimum and effective regulation might be said to be 
mutually inconsistent. The ACCC itself proposed a regulatory strategy described in 
terms of an enforcement pyramid involving four stages: 
1. adequate and clear information disclosure (the base of the pyramid); 
2. early intervention when disputes arise (moving up the pyramid); 
3. private enforcement (towards the top of the pyramid); and 
4. public enforcement (at the top of the pyramid)." 
It is a suggestion that seems to have been influenced by Braithwaite's views 38 He has 
argued that we need institutions that give people and organisations the space to be 
virtuous, that nurture rather than destroy civic virtue in the business community. This 
needs to be backed up by tough- minded regulatory bodies that can shift to a hard headed 
approach on the occasions when this is considered to be necessary to enforce the values 
and goals of legislation. Consequently, he argues for a regulatory approach that firstly 
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attempts to solve problems by persuasion and dialogue and which presume good faith 
on the part of business. When such an approach fails then the regulatory response 
should escalate to threats designed to deter the conduct. But such an approach depends 
ultimately on a comprehensive suite of regulatory powers to ensure a high level of 
voluntary compliance. Only time will tell whether the amendments to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, judicial activism to extend the application of those provisions more 
broadly, and moves to reduce the costs of litigation, combined with a more active 
ACCC role, will induce that voluntary compliance. It if does so, then in the view of the 
author, Justice will be served. For those who believe in a view of justice based on 
classical contract law, the view advanced unconsciously by economic rationalism, then 
Justice will not be so served. Herein lies the political and moral choice involved 
throughout this debate. 
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CHAPTER 8: SOME REFLECTIONS 
Man's fate will forever elude the attempts of his intellect to 
understand it... The quest for the laws which will explain the 
riddle of human behavior leads us not towards the truth but 
towards the illusion of certainty, which is our curse. 
Grant Gilmore' 
REITERATION 
This thesis has, like Gilmore cited above, been highly critical of the abstract impersonal 
values, the universal solutions and the logical imperatives within the classical law of 
contract.' Human laws should not be seen as mystical absolutes but as tentative and 
imperfect social constructs, open to change. The development of the classical law of 
contract cannót be understood independently of its social and historical context, and of 
the tradition of thought of which it formed a part.' Thus, the rise and the subsequent fall 
in the doctrine of freedom of contract, which was recounted in Chapter 5, has much to 
do with the rise and the subsequent disintegration in the nineteenth century concept of 
explanation in the natural and social sciences. 
But this is the critique of modernism more generally, a critique which should be familiar 
from Chapter 4. Nineteenth century social theory, in the tradition of Descartes, Hobbes 
and Locke, sought to find general laws of society modelled on the natural sciences, just 
as Spencer and Marx and numerous others sought to find general laws of history and 
social progress. Thus, classical contract law in its fully mature state, as developed in 
Langdell's casebook of contract law towards the end of the nineteenth century, was an 
abstraction from which all the particularities of person and subject had been removed.` 
Indeed, for theorists like Landell, law was a science and his casebook was an attempt to 
select and classify all the important contract cases ever decided, and to determine what 
he thought to be the small number of logically consistent, and self- contained principles 
and doctrines that lay beneath those cases. For classical contract law, there was only 
one, true, universal and unchanging rule of law, what Gilmore' calls a `mystical 
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absolute' or a `logicians dream of heaven'. As has already made clear in chapter 5, this 
view of contract law had a close intellectual and historical relationship with the free 
market of classical and neo- classical economic theory. 
This `positive' tendency of nineteenth century law, and of social science, had its origins 
in the Enlightenment project, a renaissance in the nineteen twenties and thirties and 
persists in economics to this day. But elsewhere, as Horwitz, Rorty, Toulmin and others 
tell us, belief in the possibility of general laws capable of making explanatory or 
predictive statements in the social sciences has plummeted. 
"The result has been a dramatic turn towards highly specific `thick description' 
in which narrative and stories purport to substitute for traditional general 
theories.i6 
Thus, we should be wary of the seductions of grand theories, and sacred rules, which 
have little connection to reality. 
In Chapter 4, the separation between fact and value as the basis for a value -free social 
science was seriously challenged along with the more privileged epistemological status 
of scientific reasoning. This challenge has been associated with a growing 
understanding of the contingency of the categories, and frames of reference, employed 
in the social sciences, along with a growing awareness that knowledge, itself, is socially 
constructed. There has been a growing understanding of the world as complex, multi - 
factored and interdependent. This, in turn, has led to a loss of faith in the single- factor 
chains of causation that were embedded in most nineteenth century explanatory 
theories.' 
This critique also points to the collapse of the philosophical dualisms that have 
characterised all forms of theoretical debate since the Enlightenment. The 
representative schemes of our language cannot sustain these efforts to formulate 
categories which are mutually exclusive and final. This insight led, for example, to 
Dewey's refusal to accept a deep chasm between `principled' and `results- oriented' 
ethics and jurisprudence, and to neo- pragmatism's rejection of the choice between 
deontological and utilitarian moral theory .8 Indeed, these developments have tended to 
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undermine the hope of finding rational ethical foundations for our social, political and 
economic arrangements, and, with it, the special right of philosophers to preach about 
those arrangements. For Dewey, James and Peirce, truth 
"was not to be found in the abstract logic of ideas, but in their practical 
consequences. There were no absolute or a priori truths, only workable and 
unworkable hypotheses.s9 
The very idea that human reason could discover immutable metaphysical principles that 
could explain the true nature of reality is an illusion. This, of course, undermines faith 
in all forms of dogmatism, and dogmatic explanatory schemes, including absolute 
property rights, absolute human rights, absolute markets and absolute rules more 
generally. 
Among American legal theorists of the Progressive and Realist schools, the challenge to 
nineteenth century legal orthodoxy, with its scientific pretensions rooted in natural 
rights, individualism and absolute property rights, involved a fundamental re- 
examination of the idea of a rule of law independent of politics and the idea of: 
"[a] self -regulating, competitive market economy presided over by a neutral, 
impartial, and decentralized `night- watchman' state ..." Classical legal thought 
and contract law was "neither neutral, nor necessary, but was instead a 
historically contingent and socially created system of thought. "10 
This attack questioned the dichotomy between the state and the market, between ends 
and means, between procedure and substance and between public and private law. The 
latter dichotomy was a central feature of classical contract thought, with its will theory 
of contract. Thus, it came to be recognised that the institution of contract was, itself, 
subordinate to social and political goals. The market, property rights, and the law more 
generally were social creations, the products of social and political struggle. 
Importantly, there was no privileged category of economic relations that could be 
regarded as voluntary." Rather, property was a delegation of coercive state power to 
individuals, while the market was an organised form of coercion of the weak by the 
strong. Indeed, the Lockean idea of natural property rights helped to disguise the 
coercive nature of these institutions. Since there was no such thing as a completely 
voluntary market, there could be no completely neutral market because rules were 
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needed to regulate that coercion. Of particular relevance to this thesis has been the rules 
that regulate the coercive enforcement of contracts by the state. 
These developments in American legal thought, influenced by American pragmatism, 
and the claim that truth was not to be found in the abstract logic of ideas, but in their 
practical consequences, also called into question the claim that legal reasoning could 
imitate geometrical forms of argument. Such deductive reasoning suppressed the moral 
or political choices that were inevitable between possible inferences in long chains of 
reasoning. Likewise, deductive reasoning, by assuming contradictory postulates, could 
produce radically different ethical systems. Indeed, such forms of reasoning have, 
themselves, come under sustained attack. Mathematicians and geometers had come to 
understand that geometries were formal logical systems based on arbitrary assumptions 
whose only essential attributes were self- consistency with no necessary connection to 
reality. Similarly, it was possible to invent different logics like the different non - 
Euclidean geometries. Consequently, there are no universal laws of logic attributable to 
the universe or to human reason. They are merely human conventions, valued only for 
their usefulness. Similarly, mathematics was simply a humanly devised tool with no 
connection to any metaphysical or theological absolutes. Thus, all Iogical and 
mathematical reasoning is purely tautological, the elaboration of implications contained 
in the definition used, according to problematic, socially- created, formal systems of 
thought. This critique of logic and mathematics undercuts all pretensions to a priori 
and absolute knowledge. There was no such thing as abstract reason and impartial legal 
theory. Moral beliefs and social preferences were prior to reason, and we needed to be 
conscious of the philosophical assumptions underlying our actions. This account has 
not gone further into the critique of the impoverished idea of human intelligence that 
underlies the Enlightenment project and economic rationalism. That critique can, 
however, be summed up in the following words of D H Lawerence; in his poem 
Thought: 
"Thought, I Iove thought. 
But not the jiggling and twisting of already existent ideas. 
I despise that self- important game. 
Thought is the welling up of unknown life into consciousness, 
Thought is the testing of statements on the touchstone of the conscience, 
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Thought is gazing on the face of life, and reading what can be read, 
Thought is pondering over experience, and coming to a conclusion. 
Thought is not a trick, or an exercise, or a set of dodges, 
Thought is a man in his wholeness wholly attending.s12 
Within the American legal profession, objective contract theory, and legal theory more 
generally, has been recognised as `Euclidean', proceeding deductively from what were 
claimed to be `self- evident truths' about the judicial process. But many of the a priori 
assumptions of traditional legal theory are themselves subject to significant attack. 
Indeed, for Frank, the legal profession manipulated abstract concepts to construct a 
façade of certainty and absolute rationality over a confused legal process.13 Such 
positivist legal theory, and positivist social science, suppresses political and moral 
discourse by appropriating the prestige associated with the natural sciences and 
conferring a privileged position on the status quo and on the professional expert - be it a 
judge or social scientist - with a capacity for judgement based on claimed technical 
expertise, neutrality and impartiality. It is also reflected in the increasing 
professionalisation and credentialism of political, social and academic discourse and the 
need for such professionals to justify their prestige and influence. Such scholasticisms' 
were merely escapes and delusions. In practice, judges shared and implemented either 
their personal standards, the moral standards of the legal profession, or the moral 
standards of those members of society they admired, with the reasons given for 
judgements being rationalisations that manipulated the language of precedents to 
produce the desired result. 
The rejection of the possibility of demonstrating the truth of ethical propositions has left 
such moral ideas without a convincing theoretical basis. But this does not, in itself, 
undermine the fundamental significance of such ideas for the stability of society. 
Paradoxically, the declining faith in the expertise, neutrality and impartiality of experts 
has led, in the United States in particular, to a reinvigorated emphasis on proceduralism 
within the law and within political theorising. But it is a proceduralism that, imitating 
the alleged neutrality of the market, is biased in favour of the existing distribution of 
wealth, power and privilege, and refuses to look at substantial outcomes of legal and 
market processes. Thus, in the case of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability 
within Australia, it has been seen that, while there has been a steady increase in concern 
236 
about procedural unconscionablity, there has been a considerable reluctance to formally 
extend the doctrine to cover substantive issues. More broadly with such theories as 
Rawls's Theory of Justice there has been a major theoretical effort to revive social 
contract theory and procedural accounts of justice. These reflect a desire to 
accommodate the positivist claim that values were incapable of objective determination, 
a claim that assumed a privileged epistomological status for scientific knowledge. 
Thus, the claim is made by Hart and Sacks: 
"These institutionalized procedures and constitutive arrangements establishing 
them are obviously more fundamental than the substantive arrangements in the 
structure of society... The principle of institutional settlement expresses the 
judgement that decisions which are duly arrived at as result of duly established 
procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole of 
society unless and until they are duly changed.i14 
We see a similar attempt in the use of economic concepts to model politics. Consensus 
theorists attempted to achieve the same accommodation with the positivists by trying to 
locate social and political norms in widely shared customs and conventions. But the 
extent to which there are such widely shared norms, or even underlying shared norms, 
remains problematic. It may simply be that values conflicting with the interests of the 
economic and political elites are simply suppressed. Others have sought to return to a 
natural law tradition or to some form of Aristotelianism. But the attempt to find a 
rational, ethical foundation for our social, political and legal systems remains hotly 
contested. And as our discussion in Chapter 4 indicated, it is ever likely to remain so. 
But this general lack of agreement has the effect of undermining the credibility of our 
moral and philosophical theorists and of this form of theorising. 
Hutchison sees dangers in four intellectual `cults' which infect such attempts at 
theorising: a cult of scepticism holding that all beliefs, with the possible exception of 
scientific discoveries, were simply matters of opinion; a cult of presentism maintaining 
that only the present was meaningful; a scientism that assumed that empirical 
knowledge was the answer to all human problems; and finally, an anti -intellectualism 
that downgraded the intellect and raised the human will to a position of primacy.'5 
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Consistent with the account given by Rorty and Toulmin, the first three `cults' flow 
directly from the Enlightenment project. Indeed, the radical scepticism of the 
Enlightenment has undermined its own project, there is nothing of which we can be 
absolutely certain, and there is no way of avoiding belief as the ground of our moral 
values or, indeed, anything else. As for the fourth `cult', this seems to be a well - 
justified reaction to the arrogance and dogmatism of past intellectual optimism and 
pretension, the lack of intellectual humility that seems to have infested the entire 
Western intellectual tradition since Plato and Aristotle. 
The total social environment may be too complex, and the human mind too limited, for 
us to fully understand the scope and operation of our social activities, a view with 
echoes in Hayek16, Habamas" and Arthur's. Abstract ethical theories are simply a 
historical, cultural phenomenon, the progressive invention of humans striving to deal 
with the uncertainties of day -to -day life, the mystery of human existence, and to give 
themselves some purpose. They can only do so from within a paradigm, or as 
Maclntyre would prefer, from within a tradition.19 As such they are only a limited part 
of a much broader human conversation. 
DEVELOPMENT 
The above marks a profound loss of confidence in scientific rationalism and in the 
associated moral speculation that dates from the Enlightenment. It points squarely to 
the normative basis of such speculation. Consequently, it also challenges the 
application of that speculation, particularly economic speculation to public policy 
problems. Thus, economic speculation in its Newtonian guise, is simply one way, 
among many possible ways, of speaking about the social world. It heralds a search for 
alternative ways of talking about, and trying to make sense of, the world and its 
bewildering confusions, both as a source of existential comfort and as a guide to actions. 
But, in the face of this confusion, and our inability to firmly ground our speculations, 
public policy formulation has to be seen as an experiment in which the criteria for 
success, the evaluative vocabulary, are cultural artefacts, inventions of the human heart 
and mind. 
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The theologian Reinhold Nielbuhr shared this loss of confidence. For him there was 
simply not enough intelligence to conduct the intricate affairs of a complex civilisation, 
though he initially believed that intelligent analysis and experiment could help 
overcome social evils. He also believed in the incommensurability of individual and 
group morality. Like James, Nielbuhr was convinced of the indeterminateness of the 
universe and the relativity of all human knowledge: 
"God, though revealed, remains veiled; his thoughts are not our thoughts nor his 
ways our ways. The worship of such a God leads to contrition; not merely to a 
contrite recognition of the conscious sins of pride and arrogance which the 
human spirit commits, but to a sense of guilt for the inevitable and inescapable 
pride involved in every human enterprise.'''' 
For Neilbuhr, as for this author, God exists, and consequently, absolute truth also exists. 
This provides an absolute basis for human hope and morality. But God's transcendence 
places that Truth beyond our reach. Consequently, God's absolute Truth can never fully 
become our truth, nor can we know how much we possess. Indeed, the human search 
for knowledge is necessarily tainted by self -interest. Consequently, the truth we know 
is necessarily personal and limited. Nevertheless, we continually proclaim our personal 
truths as universal, in the vain belief or hope, that we are masters of the universe. The 
Enlightenment merely succeeded in displacing the Christian vision of God as creator, 
redeemer and sanctifier, from the centre of the universe. It replaced this vision firstly 
with a more limited and non -Christian, anthropomorphic, masculine vision of God as a 
Rule- maker, and then, in turn, with Man within Nature. But surely in this age, the idea 
of humans, let alone men, being at the centre of the universe is bizarre. The idea of 
nature as the ultimate ground of all being is also not much of a god, around which to 
build a life or a moral discourse. 
Indeed, the Enlightenment's assumption that the universe was rational and benevolent is 
fundamentally wrong. The price of freedom, of change, and of progress is finitude, 
failure, uncertainty, decay and sin. At best, the universe provides a partially stable 
background in which we make our play and narrate our stories, including the stories of 
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our own lives. All too often, the social world which we create, the narratives we use are 
dominated by power, selfishness and passion. In this climate, the scientific tradition, 
and economic thinking, all too often become the tools of the dominant social group. 
"No society and no social group can ever escape the vicious circle of the sin 
which aggravates human insecurity in seeking to overcome it. All societies and 
individuals must therefore remain under the judgement and the doom of God. "71 
Consequently, Nielbuhr rejected faith in progress, pointing out that societies were 
dominated by necessarily selfish groups and that scientific knowledge, popular 
education, or universal Christian love could not end group conflict!' Belief in human 
progress and scientific achievement were the height of sinful pride and led unavoidably 
to disastrous failure. The greatest intelligence and the noblest ideals inevitably led 
humans to set themselves about God's teachings. Only a profound Christian humility 
before a transcendent God that acknowledged our finiteness, and limited vision could 
help alleviate much social oppression. Of course, this critique of human dogmatism 
extends to dogmatic absolutist claims within Christianity itself. Thus for Neilbuhr, 
"there is no historical reality, whether it be the church or government, whether it 
be the reason of wise men or specialists, which is not involved in the flux and 
relativity of human existence; which is not subject to error and sin, and which is 
not tempted to exaggerate its errors and sins when they are made immune to 
criticism. 
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If the `Children of Light' were ever to establish a humane and stable society, they had 
to abandon excessive faith in the goodness and rationality of humanity and to recognise 
human sinfulness, and self- interestedness. This vision was only attainable on the basis 
of revelation. The present author would not limit that revelation to the canonical texts 
of the Bible but would extend it to that revelation of the Divine Mystery that results 
from the close friendship with God to which all peoples are invited. This view does not 
lead to any reinstatement of natural law, certainly not to any assertion of absolute 
human rights, let alone absolute property, or indeed to the reinstatement of some form 
of Aristotelian virtue, however much the moral vocabulary derived from those traditions 
may continue to figure in social and political discourse. Rather, it leads to a humble 
journeying, an uncertain search for the right and the good. It is always uncertain, it is 
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always a groping. Dogmatism has therefore to be foresworn as we can only see a partial 
and distorted vision of the Kingdom. The kingdom that can be grasped is not the 
Kingdom. Reality always falls short of the Kingdom, though it is an image of the 
kingdom that inspires a striving for newness of life. 
In summary, Nielbuhr added to pragmatic and relativistic social theory a profound 
appreciation of human evil, an appreciation founded in his Christian tradition, but 
absent from Enlightenment optimism. But this optimism was an illusion. Marxism was 
only distinguished from liberalism by sharper and more specific schemes for identifying 
and endowering an elite with power. This critique of Marxism's particular claim to 
certain knowledge of the end towards which history must move, and its associated 
willingness to sacrifice every value to that end, applies with equal force to alternative 
pretensions about the end of history and to any absolutist faith in markets, and freedom 
of contract. Indeed, for Boorstin: 
"To say that a society can or ought to be `unified' by some total philosophical 
system- whether a Summma Theologica, a Calvin's Institute or Marx's capital - 
is to commit oneself to an aristocratic concept of knowledge: let the elite know 
the theories and values of the society: they will know and preserve for all the 
rest. "" 
Such elitism is the very reverse of the intellectual humility that Nielbuhr called for. Of 
course, the acceptance of a relativist position can all too easily lead to an acceptance of 
the political and economic arrangements of the current dominant state, the United 
States, as the norm The particular danger for us is that the American anti -statist 
tradition that dates from Locke, and was encouraged by secularised American 
Calvanism and by Spencer's social Darwinism, will become the moral standard by 
which we should judge our institutional and organisational arrangements. 
Consistent with Nielbuhr, Stackhouse26 advances a Biblical covemantal view of justice, 
supplemented the Catholic model of `subsidiarity' and by `fairness as equity'. As we 
saw in Chapter 4, the idea of covernant comes from the social and religious history of 
the ancient mid -east, where divine authority was invoked as a witness to morally 
binding agreements. The Old Testament relates how this "basic, `mutual', oath -bound 
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creation of responsible relationships "" was recognised to be a close analogy of the way 
in which God relates to humanity and a model of how we should relate to each other 
under God. And it involves a revelation of the nature of a just, merciful God who 
directly engages in the formation and sustaining of righteous living in community, This 
justice of a covenanting God is pre -given in that it is constituted by a standard and 
ultimate end that humans do not make; but is unfinished in that the standards of right 
and wrong, good and evil are neither fully recognised, nor completely fulfilled in this 
life. Thus, the deontologicaI right and the teleological good must both be fulfilled and 
joined for full justice. Yet, Stackhouse recognised, as does moral philosophy more 
generally, that a tension exists between these two views of justice which has not been 
reconciled. 
As was shown in Chapter 4, the development of the ideas of social contract was 
influenced by these Old Testament covenant ideas. However, a fuller understanding of 
the implication of those ideas was lost in Locke's appeal to the Natural Law rights and 
in Deism's limited vision of God as a rule giver. This covenant view directly leads to 
the rights of humans to develop religious, educational, social, and political organisations 
to exemplify their best vision of the ultimate good and how it is related to what is right. 
But it recognises that than a individualistic understanding of human rights provides only 
a partial understanding, for it fails to recognise that humans are inevitably relational 
beings, called to live in groups and to assume associated responsibilities. Freedom and 
rights are best used to fulfil responsibilities in interpersonal and civil life. 
Consequently, Stackhouse sees contract theories among those who see no need for a 
higher moral law or greater purpose, and for whom morality consists of what ever is 
agreed, as a degeneration of the covemantal idea and the greatest temptation in the 
West. 2 Rather, 
"the full actualization of the right and the good in our inner lives, in our human 
relationships, and in the matrices of social life cannot be attained on humanistic 
grounds alone but ... a divine initiative must be taken." 29 
The social contract tradition involved a progressive impoverishment of the covenant 
idea with the progressive secularisation and impoverishment of the natural law ideas 
that underpinned Lockes' account and resulted, inter alia, in the reification of the 
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concept of `freedom of contract'. But it is a degeneration implicit in Lockes' appeal to a 
Natural Law assessable to human reason. It was only late in the day that we have come 
to realise that the appeal to nature involved in that process of secularisation effectively 
removed the moral content of the tradition. In contrast, Stackhouse's covernental 
account of justice would lead directly to a relational view of the law of contract such as 
advanced by McNeil, a view far more concerned with the substantive outcomes of 
contractual relationships, which recognised a substantial duty of care on the part of the 
parties towards each other. 
ECONOMICS AS A SECULAR RELIGION 
The Enlightenment's search for neutral principles as a secular alternative to traditional 
religious authority and beliefs to justify our moral decisions, is itself a religious search, 
serving the same dogmatic and legitimating functions of what Bergson calls static 
religion.30 Economics claims to provide that secular justification for many 
contemporary policy choices. Indeed, economics threatens to become the dominant 
rationalist and fundamentalist religion of contemporary capitalist society and of the 
emerging global civilisation. This threat is aided by its attempt to appropriate the 
prestige associated with the natural sciences. Importantly, it is easy to slip between the 
use of individualism as an analytical tool to a promotion of individualism as a normative 
ideal. Thus, this religion is of particular appeal to business and political elites who gain 
from economic and social developments, because it tends to legitimise greed, love of 
money and power. It is leading to the commercialisation of all human activity, while 
aiding the atomisation and privatisation of competing values and groups. It has elevated 
money beyond a convenience to the means of salvation and the source of meaning, 
values and security and thus turning it into an idol?' 
Economists, the prophets and priests of this new religion, preach about, and have a 
substantial impact on, public policy and our institutional arrangements. Economics thus 
provides an alternative faith tradition, complete with values, ideas of welfare and of 
progress, usually defined in terms of quantitative economic indicators, which dominate 
public discourse and which seek to reshape our institutions and organisations?' With 
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their influence over government, economists are the new theocracy, the contemporary 
manifestation of Plato's guardians. This apparent similarity between economics and 
religion has often been the subject of comment. For example, the American theologian 
Harvey Cox" has recently reported that most of the concepts he came across when 
reading the business pages were quite familiar. The language of those pages bear a 
striking resemblance to Genesis, the Epistle to the Romans, and Saint Augustine's City 
of God. Indeed, Cox claims to have made out an entire theology, a grand narrative 
about the inner meaning of human history, why things had gone wrong, and how to put 
them right. In the business pages, in only thin disguise, are the theologian's myths of 
origin, legends of fall and doctrines of sin and redemption: chronicles about the creation 
of wealth, the seductive temptations of statism, captivity to faceless economic cycles, 
and, ultimately, salvation through the advent of free markets, with a small dose of 
ascetic belt tightening along the way. There were even sacraments to convey salvific 
power to the lost, a calender of entrepreneurial saints, and what theologians call 
eschatology -a teaching about the end of history. In particular, the economic 
theologian's rhetoric resembles contemporary process theology. In this school, 
although God will possess the classic attributes of omnipotence (all power), 
omniscience (all knowledge)and omnipresence (present everywhere), He does not yet 
possess them in full. Such a theology offers considerable comfort to the economic 
theologian, explaining the dislocation, pain and disorientation that are the results of 
transitions from economic heterodoxy to free markets. Thus, the market is becoming 
more like Yahweh of the Old Testament - not just one superior deity contending with 
others, but the Supreme Deity, the only true God, whose reign must now be universally 
accepted and who allows no rivals. There is no conceivable limit to The Market's 
inexorable ability to convert creation into commodities. In the church of The Market, 
everything, no matter how sacred, eventually becomes a commodity. This radical 
desacralisation dramatically alters the human relationship to land, water, air, and space. 
Indeed, human beings, themselves start to become commodities as well. This 
comprehensive wisdom of The Market is something that, in the past, only the gods have 
known. In ancient times, seers entered a trance and informed anxious seekers of the 
mood the gods and whether the time was auspicious for particular enterprises. Today 
the financial media are the diviners and seers of The Market's moods, the high priests of 
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its mysteries. Cox concludes that that "The Market" has become the most formable 
rival to traditional religions, not least because it is rarely recognised as a religion. For 
Cox, the contradictions between the world views of traditional religion and the world 
view of the Market religion are so basic that no compromise seems possible. 
This critique has much in common with the broader critique of `autonomous 
technology' developed by Elite and by Winner35. For Ellul la technique is sacred in 
our society. No social, human or spiritual fact in the modern world is so important. It 
transforms everything it touches, including the socio- politico- religious software that 
runs the system, into a machine. It is the pattern of organisation, the rationalisation of 
society, beyond the willingness of anyone to accept responsibility. Technical means 
have become ends in themselves. This attack is particularly directed against the 
technocrats to whom we have handed over our ethical responsibilities. In the process of 
implementing their utopian vision a narrow technological and theocratic elite is in the 
process of redefining the evaluative methodology for social action, our social goals, our 
social institutions and who we think we are. 
Efficient ordering is the only principle of the ever -expanding and irreversible rule of 
technique. It is the unconscious response to every challenge and is being extended to all 
areas of life. Means are remade into ends as we are increasingly committed to 
continually improved means to ends that are only poorly examined. Of particular 
concern to Winner are the changes that have taken place in ordinary language, 
traditional social institutions, earlier kinds of artefacts, human identity, personality, and 
conduct. Efficiency, speed, precise measurement, rationality, productivity and technical 
improvement have all become ends in themselves and are applied obsessively to areas 
of life from which they had previously been excluded. In particular, efficiency has 
become a more general value, the universal principle for all intelligent conduct. It is not 
that such instrumental values are themselves perverse, but the fact that they have 
escaped from their proper sphere: 
Technique refuses to tolerate competing moral judgements, excluding them from its 
field in favour of its own technical morality. Consequently, human beings have become 
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objects, no longer choosing agents, but devices for recording the results obtained by 
various techniques. Decisions are no longer to be made on the basis of complex and 
human motives, but only in favour of the technique that gives maximum efficiency. In 
the process the qualitative to become quantitative, and every stage of human activity is 
forced to submit to mathematical calculations. Whatever cannot be expressed 
numerically is to be eliminated. And all the technical devices of education, propaganda, 
amusement, sport, and religion are mobilised to convince us to be content with our 
condition of mechanical, mindless `mass man', and to exterminate the deviant and the 
idiosyncratic. 
In particular, technique forms the very substance of economic thought. Technical 
economic analysis has been substituted for political economy and its concern with the 
moral structure of economic activity. In seeking to grasp, but also to modify it is no 
mere instrument but possesses its own force. This technical orientation is particularly 
evident in the application of mathematics and statistical techniques to economics In the 
economic sphere, as in others, the technicians form a closed fraternity with their own 
esoteric vocabulary from which the layman is excluded. 
Thus, technique involves the progressive dehumanisation of the economic sphere in 
which the abstract concept of homo economicus becomes real. Not only has the entire 
human being absorbed into the economic network validating the producing- consuming 
parts of the human, the other facets have been progressively devalued. Consequently, 
all values have been reduced to money values. The whole of human life has become a 
function of economic technique. This is particularly so in respect of work. 
Politics in turn becomes an arena for the contention among rival techniques. The 
consequence is the progressive suppression of ideological and moral barriers to 
technical progress. In this environment, the conflict of propaganda takes the place of 
the debate of ideas. Technique only permits public discussion of those ideas that are in 
substantial agreement with the values created by a technical civilisation. This technical 
economy is anti -democratic, a form of slavery. Despite all the talk about freedom and 
246 
popular sovereignty, people are unable to exert any genuine influence on the direction of 
the economy, and their votes count for very little. 
For technique, there is there no mystery, no taboo, no rules outside itself. Because 
people cannot live without a sense of the secret, or the sacred, they have created for 
themselves a new religion of a rational and technical order. Indeed, since the religious 
object is that which is uncritically worshiped, technology has become the new god. 
Technique has become the essential mystery. For the technician in particular, technique 
is the locus of the sacred, an abstract idol, the reason for living. Without, technique they 
would find themselves poor, alone, naked, and stripped of all pretensions. They would 
no longer be the heroes, geniuses or even 'archangels'. Thus, technique is the god 
which brings salvation. 
These technological influences have become so much part of everyday life that they 
have become virtually invisible. For both Ellul and Winner, there can be no human 
autonomy in the face of technical autonomy; people have lost their roles as active, 
directing agents: 
"Each individual lives with procedures, rules, processes, institutions, and 
material devices that are not of his making but powerfully shape what he does. 
It is scarcely even imaginable what it would mean for each of us to make 
decisions about the vast array of sociotechnical circumstances that enter our 
experience."" 
Consequently, technical rationality and modernisation pose a particular and significant 
challenge to liberalism. They are incompatible with the central notion that justifies the 
practice of liberal politics: the idea of responsible, responsive, representative 
government. In the technocratic understanding, the real activity of governing can have 
no place for mass participation. All of the crucial decisions, plans, and actions are 
simply beyond their comprehension. Indeed, this technological society is not 
governable. Rather, the ideal is of a self- directing and self- maintaining system, 
requiring no human direction. This is true even of the means of analysis itself, the 
meaning of `rationality' having been distorted and corrupted by these technocratic 
tendencies. For Ellul, 
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"Every intervention of technique is, in effect, a reduction of facts, forces, 
phenomena, means, and instruments to the schema of logic." 
Similarly for Max Weber: 
"The fate of our time is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization 
and, above all by the `disenchantment of the world. '"37 
The price that is for this rationalisation is the loss of freedom. It is ironic that the 
libertarians' search for increased human autonomy in practice ends in the loss of the 
value that they claim to hold dearest. 
THE NEED FOR HUMILITY 
The critique developed in this thesis of rationality and of deductive reasoning does not 
question the need to use concepts to bring some order to experience. There is nowhere 
else to go. Rather, it questions the use of concepts that are so general, at such a level of 
abstraction, that they loose touch with empirical reality. This is particularly so where 
they are conceived of as absolutes. In such circumstances, their application as a guide 
to action is inherently problematic and ideological. The perspective to be drawn from 
pragmatism, and from Nielbuhr and from Stackhouse in particular, should make us wary 
of such God -like pretensions and to become more aware of the need for humility about 
our limited abilities, our intellectual techniques, our intellectual speculations and our 
actual policy decisions.38 Absolute Truth is not available to us. All truth, as we know 
it, is socially constructed and subject to revision, sometimes radically. 
The substantial judgements involved in public policy development are moral rather than 
technical. It is the quality of our moral judgements, and the sensitivity of our moral 
vocabulary, rather than the quality of our economic logic, that is the crucial element in 
public decision- making. Judgement needs to be informed by a moral sensitivity to the 
needs of others, wide learning, deep reflection, wide consultation and by wide 
experience of the practical world. Thus, we need to acknowledge that it is not so much 
the lack of technical knowledge that inhibits government policy as the particular set of 
dominant moral values which shape what is possible to think and to do. 
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We need to be particularly wary when it comes to postulating this or that as an 
overarching moral principle with priority over all other values. Despite pretensions to 
the contrary, economics does not and cannot provide the moral equivalent of a unified 
field theory, an equivalent of the physicists holy grail, which can be invoked to justify 
collective action directed by government. For example, there is no ideal form of social 
or economic organisation against which to measure actual organisations - the forms of 
organisation used in the private sector do not provide an ideal form or vocabulary that 
must be emulated. 
Of particular note is the prevalent tendency to fasten onto a particular interpretation of 
human rights and of liberty, to make them into absolutes, and then to use those 
interpretations to exclude collective action based on other values. Thus we have tended 
to elevated individualism, freedom of contract, and economic efficiency above values 
that point to mutual interdependency, and to responsibilities for our neighbours. Thus, 
such humility should make us more conscious of the needs and claims of others in 
contrast to our own needs and claims. It should make us more conscious that we 
frequently lack the knowledge for sound decisions, and thus of the need to consult 
widely, to proceed carefully, to be willing to experiment, and to reverse direction. 
Humility should also make us aware of the pretensions of rational and of the need to 
accord emotions and values a legitimate role in decision making. 
We should be more careful about such abstractions as `the economy', `the market' and 
particularly `the labour market'. In the practical policy debate, the fact that these are 
abstractions has long been forgotten - the dancers have become the servants of the steps. 
We should also be more careful about the division of people and their social groups into 
rigid categories. Rather, we should admit that is it difficult to unscramble all the 
influences that bear upon real people in all their relationships. In particular, we should 
finally abandon that crude caricature of human -kind so rightly condemned by Veblen: 
"[T]he hedonistic conception of man" as "a lightning calculator of pleasure and 
pain, who oscillates like a homogenous globule of desire of happiness under the 
impulse of stimuli that shifts him about the area, but leaves him intact ... Self 
imposed in elementary space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis, 
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until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the 
line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self - 
contained globule of desire as before. "39 
This critique should also serve as a reminder to avoid seeing the complex issues we 
confront in the world through simple dichotomies. Unfortunately, most policy debate 
occurs at a simplistic, markets are good /governments are bad, level. Rather, as Popper 
recommends, in the search for knowledge, every source, every suggestion is welcome, 
while all are open to critical examination. Qualitatively and quantitatively, by far the 
most important source of our knowledge - apart from inborn knowledge - is tradition.. 4 
In particular, the current distinction made in public debate between the public and the 
private sectors is overdrawn. We quickly forget that what we are really talking about 
are real, interdependent groups of people engaged in complex interrelationships, 
involving different and complex organisational structures and in a bewildering variety 
of activities and exchanges. Governance is a necessary part of all of those activities. It 
is only the types of governance that are in question. This is a question that cannot be 
answered on the basis of a priori reasoning. Collective action is a necessary part of any 
complex society and the Government is a legitimate organ of that collective action. 
Limitations on that government action are not to be established on the basis of abstract 
a priori reasoning but on the basis of experimentation within the framework of a 
political tradition. 
COMPLEXITY 
As has been shown, current Australian public policy debate is heavily constrained by a 
belief on the part of many participants that there is some acceptable theoretical basis for 
determining the role of the government, or that such a basis is attainable. The very 
language of the discussion contains this belief. An artificial dichotomy has been 
envisaged between the market and the state which fails to recognise the 
interdependencies within our economic system. It is a dichotomy based on an idealised 
conception of markets that is grounded neither in fact nor economic theory. 
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The claims of neo- classical economics to intellectual rigour are also subject to 
innumerable challenges dispute at a more detailed level. In response to these detailed 
attacks, many economists have insisted that critics provide an alternative meta -theory. 
In doing so they have not realised the key role that metaphors play in theory formation. 
Consequently, they have not understood the extent to which their economic thinking has 
been bounded by the Newtonian metaphor, and by their search for `natural laws' of the 
economy analogous to those of mechanics. They have assumed that economic 
phenomena can be treated as if they were natural phenomena, caused by natural forces, 
and not social phenomena, the result of social invention and institutions. Running 
through the history of this economic thought is a persisting effort to evade responsibility 
for the outcomes of the economic system, a responsibility that would have to be faced 
were the idea of Natural Law to be abandoned. In the process, economic theory has 
been emptied of its historical and social elements. Nor has economics faced up to the 
normative judgements involved in the choice of metaphors and the extent to which they 
can serve to legitimate the existing social order and the privilege of the commercial and 
policy elites. 
Since the Enlightenment, the physical sciences, and the reductionist method, have 
established priority over other ways of knowing because of their ability to produce 
reproducible results, accurate predictions and plausible explanations. However, this 
form of mastery is unlikely to be achieved of systems as complex as the social and 
economic systems. In any event, given human freedom of action, there is no prior 
reason to believe that society will exhibit the types of natural regularities seen in the 
physical sciences. 
Part of a search for a better understanding must be the recognition that we are part of an 
indivisible totality that we, in all our complexity and diversity, have a share in creating, 
in partnership with our ancestors. Important support is given to a new holistic approach 
to economic speculation by the new science of complexity. Complexity is not simply a 
new reductionist model, but a new way of looking at the world which attempts to deal 
with the interconnectedness, interdependence, and nonlinearity of systems." Such a 
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complex system cannot be understood through the reductionists method, as the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts. Real complex systems cannot be successfully 
modelled mathematically because of the extraordinary difficulty of the mathematics 
involved, and the radical differences that small differences in initial states can make. 
The way ahead is not through the reductionist approach and a more refined Newtonian 
model. There is a fundamental mismatch between our predominant ways of thinking 
about reality derived from the Enlightenment scientific tradition and the nature of reality 
in a complex system {' 
Brian Arthur has argued the alternative to the Newtonian model is Taoist. It involves 
the recognition that there is no inherent order underlying economic phenomena. 
Consequently, our economic institutions are matters for social choice. And we have to 
learn to live with the relativism and circularity that this involves. As Arthur explains: 
"The world is a matter of patterns that change, that partly repeat, but never quite 
repeat, that are always new and different. "43 
There is no perfect system to be discovered, no magic word which would remove our 
responsibility for ourselves and each other. This involves abandoning the idealisation 
of The Market that is at the heart of economic rationalism. 
What this means for policy is that there is no one right approach to policy or to 
organisational arrangements. Just as biological organisms have evolved a bewildering 
variety of organisms, it is reasonable to expect a wide variety of approaches in social 
organisations. Such variety is not to be despised, rather it is to be valued as it may well 
reflect subtle or even coarse differences in environment or a degree of `indifference' 
between approaches. Secondly, complexity in environmental circumstances may be so 
great as to defy analysis. It is not possible in principle to list in order of importance the 
influences affecting a complex system. History cannot be ignored. It shapes the 
evolution of a complex system and consequently, a complex system cannot be 
understood in isolation from its history. Similarly, the state of `fitness' of an 
organisation cannot be determined by reference to crude reductionist criteria, but may, 
perhaps, be reflected in broad measures of confidence and happiness which reflect some 
common judgement. 
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The organisational capital of such a system is not primarily in its physical endowments 
but in the complex network of relationships formed within that system and the 
knowledge held within that network. Our evolved institutional arrangements, ethical 
rules, legal rules, conventional ways of behaving and popular culture, are all part of the 
organisational capital of our system, are critical to the effectiveness of the system and 
cannot be ignored and constantly need to be renewed. Such values assume critical 
importance. One of the features of complex systems is that they emerge at the edge of 
order and chaos. Consequently, they can be highly unstable. Fundamental changes in 
the values and rules that underpin our society of the type advocated by economic 
rationalists and to some extent implemented in Australia in recent times may therefore 
have unforseen and radical implications that we will all regret. Importantly, both 
cooperation and competition are of fundamental importance to the evolution of complex 
social systems and we are unable to assign priority between them 
An inability to deduce an appropriate theoretical framework does not, however, reduce 
us to impotence. But it does mean that there is no alternative to experimentation. Nor 
are the criteria to be applied in assessing those experiments written in the heavens. 
Thus a balanced approach would not be one that rules some classes of Government 
action as inadmissible on theoretical grounds, nor would it suggest that all possible 
Government actions would be beneficial. But the experiments need not be all ours. 
Rather the way ahead should be characterised by a more careful examination of the 
models and approaches used elsewhere, and a more careful examination of the policy 
problem. Effective policy design has often been seriously inhibited by too much 
ideology, with too little attention being paid to the practical problems of policy 
implementation and of securing behavioural change. 
In framing practical policy, the important question is `What works ?'. But the question 
cannot be asked in isolation from our moral, religious and political traditions. The 
answer is more to be found in experimentation backed by empirical investigation of the 
consequences, than in a priori reasoning, and high level abstraction. It involves 
substantive moral judgements and moral sensitivity, not formal logic. It follows that the 
policy development process should properly be seen as a pragmatic, eclectic and 
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political. We should acknowledge that public policy decisions legitimately involve 
balanced judgements against potentially conflicting criteria, not a departure from a 
postulated market ideal for `illegitimate' social and political reasons. It should 
encourage a much closer examination of the environment, a much closer examination of 
policy approaches others have employed along with an assessment of their impact, and a 
willingness to engage in careful experiment. We also need to recognise the limitations 
of past policy development processes and to commit ourselves to changing those 
processes. 
While structures are very important, their effectiveness, and the effectiveness of public 
and private networks ultimately depend on trust. Economic rationalism has neglected 
the essential contribution that moral conduct makes to the capitalist system and our 
governance structures. Many economists have no concept of history and of the 
delicately constructed social fabric which makes the difference between workable and 
unworkable market economies. Nor do they have an adequate understanding of the 
complex motivations which bind individuals into functioning organisations and 
effective economies. Sound business ethics, and moral conduct more generally are an 
essential part of the social infrastructure. But that moral conduct cannot be simply 
reduced to compliance with rules. The law established the minimum standards of 
behaviour required of citizens before social sanctions are applied, not the optimal 
standards. 
REFLECTION 
For Robert Bellah, et al, in The Good Society, social science and policy analysis have 
not taken the place of public philosophy but, instead, have regrettably strengthened the 
notion that our problems are technical, rather than moral and political. In this they echo 
the critique developed by Ellul and Winner. In particular they are concerned at the 
erosion in trust in the political system and public institutions that results from the 
current emphasis on Lockean individualism and the associated economic theorising with 
its emphasis on efficiency. It threatens to undermine our democracy. In their words: 
"If policy elites stand outside the world of citizens, designing social policies 
evaluated in terms of outcomes, efficiency, or costs and benefits, as they define 
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them, they short- circuit the democratic process, and this is so whether they 
believe that people are essentially `interest maximizers' or even that they are 
motivated in part by `values'. Politics under these circumstances becomes the 
art of image manipulation by expert media managers." 44 
The consequence is a gross abuse of power that eats at the heart of the Liberal tradition. 
No society can survive without stable moral traditions and social conventions backed up 
by effective means of coercion. But the prevailing scepticism about the possibility of 
establishing any moral principle as true or valid beyond reasonable doubt has the 
immensely troubling implication that we are unable to identify the difference between 
might and right:15 We have, nevertheless, a highly developed moral vocabulary, and a 
long political tradition, both of which provide a source of stability. This represents the 
social and moral capital of our civilisation. However, Brennan and Buchanan46 have 
argued there is now a widely sensed deterioration in the social, intellectual and 
philosophical capital of Western civil order. Hirsch had a similar sense of foreboding, 
believing that an excessive reliance on self- interest as the fundamental social organising 
principle would undermine the basis of the market system itself: 
"In brief, the principle of self interest is incomplete as a social organizing 
principle. It operates effectively only in tandem with some supporting social 
principle. This fundamental characteristic of economic liberalism, which was 
largely taken for granted by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill in their different 
ways, has been lost sight of by its modem protagonists ... The attempt has been 
made to erect an increasingly explicit social organisation without a supporting 
social morality . In this way, the foundations of the market system have been 
weakened, while its general behavioural norm of acting on the criterion of self - 
interest has won ever -widening acceptance..."47 
The fear is that in acting on the precepts of economic rationalism, modern governments 
have participated in changes in the institutional structures of their societies which may 
weaken the matrix of social rules on which their economic systems depend. For their 
part, Foulbre and Weisskopf argue that the care and nurture of human capital has always 
been difficult and expensive, and that the erosion of family and community solidarity 
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imposes enormous costs; costs that are reflected in inefficient and unsuccessful 
educational efforts, high crime rates and a social atmosphere of anxiety and resentment. 
as But such forebodings are as old as civilisation itself. They may reflect the prevailing 
uncertainty about the foundations of our moral values as well as the intuition that 
civilisation is always under threat from what used to be called human sinfulness. 
It is at this point wise to recall that is the control of our greed that represents one of the 
prime victories of culture over animality. If this is so then it is also greed that 
represents one of the prime threats to our civilisation - economic rationalism is an 
ideology that attempts to justify that greed. In particular, it promotes selfishness and 
materialism. But even for the non -religious, the acquisition of personal wealth and 
power is not a satisfactory basis for self- definition. Thus, economic rationalism 
represents a fundamental threat to our civilisation. Its application to public decisions 
cannot be reconciled with the ethical import of our Christian heritage, with its command 
to love God and to love one's neighbour as oneself. Taking something that is a good, 
such as economic analysis, or a market, or human rights, or liberty, or law, and turning 
it into something that is an absolute is the essence of a new idolatry. 
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